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This dissertation presents a comparative analysis of incumbency advantage across 
developed democracies.  In particular, it examines two variants of incumbency advantage: 1) 
the extra electoral benefits that political parties gain from fielding incumbent candidates 
(incumbency advantage for political parties) and 2) the electoral advantage that individual 
incumbents enjoy over non-incumbent candidates of the same party (incumbency advantage for 
individual candidates). 
For each type of incumbency advantage, this dissertation offers three distinctive 
contributions.  First, it provides comparable estimates of both types of incumbency 
advantage across different electoral systems.  The existing literature lacks appropriate 
estimates of either type of incumbency advantage that are comparable across different electoral 
systems.  This dissertation furnishes fully comparable estimates — the first of its kind — and 
makes it possible to conduct a systematic comparative analysis of incumbency advantage.   
Second, it develops a theory of electoral systems’ impact on the magnitude of 
incumbency advantage.  This theory is partly based on the theory of personal-vote incentives, 
since the personal vote is one of the critical sources of incumbency advantage.  However, 
the theory developed in this dissertation highlights an important departure from the 
personal-vote theory, because the personal-vote incentives do not always translate into actual 
electoral gains from personal-vote building activities.  This new theory of comparative 
incumbency advantage advances our knowledge of the consequences of electoral systems 
 
 x 
and illuminates the important distinction between the personal-vote incentives and the actual 
electoral gains. 
Third, it provides an elaborate multiple-country empirical analysis, based on the 
newly compiled dataset of district- and candidate-level election results in ten developed 
democracies (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom).  This empirical analysis constitutes by far the most extensive 
cross-national analysis of incumbency advantage based on the detailed aggregate election 
data. 
The dissertation also presents a few significant implications for the relationship 
between electoral systems and accountability.  In particular, the clear distinction made 
between incumbency advantage for political parties and incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates makes it possible to derive specific implications for the collective accountability of 










1.1. Comparative Incumbency Advantage 
Do political parties benefit extra electoral gains from fielding incumbent candidates?  
Do incumbent candidates have an electoral advantage over non-incumbent candidates?  
These questions on “incumbency advantage” have drawn wide scholarly attention especially 
for U.S. Congressional elections (e.g., Erikson 1971, Gelman and King 1990).  A normative 
underpinning of these questions is that incumbency advantage may erode the collective 
responsibility of political parties and the individual accountability of legislators.  For example, 
poorly performing government parties are punished in subsequent elections (e.g., economic 
voting), but this collective accountability mechanism may be dampened if parties benefit extra 
electoral gains from fielding incumbent candidates, because these extra gains may offset the 
decline of the party vote or insulate parties against such decline.  Similarly, if individual 
incumbents have the electoral advantage over non-incumbents, the advantage tends to make 
it difficult for voters to remove these incumbent candidates, other things being equal.  To 
the extent that individual electoral accountability of elected representatives rests on voters’ 
ability to remove incumbents in elections, incumbency advantage tends to weaken such 
ability and thereby diminish individual accountability of legislators. 
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Given the significance of these normative concerns, it is not surprising that 
incumbency advantage is one of the most studied features of American politics.  
Incumbency advantage should also be an equally important subject for other democracies 
since the normative concerns raised above are applicable to any democracy (Somit et al. 
1994).  However, there have been relatively few studies of incumbency advantage for 
countries beyond the United States.  Moreover, when incumbency advantage is studied for 
countries other than the U.S., it is usually for countries that also use single-member-district 
(SMD) systems such as the United Kingdom (Gains 1998, Katz and King 1999).  Studies of 
incumbency advantage for other electoral systems are rare.  Moreover, there has been NO 
systematic, multiple-country analysis that provides appropriate and comparable estimates of 
incumbency advantage, a theoretical account for the variation in the magnitude of 
incumbency advantage, and sound empirical analysis examining hypotheses derived from the 
theory.  A fully comparative analysis of incumbency advantage is long overdue despite the 
potential significance of its normative implications. 
This dissertation offers by far the most comprehensive, comparative analysis of 
incumbency advantage.  Specifically, it distinguishes two types of incumbency advantage, 
each of which corresponds to each of the opening questions of this chapter.  The first type 
of incumbency advantage is the electoral benefit for political parties of fielding incumbent 
candidates — which I call “incumbency advantage for political parties.”  The second type is the 
electoral advantage of individual incumbents over non-incumbent candidates — which I call 
“incumbency advantage for individual candidates.”  This distinction has drawn little attention in 
the existing U.S.- or SMD-centered literature since the electoral fates of parties and their 
candidates largely coincide in the SMD systems.  When we shift our attention to comparative 
perspectives, however, this distinction between the two types of incumbency advantage 
 3 
becomes crucial since the electoral fates of parties and their candidates often diverge under 
electoral systems that allow for intra-party electoral competition of candidates, popular types 
of electoral systems found in approximately one-fourth of democratic countries in the 
world.1
For each type of incumbency advantage, this dissertation provides three distinctive 
contributions.  First, it offers the comparable estimates of incumbency advantage across 
different electoral systems.  The existing literature lacks the appropriate and comparable 
estimates of either type of incumbency advantage.  This dissertation provides the first fully 
comparable estimates of both types of incumbency advantage.  Second, it develops a theory 
of the impact of electoral systems on the variation in the magnitude of incumbency 
advantage.  The theory is partly based on the existing theory of the cross-system variation in 
personal-vote incentives, since the personal vote is one of the crucial sources of incumbency 
advantage.  However, the theory developed in this dissertation highlights an important 
difference from the personal-vote theory for both types of incumbency advantage, because 
the incentives do not always translate into actual electoral gains.  This new theory of 
comparative incumbency advantage enriches our theoretical knowledge about the 
consequence of different electoral systems.  Third, it provides the multiple-country empirical 
analysis examining the hypotheses derived from the theory, based on the newly compiled 
dataset of district- and candidate-level election results in multiple developed democracies.  
 
                                                 
1 This is of the democratic countries during 1990-2000 included in Matt Golder’s dataset of Democratic 
Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000 (Golder 2005).  The information of types of party lists used in 
PR systems or the PR tier of the mixed-member systems was supplemented from Database on Political 
Institutions (DPI2004) (Beck et al. 2001) and Chang and Golden (2006).  There are 115 democracies in 
Golder’s dataset but 13 countries are excluded since the information of list types is not available for these 
countries.  Of the remaining 102 democracies in this dataset, 27 countries (26.5%) allow intra-party 
competition in general elections. 
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This empirical analysis constitutes the most extensive cross-national analysis of incumbency 
advantage based on the detailed aggregate election data undertaken to date. 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows.  Section 1.2 reviews the 
previous literature on incumbency advantage and situates this dissertation in the current state 
of the literature.  Section 1.3 discusses the two types of incumbency advantage examined in 
this dissertation.  Section 1.4 details the first two of the contributions of this dissertation — 
the provision of the comparable estimates of both types of incumbency advantage and the 
development of the theory of comparative incumbency advantage.  Section 1.5 deals with 
the third contribution — by far the most extensive cross-national analysis of incumbency 
advantage, based on the detailed aggregate electoral data.  Section 1.6 discusses the 
implications of this study for broader themes of comparative institutions and democratic 
accountability.  Section 1.7 concludes this chapter by introducing the organization of the 
dissertation. 
 
1.2. Previous Studies on Incumbency Advantage 
One prominent feature of U.S. Congressional elections is an extraordinarily high 
reelection rate of incumbent candidates.  Throughout the post-war period, the incumbent 
reelection rate has been quite high and shown an increasing trend.  The unconditional 
incumbent reelection rate has grown from approximately 70% to 90% since 1950s, and the 
reelection rate conditional on returning to the race has grown from about 80% to near 100%.  
Although the reelection of incumbents in itself is not necessarily bad for democratic 
governance, the extraordinarily high reelection rate in the U.S. legitimately raises concerns 
about whether incumbents enjoy unfair electoral advantage, thereby undermining the 
competitiveness, accountability, and healthiness of democratic elections. 
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These concerns have spawned a huge amount of research on incumbency advantage 
in U.S. elections in the past four decades (e.g., Erikson 1971, Mayhew 1974b, Fiorina 1977, 
Gelman and King 1990, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Cox and Katz 2002, Carson et al. 
2007).  One of the primary objects of these studies is to appropriately estimate incumbency 
advantage since the high reelection rate of incumbents does not necessarily mean that 
incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage (Gelman and Huang 2008, Lee 2008).  Without 
controlling for other factors influencing incumbents’ reelection, such as a party’s baseline 
electoral strength in a district, the high observed reelection rate may simply reflect those 
other factors.  Most of the recent studies of incumbency advantage in U.S. elections under 
SMD systems are based on regression models, first proposed by Gelman and King (1990), 
with some modifications and improvements later forwarded.  These regression-based models 
control for those factors other than incumbent candidates that affect the election results to 
estimate incumbency advantage. 
While there still remain debates and disagreements about the magnitude and sources 
of advantage, many of the studies on U.S. elections have shown that incumbent candidates 
or parties running incumbents indeed have enjoyed an electoral advantage.  For the U.S. 
House of Representatives, incumbency advantage in terms of vote share is typically 
estimated at the range of 6 to 10 percentage points after the 1960s and 1 to 3 percentage 
points before (e.g., Gelman and King 1991).  Skeptics claim that these estimated advantages 
might be overstated due to potential endogeneity of incumbents’ decisions to return to the 
race (Cox and Katz 2002).  However, by focusing on districts where incumbents 
involuntarily exit and are not susceptible to this endogeneity bias, even one of the strongest 
critics estimated that incumbency advantage without bias is at 2.9 percentage points in the 
post-1960s period (Cox and Katz 2002).  This is smaller than the usual estimates of 6-10 
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percentage points but still positive and sizable compared to the advantages estimated for 
other developed democracies.  In addition, using term limits for state elective offices as 
instrumental variables to redress the endogeneous-retirement issues, Ansolabehere and 
Snyder (2004) estimated incumbency advantage for state executive and legislative elections at 
about 7-9 percentage points. 
The electoral advantage of incumbents has also been reported for other developed 
democracies using SMD systems.  For the United Kingdom, Gaines (1998) estimated 
incumbency advantage for the two largest parties at about 1 to 2 percentage points during 
1950-1992, and Katz and King (1999) estimated it at approximately 0.5 to 1 percentage 
points for the Conservatives and Labour and at about 3 percentage points for the Liberals or 
Alliance during 1959-1992.  For Germany, Hainmueller and Kern (2008) estimated 
incumbency advantage in SMD vote-shares for the two largest parties at about 1.5 to 2.4 
percentage points and the spillover effect of incumbency on PR vote shares at about 1.3 to 
2.1 percentage points.  Overall, these studies consistently find electoral advantages of 
incumbents  under SMD systems in developed democracies. 
A few recent studies report negative incumbency advantage for some SMD countries 
in the developing world, such as India (Linden 2004, Uppal 2009) and Brazil (Titiunik 2008).  
However, these studies attribute the negative advantage to particular political environments 
of developing countries, such as weak institutionalization of party systems, high electoral 
volatility, and higher incentives for rent extraction.  When we focus our attention to 
developed democracies, in which electoral competition is more institutionalized and 
stabilized, the positive incumbency advantage is a norm in SMD systems. 
The most developed literature of incumbency advantage in systems other than SMD 
can be found for U.S. state legislatures because some states adopted two distinctive types of 
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multimember district (MMD) systems.  The studies in this literature showed that 
incumbency advantage is smaller in these MMD systems than in SMD systems (e.g., Cox and 
Morgenstern 1995, Hirano and Snyder 2009).  However, these MMD systems are peculiar to 
U.S. state legislatures and quite different from those adopted by many other countries’ 
national parliaments, such as the closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems and 
various forms of MMD systems with intra-party electoral competition of candidates, 
including open-list PR, Single Transferable Vote (STV), and Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV) systems.2
While incumbency advantage is well studied for SMD countries or the particular 
MMD systems of some U.S. state legislatures, there are few studies on this subject in the 
comparative literature beyond SMD systems.  There have been a handful of studies focusing 
on single-country cases of MMD systems, but the number of these studies for any given 
country is small, and the coverage of countries across these studies is also small.  Moreover, 
systematic comparative study of incumbency advantage across multiple countries with 
different electoral systems is extremely rare.  One of the reasons for little attention to 
incumbency advantage from comparative perspectives is, perhaps, that individual 
incumbents’ reelection rate, which is so high and prominent and thus has generated the huge 
  Although the studies of incumbency advantage in MMD systems in U.S. 
state legislatures are relatively well developed, they are not directly relevant to the studies on 
MMD systems in other countries. 
                                                 
2 In fact, one of the two MMD systems used in U.S. states — the MMD post system, in which each candidate 
is slated for one of the seats available in the same district — is effectively the SMD system.  In other words, 
multiple, separate SMD races are taking place in the same district under this system.  The other system — the 
MMD free-for-all system — provides voters with M ballots, and the top M candidates won in an M-member 
district.  This is quite different from the closed-list PR system, in which voters cast a single ballot for a party, 
the seats are allocated to each party based on the party’s vote total, and candidates assume seats according to 
the predetermined candidate list of each party.  It also differs from the MMD systems with intra-party 
competition since the provision of M ballots to voters effectively prevents intra-party competition.  For 
example, each Republican voter has M votes, and therefore, Republican candidates do not need to compete 
with each other to win a vote of the same Republican voter.  The Republican voter may simply cast each of his 
M votes to each of M Republican candidates, respectively. 
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literature in the U.S. context, is less conspicuous in other developed democracies.  According 
to Matland and Studlar (2004), between 1979 and 1994, the U.S. recorded the highest 
average rate of incumbent’s reelection (84.9%) among 25 advanced industrial democracies, 
whose overall average was 67.7%, a much smaller number than that in the U.S. 
Relatively lower rates of incumbent reelection, however, do not imply that 
incumbency advantage is irrelevant in these democracies.  As discussed above, the 
incumbent reelection rate is not equivalent to incumbency advantage.  If measured 
appropriately, a country with a relatively moderate rate or even a very low rate of incumbent 
return may have a sizable amount of incumbency advantage.  For example, Canada recorded 
the lowest incumbents’ returning rate in the 25 democracies surveyed by Matland and 
Studlar (2004), but the evidence in Chapter 4 of this dissertation reveals that incumbents of 
major parties in Canada enjoy a greater electoral advantage over non-incumbents than those 
in Japan, which is ranked at the sixth of the 25 countries in the incumbents’ reelection rate 
by Matland and Studlar. 
Besides their very small number, another feature of the existing studies on 
incumbency advantage in MMD systems is that they are less systematic than their 
counterparts in SMD systems.  Compared to the SMD literature, the studies of MMD use 
more eclectic, multiple methods to study incumbency advantage.  Some of these studies rest 
their argument of incumbency advantage on the observed rate of reelection (Gallagher 2000, 
Hayama 1992), which is, as discussed above, regarded as an inappropriate, biased 
measurement of incumbency advantage in the more-developed SMD literature (Gelman and 
Huang 2008, Lee 2008).  Indeed, the first and foremost obstacle of a truly comparative study 
of incumbency advantage is that the literature lacks appropriate, comparable estimates of 
incumbency advantage across SMD and MMD systems.  The first task of such a comparative 
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study should be the development of the appropriate and comparable estimates of 
incumbency advantage. 
Once we overcome the issue of comparable estimation, the next task of the 
comparative study of incumbency advantage should be explanation.  We naturally expect 
some variation in the magnitude of incumbency advantage across countries.  If there is 
variation in incumbency advantage across countries, a natural question is what factors 
influence the variation.  Given the importance of the normative concerns related to 
incumbency advantage, learning what factors affect the magnitude of incumbency advantage 
would be very valuable to deepen our understanding of democratic elections.  In the existing 
literature, there have been only a few studies that attempt to provide a systematic theoretical 
account and empirical evidence of the cross-country variation of incumbency advantage.  
Somit et al. (1994) is one of the earliest attempts to analyze incumbency advantage across 
multiple democracies, but that study did not fully develop a systematic theoretical account 
for the variation it noted across these cases.  Morgenstern et al. (n.d.) constructed a theory 
for the variation in the reelection rate of incumbents, based on a set of explanatory variables, 
such as the value of office, the resources available to incumbents, electoral volatility, and the 
ease of ballot access.  Their study did not, however, thoroughly examine the question 
addressed in this paper — how incumbency advantage varies across electoral systems — and 
did not provide fully systematic empirical evidence.  Moreover, they use incumbents’ 
reelection rates — which is, again, not appropriate for the estimates of incumbency 
advantage — as their dependent variable.  In short, the systematic theory and empirical 
evidence of incumbency advantage is long overdue, despite the potential importance of the 
subject. 
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To summarize, while a large number of studies have been conducted for incumbency 
advantage in SMD systems, we have only a small number of studies for countries with MMD 
systems, and these few studies of MMD systems are generally less systematically conducted 
than are studies on SMD systems.  Moreover, there have been few comparative studies of 
incumbency advantage across electoral systems.  This dissertation offers the first comprehensive 
attempt to conduct a theoretically and methodologically systematic study of incumbency 
advantage across electoral systems.  It advances the literature on incumbency advantage by 
bringing a truly comparative perspective to the literature. 
 
1.3. Two Variants of Incumbency Advantage 
In this dissertation, I examine two variants of incumbency advantage, corresponding 
to the following two questions regarding the electoral advantage of incumbents: 
 
(1) Do political parties benefit from fielding incumbent candidates?  (Incumbency advantage 
for political parties) 
 
(2) Do incumbent candidates have an electoral advantage over non-incumbent candidates?  
(Incumbency advantage for individual candidates) 
 
The first variant of incumbency advantage concerns the extra electoral benefits that 
political parties gain from fielding incumbent candidates — which I call “incumbency 
advantage for political parties.”  This is the difference in the electoral outcome for a political 
party between when it fields incumbent candidates and when it does not, controlling for 
other factors.  The idea is that votes that a party received can be separated into two 
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components: baseline party votes, which the party received based on their collective 
reputation, and extra votes, based on personal reputation of incumbent candidates.  The first 
component is labeled “normal vote” in the literature on incumbency advantage in U.S. 
elections.  The subject of interest here is the second component, extra votes due to the 
incumbency status of the party’s candidates. 
The second variant of incumbency advantage concerns the electoral gains that 
candidates cultivate while they hold an incumbent seat — which I call “incumbency 
advantage for individual candidates.”  This is the difference in the electoral outcomes of 
incumbents and non-incumbents, controlling for other factors, such as their party affiliation, 
their party’s electoral strength in a district, and various individual characteristics (except for 
incumbency).  This can equally be defined as the difference in the potential election outcomes 
of the same candidate when she is an incumbent and when she is not.  The idea is that 
incumbent legislators can take advantage of their privileged access to government and 
legislative resources to cultivate personal votes while they are holding a seat, and these personal 
votes would provide an extra electoral advantage to incumbent candidates.   
The difference between these two types of incumbency advantage has received little 
attention in the existing literature.  This may be because the existing literature has 
predominantly focused on U.S. House elections, which uses the SMD plurality system.  In 
the SMD system, the electoral fates of parties and their candidates largely coincide, and 
therefore, the necessity to distinguish the electoral advantage of incumbency for parties and 
candidates should be small.  However, when we move our attention to other democracies, 
many countries use electoral rules in which the electoral fates of parties and their candidates 
do not necessarily fully coincide.  These are the rules that allow intra-party competition — 
direct competition of candidates from the same party in the same electoral district.  Under 
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these electoral systems, the incumbency advantage for political parties and individual 
candidates necessarily diverge.  For this reason, it is important to distinguish these two 
variants of incumbency advantage when we approach this subject from a comparative 
perspective. 
The distinction of these two variants of incumbency advantage is different from the 
one recently introduced in the literature based on U.S. elections.  Lee (2008) introduced what 
he termed “incumbent party advantage” — the electoral advantage for political parties of 
holding an incumbent seat, regardless of an incumbent candidate returning to the race.  This 
is different from what he called “incumbent candidate advantage” — the electoral advantage 
for political parties of running an incumbent candidate — the usual definition of 
incumbency advantage in the literature (e.g. Gelman and King 1990) and the one I call 
incumbency advantage for political parties.  These two types of incumbency advantage 
distinguished by Lee both regard the electoral advantage enjoyed by political parties, and the 
difference lies in the type of incumbency (candidates or seats) from which parties gain 
benefits.  On the other hand, the two types of advantage distinguished in this dissertation 
both focus on incumbent candidates (not a party’s incumbent seats), and the difference is in 
the beneficiary of the advantage (either political parties or individual candidates). 
When we seriously consider incumbency advantage from a comparative perspective, 
the variety of electoral rules adopted by different countries necessitates the distinction 
between incumbency advantage for political parties and for individual candidates.  Bringing 
this distinction into the center place in the comparative analysis of incumbency advantage is 
one of the contributions of this dissertation.  The distinction is important in its own right 
because each type of incumbency advantage refers to the different substantive concept.  It is 
also important because the distinction clarifies the implications of incumbency advantage for 
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two different types of electoral accountability — the collective electoral accountability of 
political parties and the individual electoral accountability of legislators.  If parties enjoy 
electoral gains from running incumbent candidates beyond the parties’ baseline electoral 
support (incumbency advantage for political parties), the collective accountability of these parties 
may be compromised.  For example, government parties that have managed economies 
poorly are known to lose votes in subsequent elections (economic voting), but these 
collective accountability mechanisms of democratic elections may be dampened if parties 
benefit from extra electoral gains from fielding their incumbent candidates because these 
extra gains may offset the decline of the party’s votes due to economic voting or insulate 
parties against such decline.  Also, if individual candidates benefit from holding an 
incumbent seat (incumbency advantage for individual candidates), the individual accountability 
of legislators may be compromised since an extra personal electoral advantage tends to 
shelter these incumbents from the risk of electoral defeat.  Given these implications for 
electoral accountability, this dissertation also contributes to the burgeoning comparative 
literature on the balance between collective and individual accountability (Carey 2009). 
 
1.4. Electoral Systems and Comparative Incumbency Advantage 
This dissertation focuses on the variation in incumbency advantage across different 
electoral systems.  This is because electoral systems are one of the most fundamental 
components of the institutional arrangements of democracy, and the difference in electoral 
systems is one of the major variations in democratic institutions of developed democracies.  
Specifically, the dissertation addresses the following two questions concerning the variation 
in each of the two variants of incumbency advantage: 
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(a) How can we estimate comparably the magnitude of incumbency advantage across 
different electoral systems? 
 
(b) How do the electoral systems affect the variation across contexts in the magnitude of 
incumbency advantage? 
 
Below, I offer a discussion of each question in turn. 
 
1.4.1. Comparable Estimates of Incumbency Advantage across Electoral Systems 
The first question concerns the comparable estimation of incumbency advantage.  As 
reviewed in 1.2, while there is the well-developed literature on the methods to estimate 
incumbency advantage in SMD systems, there have been few studies on the methods 
applicable to MMD systems and to produce the comparable estimates across SMD and 
MMD systems.  Most existing comparative studies on this subject rely on the crude measure 
of the incumbents’ reelection rate, which is not appropriate as an estimate of incumbency 
advantage.  We need the estimates of both types of incumbency advantage in MMD systems, 
which are comparable and equally sophisticated as the estimates in SMD systems. 
The estimates of incumbency advantage for political parties proposed here can be 
seen as a generalization of the Gelman-King type regression model of incumbency 
advantage in the SMD systems with party vote share as the dependent variable (Gelman and 
King 1990).  A particular problem for the estimation is that district magnitude — the 
number of seats in a district — varies across electoral districts in the MMD systems.  This 
creates two issues.  First, the number of incumbents running from a party varies across 
districts.  In the SMD systems, the estimation of the impact of a single incumbent on the 
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party’s election result is simple because there is only one incumbent in each district, but in 
the MMD systems, we need to measure the impact based on multiple incumbents in the 
same district, and the number of incumbents varies across districts.  Second, the party vote 
share, a frequently used dependent variable in the analysis of incumbency advantage, has 
different substantive meaning across districts with varying district magnitudes in the MMD 
systems.  For example, a 5% vote share hardly secure a seat in a single-member district, but 
the same vote share almost guarantees a seat in a 25-seat district.  Hence, if we measure the 
impact of running a single incumbent in vote share, the same substantive impact of running 
a single incumbent should be expressed in the varying amount of vote share across districts 
with different district magnitudes.  To address these issues and derive comparable estimates 
of incumbency advantage for parties across districts with different district magnitudes, I 
propose a novel specification of interaction between the number-of-incumbents variable and 
a reciprocal of district magnitude in the regression of party vote share.  As fully discussed in 
Chapter 2, this specification provides appropriate and comparable estimates of incumbency 
advantage for political parties between SMD and MMD systems as well as across electoral 
districts with different district magnitudes.  In addition, this specification allows examining 
whether the substantive impact of running incumbents also varies as district magnitude grows.  
This enables the direct test of the hypotheses derived from my theory about incumbency 
advantage for parties. 
For the estimates of incumbency advantage for individual candidates, I apply a 
“potential outcome framework,” on which various causal inference methods are based.  As 
discussed in 1.3, incumbency advantage for candidates can be defined as the difference in the 
potential outcomes of the same candidate when she is an incumbent and when she is not.  
Since candidate vote share is again not a comparable unit of measurement across districts 
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with varying district magnitudes, I measure the advantage in terms of three probabilities 
related to candidates’ decision to return to the electoral race and their winning of a seat.  
More specifically, based on the data of all candidates in election t-1, I estimate incumbency 
advantage in i) the joint probability of returning to the race in election t and winning a seat, 
ii) the marginal probability of returning to the race in t, and iii) the probability of winning a 
seat in t conditional on returning to the race.  An innovative feature is that, using all 
candidates in election t-1 and not dropping non-returning candidates in t, these estimates of 
incumbency advantage for candidates are immune to the potential endogeneity bias, due to 
strategic retirement of candidates.  I use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate 
the causal impact of holding an incumbent seat on individual candidates’ three probabilities 
regarding returning and winning.  This is an appropriate method since the RD estimates 
provide the causal impact of incumbency for marginal incumbents and non-incumbents, for 
whom the potential outcomes of incumbency and non-incumbency are well defined and the 
electoral advantage of incumbency should be most important.  The estimates of incumbency 
advantage for candidates measured in probabilities (not vote share) are also comparable 
across districts with different district magnitudes. 
To summarize, given the lack of appropriate, comparable estimates of incumbency 
advantage across electoral systems in the existing literature, the first important task of truly 
comparative analysis of incumbency advantage is to develop such estimates.  This 
dissertation proposes the specification of interaction of the number-of-incumbents variable 
and the reciprocal of district magnitude in the regression of party vote share as an 
appropriate model for incumbency advantage for political parties.  It also proposes the 
regression discontinuity estimates of incumbency advantage for individual candidates in 
terms of three probabilities related to candidates’ returning to the race and winning a seat.  
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The first highlight and contribution of this dissertation is that it proposes these estimates of 
both types of incumbency advantage comparable across SMD and MMD systems. 
 
1.4.2. Explaining the Variation in Incumbency Advantage across Electoral Systems 
The second question concerns a theoretical explanation for the variation in 
incumbency advantage and empirical evidence supporting it.  The existing comparative 
electoral-system literature provides some guidance in considering the theory of the variation 
in incumbency advantage across electoral systems.  In particular, the literature suggests that 
electoral systems are known to induce the variation in politicians’ incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995).  Since the personal vote is one of the primary 
sources of incumbency advantage, it is natural to suspect that electoral systems would 
produce the variation in incumbency advantage similar to that in the personal-vote 
incentives.  However, there are reasons to believe that the existence of strong incentives for 
personal votes does not guarantee that they directly translate into incumbency advantage 
either for political parties or for individual candidates.   
First, the greater incentives for the personal vote of individual candidates do not 
necessarily lead to greater vote gains even for these candidates themselves.  The literature is 
silent on whether incentives actually lead to electoral gains (Shugart 2005).  Most empirical 
studies of the personal vote have not assessed election outcomes directly but instead use 
non-election outcomes of the personal-vote-building activities as dependent variables, such 
as incidence of corruption (Chang and Golden 2006) and the type of bills initiated by 
legislators (Crisp et al. 2004).  These studies have demonstrated that these outcomes of the 
personal-vote-building activities increase where personal vote incentives are greater.  
However, politicians’ greater efforts to cultivate a personal vote may not always result in 
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their electoral gains due to greater competition, for example.  As long as some features of 
electoral systems make it difficult to translate personal-vote incentives into actual electoral 
gains to incumbents, the variation in incumbency advantage for individual candidates diverge 
from the variation in personal-vote incentives across electoral systems. 
Second, even when the personal-vote-building efforts of individual politicians lead to 
actual electoral gains for them (incumbency advantage for candidates), these gains do not 
necessarily translate into extra gains to their parties beyond the parties’ baseline electoral 
strength (incumbency advantage for parties).  A party can earn extra votes from running its 
incumbents, only if these incumbents can attract some voters who would otherwise abstain 
or vote for another party if the party did not field these incumbents.  If there are conditions 
that make it difficult for individual incumbents to reach these voters, the personal-vote gains 
of individual incumbents do not effectively translate into their party’s additional electoral 
gains.  From the party’s perspectives, these individual gains would be merely a reshuffle 
among the party’s candidates of the same votes. 
These discussions suggest that we need a theory for the relationship between 
electoral systems and each type of incumbency advantage, which is built on the existing 
theory of personal-vote incentives, yet is distinct from it.  In the chapters that follow, I 
develop such a theory, whose prediction for both types of incumbency advantage diverges 
from that for individual politicians’ personal-vote incentives in an important way.  First, my 
theory suggests that incumbency advantage for political parties will be greater when electoral 
systems allow for intra-party competition, which is consistent with the existing theory of the 
personal-vote incentives.  However, it also predicts that, under electoral systems with intra-
party competition, incumbency advantage for parties declines as district magnitude grows, 
which is opposite to the personal-vote incentives, which increase as district magnitude grows.  
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Second, my theory expects that incumbency advantage for individual candidates will decline 
as electoral systems facilitate greater intra-party competition.  This also contradicts with the 
existing theory of personal-vote incentives, which predicts that the incentives will be greater 
as systems allow for more intense intra-party competition.  The development of these 
original theoretical accounts of the impact of electoral systems on both types of incumbency 
advantage is the second important contribution of this dissertation. 
 
1.5. Empirical Cases and Dataset 
The third contribution of this dissertation is that it provides by far the most 
systematic cross-country empirical analysis of both types of incumbency advantage, which 
examines the hypotheses derived from my theories.  The empirical analysis of incumbency 
advantage for political parties is conducted, based on district-level party vote data of nine 
developed democracies — Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom.  The nine countries are classified into the three major 
categories of electoral systems: the SMD systems (New Zealand and United Kingdom), the 
MMD systems with intra-party competition (Finland, Ireland, Italy, and Japan), and the 
MMD systems with no intra-party competition (Austria, Belgium, and Norway).  These 
country cases are used to examine the hypotheses regarding these three categories of 
electoral systems. 
The empirical analysis of incumbency advantage for individual candidates is 
conducted, based on candidate-level vote data of five developed democracies — Canada, 
Finland, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. — which use or had used various candidate-centered 
electoral rules, such as SMD plurality, open-list PR, and SNTV systems.  The winning 
probability-based incumbency advantage for candidates is estimated for each of the major 
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parties of these countries to examine the hypotheses regarding the degree of intra-party 
competition allowed by candidate-centered electoral systems and the magnitude of 
incumbency advantage for individual candidates. 
These empirical analyses show a stark contrast to those of the existing studies of 
incumbency advantage in terms of its coverage and depth.  There has been no study on 
incumbency advantage that covered as many countries as this dissertation to examine a 
hypothesis systematically derived from a theory, based on the data of election results as 
detailed as this one.  Indeed, even when we move our attention to comparative election 
studies in general, cross-country analysis of district-level or candidate-level election results in 
this scale is still relatively rare.  This dissertation is among the first of the fully comparative 
analyses of election results.  It demonstrates that this type of analysis is possible and 
worthwhile, despite its huge scale and a large amount of efforts required for it. 
To carry out these empirical analyses, I have compiled by far the most extensive and 
detailed dataset of district-level party votes and individual candidate votes in the ten 
developed democracies.  Although I rely on the existing dataset whenever I can, I by myself 
collected the majority of the dataset from the original sources.  The compilation of this huge 
dataset can also be considered as another major contribution of this dissertation. 
 
1.6. Institutions and Democratic Accountability 
This study’s main contribution is the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact 
of electoral systems on the two types of incumbency advantage.  However, as each type of 
incumbency advantage is closely related to the issue of either collective or individual electoral 
accountability, the dissertation also has implications for broader themes of institutions and 
democratic accountability.  
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For incumbency advantage for political parties, the relevant literature is the one that 
examines democratic institutions and the collective responsibility of political parties.  This 
literature examines the extent to which elections contribute to maintaining accountability of 
government parties and delegating mandates to them, and how the effectiveness of elections 
in these functions varies across institutions and contexts.  For example, it was found that 
“clarity of responsibility” conditions the effectiveness of the accountability role of elections 
with respect to government performance such as economic management (Powell and 
Whitten 1993) and the extent of corruption (Tavits 2008).  Majoritarian systems perform 
better than proportional systems in the accountability and mandate-giving roles of elections 
(Powell 2000).  Compared to Parliamentary systems, Presidential regimes facilitate the 
accountability role while weakening the mandate-giving role of elections (Samuels and 
Shugart 2003).  This dissertation adds the impact of electoral systems on incumbency 
advantage for political parties to the list of these important factors that condition the 
effectiveness of the elections’ democratic roles based on the collective responsibility of 
political parties. 
The comparative literature on democratic accountability has so far focused on the 
collective accountability of political parties.  This may be because the literature has centered 
on developed democracies in which the unity and the collective responsibility of political 
parties are considered as an ideal.  In other parts of the world, however, the collective 
accountability is not necessarily an ideal.  For example, in many Latin American countries, 
too strong party leaders are considered as a problem, and therefore, increasing the individual 
accountability of legislators, as opposed to the collective accountability of parties, is given a 
priority (Carey 2009).  Even among developed democracies, in which the collective 
accountability is usually appreciated, some countries have institutions that facilitate disunity 
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of political parties, such as electoral systems with intra-party competition.  A natural question 
for these countries should be whether the erosion of the collective accountability of parties 
is matched with the expansion of the individual accountability of legislators.  Reflecting these 
issues, there is the emerging literature that tries to address the balance between the collective 
accountability of parties and the individual accountability of legislators (Carey 2009).  As 
incumbency advantage for individual candidates has implications for the individual 
accountability of legislators, together with the implications from incumbency advantage for 
political parties, this dissertation would provide insights into this issue of the balance 
between the two versions of electoral accountability. 
 
1.7. Organization of the Dissertation 
  The rest of the dissertation is divided into four chapters.  Chapter 2 explores the 
incumbency advantage for political parties.  In this chapter, I propose a theory for the cross-
system variation in the electoral benefits that political parties gain from fielding incumbent 
candidates and test the empirical implications of the theory using aggregate data of district-
level party votes in nine developed democracies — Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  These nine countries’ electoral 
systems are classified into three broad categories: 1) single-member district systems (New 
Zealand, the U.K.), 2) multimember district systems that allow intra-party competition (Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan), and 3) multimember district systems that do not allow intra-party 
competition (Austria, Belgium, Norway).  I find that the parties’ gains from running 
incumbent candidates are greater under electoral systems with intra-party competition than 
those without it, and that, among the systems with intra-party competition, the parties’ gains 
decline as district magnitude grows.     
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Chapters 3 and 4 examine the incumbency advantage for individual candidates.  
Chapter 3 offers an argument that incumbent candidates in multimember district rules with 
intra-party competition may have little advantage or even a disadvantage, unlike their 
counterparts in single-member district rules.  The chapter empirically demonstrates this 
argument using electoral data from Japan during 1958-1993 when the country used the 
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system.  Applying a regression-discontinuity design, I 
find that non-incumbent candidates who narrowly lost in the previous election 
outperformed the marginally-winning incumbents in the following election.  The results 
suggest that there is important variation in the realization of incumbency advantage across 
electoral systems. 
Chapter 4 extends the argument and findings of Chapter 3 to comparative empirical 
analysis of five developed democracies — Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. — 
which use or had used various candidate-centered electoral rules, such as SMD plurality, 
open-list PR, and SNTV systems.  This chapter presents an argument, which extends the 
one in Chapter 3, that as electoral systems generate greater intra-party competition, the 
electoral advantage of incumbents will become smaller, since intra-party competition tends 
to weaken the advantages that incumbents enjoy and strengthen the disadvantages that they 
may suffer.  It also provides supportive empirical evidence for this argument, based on a 
regression discontinuity analysis of incumbency advantage for individual candidates of the 
five developed democracies.  






When Do Political Parties Benefit from Incumbents’ Personal Vote? 
Comparative Analysis of Incumbency Advantage for Political Parties 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 This chapter presents comparative analysis of the electoral benefits that political 
parties enjoy from fielding incumbent candidates — incumbency advantage for political parties.  
I develop the theory of the variation in this type of incumbency advantage across three 
major categories of electoral systems, and test the hypotheses derived from the theory, based 
on the district-level party vote data from the nine developed democracies — Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  I 
find that there is indeed a substantial amount of electoral gains for parties from running 
incumbent candidates and these gains vary across electoral systems in consistent with my 
theory. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 presents my 
theoretical argument about how different electoral systems influence the electoral advantage 
for parties of running incumbent candidates.  Section 2.3 describes the data, and Section 2.4 
Introduces the empirical models used to examine the hypotheses derived from my theory.  
Section 2.5 presents my findings in detail.  Section 2.6 reports the simulation results, based 
on the estimated models, the aggregate advantage that parties gain from fielding incumbent 
candidates to assess the substantive significance of the advantage.  Section 2.7 concludes by 
summarizing the findings of the chapter. 
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2.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
I focus here on the electoral rules governing general elections only.  The rules 
governing the selection of candidates might also create different incentives for the personal 
vote.  These rules are left out of the analysis as their impact on general election outcomes, 
where the electoral benefit to parties is realized, is limited given that the electorate in 
candidate selection is usually much smaller and confined to party elites or members.  A 
possible exception may be open primaries (e.g., in the U.S.), in which the general electorate 
can also participate in primaries; however, these are not included either since there are not 
many countries where open primaries are prevalent in legislative elections. 
I present my theory in two parts.  The first part is laid out in terms of three major 
categories of electoral systems: 1) single-member district systems (hereafter referred to as 
“SMD” systems), 2) multimember district systems that allow intra-party competition (“MMD-
OPN” hereafter) — including open-list proportional representation (PR), single transferable 
vote (STV), and single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems — and 3) multimember 
district systems that do not allow intra-party competition (“MMD-CLD”), such as closed-list 
PR.  
The argument in this part is built on the theory of politicians’ incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote (Carey and Shughart 1995) and voters’ demand for candidates’ personal 
reputations (Shugart et al. 2005).  In the U.S. Congressional-elections literature, incumbency 
advantage is disaggregated into several components, most notably the direct benefits from 
holding a legislative seat, the quality of incumbents, and the average low-quality of 
challengers in incumbent-running districts (Cox and Katz 1996, Levitt and Wolfram 1997).  
Of these components, only the direct office-holder benefits are sometimes referred to as 
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“the personal vote” (Ansolabehere et al. 2000).  The personal vote, however, derives not 
only from the direct benefits of holding office (e.g., constituency services) but also from an 
incumbent’s personal quality (e.g., a reputation for competent performance).  In addition, a 
large number of empirical studies on candidate entry suggest that high-quality challengers are 
more likely to enter the race when the personal vote of incumbents is either absent or weak 
— e.g., when incumbents retire, incumbents are unable to spend much on campaigning, 
incumbents are electorally vulnerable, and district boundaries are redrawn (see Carson 2005 
for a review).  These findings imply that the average low quality of challengers in incumbent-
running-districts is, in large part, a consequence of the deterrence effect of the personal vote 
cultivated by incumbents on the entry of high quality challengers.  Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to conceptualize the entire incumbency advantage, or at least its major 
component, as reflecting the personal vote of incumbent candidates and theorize the 
variation in the electoral advantage of running incumbents across electoral systems primarily 
in terms of the personal vote. 
Particular features of electoral systems determine the importance of a personal 
reputation of candidates in their election strategy and voters’ decisions.  When electoral 
systems put a premium on a personal reputation, incumbents are encouraged to develop a 
personal vote.  Under these systems, incumbents’ parties also gain extra votes from fielding 
incumbents as long as incumbents’ efforts to cultivate a personal vote can attract some 
voters who would otherwise vote for another party or abstain if there were no personal 
voting.  In the first part of the theory, elaborated in 2.2.1. below, I focus on the cases in 
which personal-vote incentives of individual incumbents lead directly to the electoral 
benefits for their parties.  I will turn to the cases in which they don’t necessarily translate so 
directly in the second part, presented in 2.2.2.  
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2.2.1. Comparison of Three Electoral Systems 
A personal reputation has greater meaning under electoral systems that allow intra-
party competition (MMD-OPN) than those that don’t (SMD, MMD-CLD).  When they face 
direct competition with other candidates from the same party in their electoral district, 
candidates cannot rely solely on their party’s collective reputation to win elections.  Rather, 
they need to distinguish themselves from other candidates of the same party and provide 
voters with reasons to vote for them instead of their copartisans.  Under these circumstances, 
incumbent legislators have strong incentives to use their privileges, such as wider name 
recognition among voters and greater access to government and parliamentary resources, to 
cultivate a personal reputation.  Voters also demand information about individual candidates 
because they need to cast a vote for an individual candidate.  As a result, some fraction of 
voters chooses incumbents mainly based on their personal reputation and cast a personal 
vote.  In this process, an incumbent can attract voters who would otherwise choose a 
different party or abstain if no personal-reputation-building efforts were undertaken by that 
incumbent.  Those who vote for an incumbent candidate of one party over candidates from 
other parties that are ideologically more preferable for them and those who turned out 
responding to the personal-vote-building effort of the incumbent provide extra votes to the 
incumbent’s party beyond its baseline partisan strength in the district.  In this way, the 
personal vote of incumbent candidates can be translated into the electoral advantage for 
their parties.   
When electoral systems do not allow intra-party competition, however, individual 
candidates’ incentives for the personal vote are considerably weaker, because they do not 
need to distinguish themselves from their copartisans.  Likewise, voters’ demand for 
information about individual candidates is weaker since these voters need such information 
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less when they cast a ballot.  Accordingly, the electoral advantage for parties from fielding 
incumbent candidates should be greater under electoral systems with intra-party competition 
(MMD-OPN) than those without it (SMD, MMD-CLD). 
Of the two systems that do not allow intra-party competition (SMD, MMD-CLD), 
personal reputation has less importance for both voters and incumbents in MMD-CLD 
systems.  Evaluating individual candidates based on their individual characteristics and 
personal reputation is a costly process for voters, especially when there are multiple 
incumbents and non-incumbent candidates of the same party in the same district.  Voters are 
less likely to be engaged with such costly evaluations in MMD-CLD systems since they are 
unnecessary in these systems in which the rank order of candidates of the same party in a 
district is predetermined.  By the same reasoning, incumbents have less incentive to develop 
a personal reputation since they do not need to distinguish themselves from their copartisans.  
As a result, there should be little personal voting under MMD-CLD systems, and therefore, 
fielding incumbent candidates should also produce little electoral advantage for parties under 
these systems. 
Although not as much as in MMD-OPN systems, a personal reputation still has 
some importance under SMD systems.  Since there is only one incumbent in each district, it 
is not so burdensome for voters to evaluate the incumbent based on her personal reputation.  
When an incumbent provides some district services, voters can easily attribute these services 
to the sole incumbent.  In this situation, it is rational for incumbents to cultivate a personal 
reputation to improve their winning chances.  Therefore, we expect a positive gain for 
parties of running incumbents under SMD systems, which should be greater than under 
MMD-CLD systems.  As discussed above, however, the advantage should be smaller in 
SMD systems than in MMD-OPN systems because incumbents’ incentives for the personal 
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vote and voters’ demand for the information about individual candidates are weaker in SMD 
than in MMD-OPN.   
The argument so far can be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Of the three major categories of electoral systems, SMD, MMD-CLD, and MMD-OPN, 
the electoral advantage of parties from fielding incumbent candidates is greatest under MMD-OPN 
systems, followed by SMD systems, and last by MMD-CLD systems. 
 
2.2.2. Variation within MMD systems with Intra-Party Competition 
The second part of my theory concerns the variation within MMD-OPN systems.  
In this part, my theoretical expectation departs from the theory of individual politicians’ 
incentives in an important way.  The existing theory predicts that politicians’ incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote become greater when district magnitude is larger under MMD-OPN 
systems because as district magnitude grows, the number of candidates from the same party 
also increases, and so does the necessity to distinguish themselves from copartisans.  I argue 
that, contrary to individual politicians’ incentives for the personal vote, which should relate 
positively to district magnitude, the electoral gains of parties from their incumbents’ personal 
vote decline as district magnitude grows.  This is because when district magnitude is large, 
incumbents’ personal-vote-building activities do not effectively translate into actual vote 
gains even for the incumbents themselves for the following two reasons.  
 First, individual credit-claiming becomes more difficult as district magnitude grows, 
and therefore, there is likely to be smaller gains from incumbents’ personal-vote-earning 
efforts at high district magnitudes.  When there is intra-party competition, it is common for 
legislators of the same party in the same district to specialize in different policy areas or 
divide their electoral district into narrow bailiwicks in order to credibly claim credit in these 
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policy or geographical areas (Hirano 2006, Marsh 2000, McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995).  
Credit-claiming in a specific policy area is less credible when district magnitude is large since 
there is likely to be a greater number of incumbent legislators of the same party than the 
number of electorally attractive policy areas.  Maintaining geographical bailiwicks in districts 
with high district magnitude is also difficult because there are a larger number of copartisans 
who try to erode one’s bailiwick from multiple directions.  For these reasons, while higher 
district magnitude provides individual legislators with greater pressures to cultivate a 
personal vote, it is more difficult to turn the personal vote-developing efforts into actual 
electoral gains. 
Second, any tangible gains from the personal vote, if any, should remain in the hands 
of individual candidates, and these gains are less likely to lead to additional electoral gains for 
their parties at high district magnitudes due to voters’ use of information shortcuts.  The 
realization of the electoral advantage for parties by fielding their incumbents requires some 
fraction of voters — most likely, less partisan and independent voters — to conduct an 
evaluation of candidates across parties.  For example, for party A to gain from the personal 
vote of its candidate at the expense of party B, a certain fraction of voters must consider 
candidates of A and B, and choose a candidate of A over other candidates of B based on her 
personal reputation.1
                                                 
1 The process does not require the majority of voters to do this evaluation of candidates across parties.  
Rather, the existence of a small minority of voters who conduct this evaluation is sufficient to produce, in 
the aggregate, the electoral advantage for parties by fielding incumbent candidates. 
  This is feasible at low levels of district magnitude since the number of 
candidates from a single party is also small, and when voters evaluate candidates of multiple 
parties, the total number of candidates to be evaluated is still reasonably small.  If district 
magnitude is 3, for example, the number of candidates from a single party will be at most 3.  
If voters compare candidates from two parties, the maximum number of candidates they 
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need to evaluate is only 6.2  It becomes increasingly costly for voters to conduct such cross-
party candidate evaluation as district magnitude becomes greater.  If district magnitude is 20, 
voters need to evaluate at most 40 candidates in the same scenario.  In this informationally-
demanding environment, it is more rational for voters to adopt a two-step information 
shortcutting strategy: first, they choose a single party list relying on a collective reputation of 
the party, and then they evaluate only the candidates of this party based on their personal 
reputation. 3
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
  If voters make electoral choices in this way, personal reputation matters 
primarily for individual candidates, and there are only small gains for political parties from 
their incumbents’ personal vote when district magnitude is large. 
Hypothesis 2: Within MMD-OPN systems, the electoral advantage for parties from fielding incumbent 
candidates declines as district magnitude grows.  Accordingly, the advantage is greater under MMD-
OPN systems whose electoral districts have, on average, low district magnitude (MMD-OPN/Low 




I examine the hypotheses derived above by estimating the impact of running 
incumbent candidates on the district-level party vote shares in the national parliamentary 
elections (lower house) in nine developed democracies.  Table 2.1 lists these countries and 
                                                 
2 The values of 6 here and 40 in the next example are the maximum possible number of candidates to be 
evaluated.  More realistically, voters evaluate some fraction of the candidates of both parties.  The point is 
that as district magnitude grows, the number of candidates to be evaluated also increases. 
3 This voting behavior is also a testable hypothesis that may be examined empirically using survey data of 
voters.  This paper focuses on the hypotheses at the aggregate level and leaves the examination of the 
hypotheses at the individual-voter level to future research. 
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summary statistics of the data for each country.  These countries include: New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom for SMD systems, Austria, Belgium and Norway for MMD-CLD 
systems, 4
To select country cases, I started with the usual list of 23 developed democracies, 
often called OECD countries.  For SMD systems, I focused on the pure SMD plurality 
countries; namely, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.  New Zealand and the U.K. 
were chosen over other two countries because a preliminary analysis suggested potentially 
biased estimates for Canada (discussed later) and the U.S. uses open primaries.  For MMD-
CLD systems, of eight countries with closed-list PR, Austria, Belgium and Norway were 
chosen over others because the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden do not publish a 
candidate list in their official publications of election results, and Iceland uses open primaries.  
For MMD-OPN/High DM systems, Finland and Italy were chosen over the other four 
open-list PR countries (Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) because Denmark 
and Greece use an open-list to only a limited degree; Luxembourg is a small country with a 
small number of districts, which does not permit a meaningful cross-district analysis; and 
Switzerland does not publish a list of candidates.  For MMD-OPN/Low DM systems, 
Ireland and Japan are the only available choices.  I do not cover Mixed-Member systems in 
this dissertation. 
 Ireland and Japan for MMD-OPN/Low DM systems, and Finland and Italy for 
MMD-OPN/High DM systems.  These countries are selected from developed democracies 
because they are representatives of each electoral system, and their governments report a list 
of candidates at district level in their official publications of election results so that the 
information about incumbents can be collected. 
                                                 
4 These countries allow preferential votes for candidates, but those preferential votes are largely 
ineffective and seldom affect actual election outcomes (Gallagher et al. 2001, Katz 1986).  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to classify the electoral rules of these countries as MMD-CLD. 
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Each country case includes multiple elections.  The time periods covered for some 
countries are shorter than others because some changed their electoral systems (Italy, Japan, 
New Zealand) or information about incumbent candidates could not be collected for some 
elections (Austria, Belgium).  The analysis focuses on major parties of each country, defined 
as those which had held more than a 10% seat share prior to an election.  In addition, the 
observations included in the estimation are those parties that also ran in the previous 
elections, since the empirical models specified below require lagged variables at the right-
hand side.  Districts after a major boundary change are also excluded as lagged variables 
from the previous elections do not exist for these districts.  A few single-member districts in 
MMD countries are excluded to focus on pure multimember districts in these countries.  
Finally, a very small number of uncompetitive districts, where no candidates ran against the 
incumbents, are excluded as well.  In all, the dataset encompasses 92 elections (average 10.2 
elections per country) and 20,573 observations of district-level party votes. 
 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
 
2.4. Empirical Models 
Empirical models are estimated separately for the three categories of electoral 
systems: SMD, MMD-CLD, and MMD-OPN.  MMD-OPN/High DM and Low DM 
systems are estimated in a single model to test whether the variation in district magnitude 





2.4.1. The Model for SMD Systems 




















1                                       (1) 
 
t
cijV  is party j’s vote share in district i at election t of country c.  
t
cjα  is a dummy variable for 
each party j of country c in each election t, which estimates a national-level partisan swing to 
party j in each election.6 1−tcijV  is a lagged vote share, intended to capture the baseline partisan 
strength of party j in district i, as is common in the literature of incumbency advantage.  
t
ciNumPty  is the control of the number of parties running in district i.  Party vote shares tend 
to be smaller, on average, as the number of parties running in a district is greater.  tcijInc = 1 
if party j’s incumbent runs in district i and 0 otherwise.  1−tcijSeat = 1 if party j won the seat in 
district i in election t-1 and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Inc ( 3β ) is the estimate of the 
electoral gain for parties by fielding an incumbent candidate, controlling for other factors 
that reflect what parties are expected to earn from their collective party reputation at both 
national and local levels.7 3β  If  > 0, then it supports Hypothesis 1, which expects a positive 
advantage under SMD systems. 
                                                 
5 The model for SMD systems is an adaptation of the regression model of incumbency advantage widely 
used in the U.S. Congressional elections literature (Gelman and King 1990).  Recently, some causal inference 
approaches are proposed to estimate incumbency advantage in the U.S. Congressional elections (Lee 2008, 
Sekhon and Titiunik 2007), but these specific methods are designed for SMD systems only and are not 
directly applicable to comparative analyses involving MMDs.  
6 Inclusion of a battery of these party-election-country fixed effects makes other frequently used fixed 
effects, such as country fixed effects, unnecessary. 
7 To simplify the notation, superscripts and subscripts of variables are often suppressed below. 
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2.4.2. The Model for MMD Systems 
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654          (2) 
 
Since parties may field multiple candidates and hold multiple seats in a district under 
MMD systems, incumbent and seat variables are now specified as the number of incumbents 
running from party j ( tcijNumInc ) and the number of seats won by party j in election t-1 
( 1−tcijNumSeat ).  My theory predicts that the impact of running incumbents declines as district 
magnitude grows in MMD-OPN systems, which suggests that the model should include an 
interaction term between NumInc  and district magnitude ( DM ) so that we can examine 
how the impact of NumInc  varies with DM .  The most frequently used specification of 
interaction in our discipline is a linear interaction term ( DMNumInc× ).  A linear interaction 
term may be chosen as a default specification for interaction if a substantive theoretical 
consideration does not suggest any specific functional form for interaction (Kam and 
Franzese 2007).  However, given the substantive nature of the problem here — the 
dependent variable is a vote share and district magnitude varies across districts — a linear 
interaction term is not appropriate and we should use the interaction of NumInc  and the 
reciprocal of DM  ( DMNumInc / ).  I explain the rationale for this specification below in 
terms of incumbency variables, but the same reasoning can be applied to party seat variables, 
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and therefore, the interaction of NumSeat  and the reciprocal of DM  ( DMNumSeat / ) is 
also included in the model. 
First, I set aside the hypothesis that the impact of incumbents declines as district 
magnitude grows and focus on the nature of the problem.  That is to say, we first consider 
how we should model the impact of running incumbents if the substantive impact of 
running incumbents on their party’s electoral fate is constant across districts with different 
magnitude.  It is important here to distinguish between the impact of running incumbents on 
their party’s electoral fate and the impact on their party’s vote share, which is modeled in 
equation (2).  Then, we should also note that the impact of a single incumbent on a party’s 
vote share must decline with district magnitude even when the impact of a single incumbent on 
the electoral fate of a party is constant across different district magnitudes.  This is because the 
same proportion vote-share has greater meaning for the party’s electoral fate when the 
number of seats in a district is larger.  For example, a 10 percentage point increase in vote 
share can alter the winning probability of only one seat in a single-seat district, but the same 
amount of increase is likely to secure a few additional seats for a party in a 20-seat district.  
Then, if running a single incumbent increases her party’s vote share by, say, 10 percentage 
points in a single-seat district, it is reasonable to expect that running a single incumbent 
produces a much smaller increase in vote share in a 20-seat district.  In general, a certain vote 
share, V , in a single-member district is comparable to DMV /  in a district with district 
magnitude DM .  Therefore, it is reasonable to model the impact of a single incumbent on 
vote share by DMNumInc /  — i.e., the impact on vote share declines proportionately to district 
magnitude — when the impact on the party’s electoral fate is constant across different district 
magnitudes.  Under this specification, the impact of one additional incumbent in a 20-seat 
district in the above example should be a 0.5 percentage-point increase in a party vote share 
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(10%/20 = 0.5%).  The variable DMNumInc /  models such a decline (which is 
proportionate to the district magnitude) of the marginal impact of running incumbents on 
the party’s vote share.  This is clearly seen from the fact that, if DMNumInc /  is a sole 
variable in the model to represent the number of incumbents (i.e., the model does not 
include NumInc ), the impact of running one additional incumbent is given by DM/5β . 
A decline of the impact of a single incumbent on a party’s vote share proportionate 
to the district magnitude is a reasonable specification for the constant impact on the party’s 
electoral fate, but this interaction term, DMNumInc / , alone cannot model the varying impact 
across different district magnitudes of running incumbents on the electoral fate of the party.  
Furthermore, even when we do not have a clear theoretical expectation of the variation 
across district magnitudes of a certain variable’s impact on the party’s electoral fate (e.g., the 
impact of the number of seats), the specification using the interaction with the reciprocal of 
DM alone may be too restrictive.  Including NumInc  simultaneously with DMNumInc /  
introduces flexibility to the variation of the impact of running incumbents across districts 
with different magnitude.  Specifically, the coefficient of NumInc  ( 4β ) estimates the 
deviation in the declining rate of the impact of a single incumbent from the decline 
proportionate to district magnitude.  More specifically, if the coefficient of NumInc  is 
negative ( 4β < 0), the impact of a single incumbent on a party’s vote share declines faster 
than the decline proportionate to district magnitude.  This means that the substantive impact 
of running an incumbent on the electoral fate of the party diminishes as district magnitude 
increases.  If it is positive ( 4β > 0), the impact on a party vote share declines more slowly than 
the proportionate decline, which indicates that the substantive impact on the party’s electoral 
fate increases as district magnitude grows.  If it is zero ( 4β = 0), the impact on a vote share 
declines proportionately to district magnitude, and the substantive impact on the electoral fate 
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of the party is constant across district magnitudes.8
NumInc
  These discussions suggest that an 
appropriate specification of the model for MMD systems should include , 
DMNumInc / , NumSeat , and DMNumSeat / as independent variables, as in equation (2). 
Although I do not expect district magnitude itself to have a particular impact on 
parties’ vote shares, DM  is included in equation (2) because it is one of the constitutive 
terms of the interactions, DMNumInc /  and DMNumSeat / , and its omission may lead to 
biased or inconsistent estimates if DM  itself indeed has any impact on a party’s vote share 
(Brambor et al. 2005).  Even when we do not theoretically expect an impact of a constitutive 
term itself on a dependent variable, it is advisable to include it and test empirically whether 
the term has any significant impact (Kam and Franzese 2007).9
In the specification of equation (2), the marginal impact of 
 
NumInc  (= DM/54 ββ + ) 
is the estimate of the electoral gain for parties by fielding one additional incumbent candidate, 
controlling for other factors that reflect their collective party reputation at both national and 
local levels.  If this marginal impact is greater than zero ( DM/54 ββ +  > 0), it indicates that 
there is indeed an electoral advantage for parties by fielding an incumbent candidate.  For 
MMD-OPN systems, we expect 4β < 0 and 5β > 0 since Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive 
advantage for parties from running incumbents, and Hypothesis 2 posits that the electoral 
advantage from incumbents declines as district magnitude grows.  As elaborated above, 
DM/5β  represents the decline proportionate to district magnitude in the impact of a single 
                                                 
8 The discussion here assumes 5β > 0, which is consistent with my hypotheses.  If 5β < 0 and 4β = 0, 
the impact of running a single incumbent is negative, and the impact increases (or the magnitude of the 
negative impact decreases) proportionately to district magnitude.  In this case, 4β > 0 or 4β < 0 
represents the deviation in the increasing rate of the impact from the increase proportionate to district 
magnitude. 
9 It turns out that DM  has neither a substantively nor statistically significant impact in either MMD-
OPN or MMD-CLD models (see coefficient estimates in Table 2.2). 
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incumbent on a vote share, and 4β  indicates the extent to which the decline in the impact of 
a single incumbent deviates from the proportionate decline.  If the impact of a single 
incumbent on a vote share declines faster than the proportionate decline to district 
magnitude ( 4β < 0), we can conclude that the electoral advantage that parties gain from 
running an additional incumbent decreases as district magnitude increases.  For MMD-CLD 
systems, we expect 4β ≈ 0 and 5β ≈ 0, as Hypothesis 1 suggests little advantage. 
 
2.4.3. Potential Endogeneity Bias 
If incumbents exit from the race because they expect poor electoral prospects of 
their party in their district, the incumbent-candidate variable is endogenous and the 
estimated incumbency advantage is biased upward (Cox and Katz 2002).  To assess if this is 
a serious concern for my dataset, I estimated a probit model of the retirement of incumbent 
MPs, a key covariate of which is their party’s margin of victory in the previous election.  
Since the party’s margin of victory reflects the closeness of the race for their parties, if its 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant, the results indicate that MPs exit from the 
race in a district where their party’s electoral prospect is poor and suggest a potential 
endogeneity.  The margin of victory variable is computed based on the winning vote margin 
of the last seat that MPs’ party won in their district in the previous election and the specific 
electoral formula of each country.  I used the natural log of the margin of victory variable to 
reflect the possibility of diminishing impact of vote margin.  Other control variables included 
in the model are seniority (the cumulative number of years MPs had served in the parliament 
prior to an election) and party dummies.  The model is estimated for each country separately.  
The coefficients of party vote margin are statistically insignificant for all countries except 
Austria and Finland.  For Austria and Finland, the coefficients are positive, rather than 
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negative, suggesting that the poor electoral prospect of their party is unlikely to be an 
important determinant of MPs’ exit.  These results suggest that this sort of endogeneity is 
not a serious concern for the countries included in the dataset.  In addition, I estimated the 
same model for Canada, which was included in the preliminary analysis.  The coefficient of 
the party vote margin is negative and statistically significant, suggesting a potential 
endogeneity.  Consequently, I excluded Canada from my analysis. 
 
2.5. Results 
Table 2.2 presents the estimation results for the three models.  Model 1 is the 
estimation result for SMD systems based on equation (1).  Models 2 and 3 are for MMD-
OPN and MMD-CLD systems respectively, based on equation (2).  Standard errors are 
clustered in each district and election so that they are robust to stochastic dependence 
among parties in the same district and heteroschedastic errors across parties and districts.  
The coefficient estimates of incumbency variables, Inc , NumInc , and DMNumInc /  are 
highlighted in gray in Table 2.2.   
 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
 
The coefficient estimate of Inc  in Model 1 indicates a positive and statistically 
significant gain for parties from running an incumbent under SMD systems, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  When parties field an incumbent candidate, they receive about 
a 1.01 percentage-point increase in their district vote share.  The estimation result of Model 2 
for MMD-OPN systems supports both Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The coefficient of 
DMNumInc /  has an expected positive sign and is statistically significant.  The coefficient on 
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NumInc  is negative as expected and statistically significant, suggesting that the vote gain of 
parties from one additional incumbent declines faster than the decline proportionate to 
district magnitude.  These coefficient estimates indicate that under MMD-OPN systems, 
there is an electoral advantage for parties from fielding incumbents, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, and the electoral advantage declines as district magnitude grows, as in 
Hypothesis 2.  The estimation result of Model 3 for MMD-CLD systems is also consistent 
with Hypothesis 1.  The coefficients of NumInc  and DMNumInc /  are both statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that there is little electoral advantage for parties by running 
incumbents.   
To compare the magnitude of the electoral gains across electoral systems, Figure 2.1 
depicts the estimates of the marginal impact of running an additional incumbent over 
different district magnitudes for each system.  For MMD-OPN and MMD-CLD systems 
(the left and right panels), these are the estimates of the marginal impact of NumInc , based 
on Models 2 and 3, respectively (= DM/54 ββ +  from equation (2)).  This estimated impact 
is drawn over a range of district magnitudes from 3 to 25, which contains the vast majority 
of district observations of MMD-OPN and MMD-CLD systems.  For SMD systems, the 
marginal impact of Inc  is translated into a quantity comparable with those of MMD systems 
by dividing the estimated coefficient of Inc in Model 1 ( 3β  in equation (1)) by district 
magnitude (= DM/3β ).  This quantity is drawn over a range of district magnitudes from 1 to 
25 (the center panel).  Black lines in these figures show point estimates of the impact and 
gray areas represent 90% confidence intervals. 
 
 [Figure 2.1 about here] 
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 The left panel for MMD-OPN systems in Figure 2.1 shows that, while it is positive 
and statistically significant at lower district magnitudes, the gain in party vote share becomes 
statistically indistinguishable from zero at higher district magnitudes, which is another 
indication for the decline in the impact of an incumbent on the party’s electoral fate with 
district magnitude.  The right panel for MMD-CLD systems shows that while there is a 
certain range of district magnitude for which the vote gain from an additional incumbent is 
statistically significant, the point estimates are almost flat over the entire range of district 
magnitude and statistically insignificant for most values of district magnitude.  This also 
suggests that there are only small electoral gains, if any, from running incumbents under 
MMD-CLD systems. 
In MMD-OPN systems, the increase in the district party vote share due to an 
additional incumbent candidate is sizable at lower district magnitudes.  For example, 
between the district magnitudes of 3 and 5, in which almost all districts in MMD-OPN/Low 
DM countries (Ireland and Japan) fall, the estimated increase in party vote share ranges from 
2.49 percentage points, when district magnitude is 3, to 1.38 percentage points, when it is 5.  
The estimated vote gains at the same district magnitudes under MMD-CLD systems are only 
0.26 to 0.22 percentage points.  The electoral advantage of running an incumbent is clearly 
greater in MMD-OPN systems than MMD-CLD systems when the number of seats in a 
district is small.  To see this difference formally, I computed the difference between the 
estimated vote gains from running an additional incumbent between MMD-OPN and 
MMD-CLD systems; i.e., the difference in the estimated marginal impact of NumInc  
(= DM/54 ββ + ) between Models 2 and 3.  The estimated difference is drawn over district 
magnitudes between 3 and 25 in the left panel of Figure 2.2, in which a black line is the 
estimated difference and a gray area is its 90% confidence interval.  Up to a district 
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magnitude of 11, the difference between the estimated advantage in MMD-OPN and MMD-
CLD systems is statistically significant.  The advantage in MMD-OPN systems is clearly 
greater than that in MMD-CLD systems below a district magnitude of 11, but beyond this 
point, the advantage in MMD-OPN systems is too small to be statistically distinguishable 
from that in MMD-CLD systems. 
 
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
A similar difference can be observed between the estimated advantage of MMD-
OPN systems and SMD systems (the left and center panels of Figure 2.1).  The estimated 
vote gain in MMD-OPN systems at low district magnitudes — for example, 2.49 and 1.38 
percentage points at district magnitudes of 3 and 5 — is even greater than the gain of 1.01 
percentage points estimated for SMD systems for which district magnitude is only 1.  When 
divided by district magnitudes of 3 and 5, the estimated vote advantage of SMD is translated 
into 0.34 (=1.01/3) and 0.20 (=1.01/5) percentage points respectively, which is much 
smaller than the 2.49 and 1.38 percentage points estimated for MMD-OPN systems.  The 
difference between these two systems is given formally in the center panel of Figure 2.2, 
which depicts the marginal impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) in Model 2 (MMD-OPN) 
minus the marginal impact of Inc in Model 1 (SMD) divided by district magnitude ( DM/3β ).  
The difference is statistically significant up to a district magnitude of 18, but beyond that, the 
advantage in MMD-OPN systems becomes too small to be statistically distinguishable from 
the advantage in SMD systems. 
My hypotheses also suggest that the electoral advantage of running an incumbent is 
greater in SMD systems than in MMD-CLD systems.  As is already discussed, the advantage 
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is statistically significant for SMD but largely insignificant for MMD-CLD systems, which 
seems to suggest that the electoral advantage of running incumbents is greater in SMD than 
in MMD-CLD systems as hypothesized.  However, it turned out that the difference in the 
advantage between these two systems is not statistically significant.  This is shown in the 
right panel of Figure 2.2 that records the marginal impact of Inc in Model 1 (SMD) divided 
by district magnitude ( DM/3β ) minus the marginal impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) in 
Model 3 (MMD-CLD) over varying district magnitudes.  As is clear from the figure, the 
estimated difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the entire range of district 
magnitudes. 
In general, the estimation results of the three models in Table 2.2 and the analysis of 
these results based on Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide strong support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Specifically, I found that there is positive and statistically significant electoral advantage for 
parties from fielding incumbents under MMD-OPN and SMD systems while the advantage 
under MMD-CLD systems is largely statistically insignificant.  The advantage under MMD-
OPN systems is greater than that under the other two systems when district magnitude is 
small, but the difference dissipates as district magnitude grows, since the advantage declines 
as district magnitude increases under MMD-OPN systems.  While the hypothesis suggests 
that the electoral advantage of running incumbents is greater in SMD than in MMD-CLD 
systems, it is found that the advantages in these systems are statistically indistinguishable.  
The results suggest that the main difference in the electoral advantage of incumbents lie 
between electoral rules with intra-party competition and those without it, and the difference 




2.6. Substantive Significance 
To gauge the substantive significance of the electoral advantage of running 
incumbent candidates, I simulated, based on the estimated models, the aggregate impact of 
fielding incumbent candidates on national-level vote shares of their parties, which I label 
“aggregate incumbency advantage.”  We can assess the substantive magnitude of the 
electoral advantage of running incumbents by comparing the simulated aggregate 
incumbency advantage with, for example, past findings regarding the magnitude of 
economic voting, which are also measured in national vote shares.   
For each party in each election, this national-level quantity can be derived by 
simulating vote shares in all districts based on the estimated models and aggregating district-
level quantities into the national one.  Specifically, for each party j of country c in each 
election t, we first set up two hypothetical states: in the first state, there is no electoral gain 
for party j from incumbents while in the second state, party j enjoys the gains from fielding 
incumbents.  The first state is simulated by setting the number of incumbent variables for 
party j to zero with all other variables held at their actual values.  The second state is 
simulated by changing the number of incumbent variables of party j to an appropriate 
hypothetical value (discussed later).  For each of the two hypothetical states, we simulate 
district-level vote shares of party j in all districts and aggregate the district-level votes to 
calculate a national-level vote share.10
                                                 
10 Simulated district-level party vote shares are multiplied by the valid number of votes cast in each district 
and aggregated into national-level party votes.  Then, national-level party votes are divided by the valid 
number of votes cast nationwide to derive a national-level party vote share.  
  The aggregate incumbency advantage for party j of 
country c in election t is computed as the simulated national-level vote share of party j under 
the second hypothetical state, in which the party enjoys the gains from running incumbents, 
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minus the same vote share under the first state, in which there is no gain from fielding 
incumbents. 
For the second hypothetical state in which parties enjoy the electoral gains from 
incumbents, one possibility of a hypothetical number of incumbents used for simulation is 
the actual number of incumbents in each election.  This provides a simulation of the 
advantage parties actually gained in each election.  However, the propensity of fielding 
incumbent candidates varies across parties and countries.  The aggregate incumbency 
advantage simulated based on the actual number of incumbents reflects this variation in the 
incumbents’ rate of returning to the electoral race.  To single out the impact of electoral 
systems on the electoral advantage of running incumbents, we should fix the returning rate 
of incumbents across parties and countries so that the simulated advantage represents the 
variation across electoral systems, controlling for the incumbents’ returning rate.  I calculated 
the average returning rate of incumbents of the parties for which a simulation is conducted 
(78.15%) and applied this returning rate to all parties.  That is, I set a hypothetical number of 
incumbents for each party at 0.7815 times the total number of seats held by this party prior 
to an election.  Since the aggregate incumbency advantage simulated this way varies 
depending on which incumbents actually returned to the race, I simulated the electoral 
advantage for each party under a different combination of returning incumbents for 1000 
times, with the set of returning incumbents chosen randomly for each simulation, and 
derived the average of these simulations. 
The aggregate incumbency advantage is simulated for each party in each election in 
the dataset.  For Ireland, for example, there are altogether 39 party-election-level results of 
this quantity: 15 each for Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, and 9 for Labour (the first two parties 
held more than a 10% seat share prior to all 15 elections in the dataset while Labour did so 
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prior to 9 elections only).  I computed the average of the multiple simulation results for each 
country to produce a single quantity summarizing the aggregate impact of running 
incumbent candidates in each country (average aggregate incumbency advantage).  For 
example, the average aggregate incumbency advantage for Ireland was computed by 
averaging the 39 party-election-level aggregate incumbency advantages. 
Figure 2.3 shows the simulation results of the average aggregate incumbency 
advantage for all countries included in the analysis.  The pattern appearing in this figure 
reflects the findings in the previous section.  First, the average aggregate incumbency 
advantage is the largest for MMD-OPN/Low DM systems: an increase of 2.04 percentage 
points and 1.93 percentage points in national-level vote share for Japan and Ireland 
respectively (median district magnitude is 4 for both countries).  The advantage under 
MMD-OPN systems decline as a country’s district magnitude increases: a 0.65 percentage-
point gain for Finland (median district magnitude is 13) and a 0.20 percentage-point increase 
for Italy (median district magnitude is 18).  The advantages under SMD and MMD-CLD 
systems are small and largely indistinguishable between these two systems: a gain of 0.40 and 
0.39 percentage points for New Zealand and the U.K. (SMD), and an increase of 0.43, 0.36, 
and 0.23 percentage points for Belgium, Norway, and Austria (MMD-CLD), respectively.  
These advantages in SMD and MMD-CLD are also of a similar magnitude to the gain in 
Italy, which has the highest median district magnitude of the MMD-OPN countries included 
in the analysis. 
 
 [Figure 2.3 about here] 
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The simulated average aggregate impacts in Figure 2.3 are suggestive of a substantive 
importance of the personal vote of incumbent candidates under these electoral systems.  
One way to gauge the substantive significance is to compare the simulated average aggregate 
incumbency advantage to the historical volatility of party vote shares from one election to 
the next.  Parties care about how much their vote shares change from election to election 
because it affects their standing in the government and the parliament.  If the magnitude of 
the electoral gains from running incumbents is sizable compared to the change in parties’ 
vote shares between elections, we can conclude that the electoral gains from incumbents is 
substantively significant for these parties.  For 92 elections in the nine countries included in 
the analysis, the average absolute vote swing in terms of national-level vote shares of the 
parties that held more than a 10% seat share prior to each election is 3.05 percentage 
points.11
                                                 
11 To derive this quantity, I first compute the absolute value of the difference in the national-level vote 
share of each party in election t and the same vote share in election t-1.  Then, the quantity is averaged 
across all parties and elections. 
  The magnitude of the simulated average aggregate impact of running incumbents 
under MMD-OPN/Low DM equals about two-thirds (2.04/3.05 = 66.89% for Japan and 
1.93/3.05 = 63.28% for Ireland) of the average absolute vote change from one election to 
another; the impact under MMD-OPN/High DM is in the range of one-fifth (0.65/3.05 = 
21.31% for Finland) to one-fifteenth (0.20/3.05 = 6.56% for Italy); the impacts under SMD 
are about one-eighth (0.40/3.05 = 13.11% for New Zealand and 0.39/3.05 = 12.79% for the 
U.K.); and those in MMD-CLD are in the range of one-seventh to one-thirteenth (from 
0.43/3.05 = 14.1% for Belgium to 0.23/3.05 = 7.54% for Austria).  The comparison 
demonstrates that the impact of the electoral benefit to parties from their incumbent 
candidates’ personal vote is substantively large under electoral systems with intra-party 
competition (MMD-OPN), especially when the average district-magnitude is low — the 
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simulated impact is as large as two-thirds of the change in parties’ vote shares between 
elections under MMD-OPN/Low DM systems.  
Given our concern that the personal vote of incumbents may undermine some 
important functions of elections based on the collective responsibility of parties, such as 
collective accountability and mandate-giving roles, it is informative to compare the simulated 
aggregate impacts of incumbents to the prior findings in the literature about these functions 
of elections.  Here I make such a comparison to the extent of economic voting in advanced 
industrial democracies.  Powell and Whitten (1993) found that, in their sample of 93 
parliamentary elections in 19 developed democracies, single-party majority governments lost, 
on average, 3.6 percentage points in vote share, and postelection majority coalitions lost 2.5 
percentage points.  We see that the magnitude of the average aggregate incumbency 
advantage in MMD-OPN/Low DM countries is more than one-half of the magnitude of 
voters’ penalization of poorly performing single-party majority governments (2.04/3.6 = 
56.67% for Japan and 1.93/3.6 = 53.61% for Ireland) and as large as four-fifths of the 
voters’ punishment on coalition parties (2.04/2.5 = 81.60% for Japan and 1.93/2.5 = 
77.20% for Ireland), respectively.  Similarly, the advantage in Finland under MMD-
OPN/High DM equals about one-fifth (0.65/3.6 = 18.06%) of single party government’s 
vote loss and one-fourth (0.65/2.5 = 26.00%) of coalition governments’ vote loss.  The 
advantages in Italy, the other country under MMD-OPN/High DM but with greater district 
magnitude, and countries under SMD and MMD-CLD are about or below one-tenth of the 
governments’ vote loss.  In a more recent study, Duch and Stevenson (2008) used 163 public 
opinion surveys in 18 developed democracies and found that the worsening of economic 
perceptions of voters lead to, on average, the loss of 5 percentage points in the vote share of 
a chief executive party.  Given this estimate, we see that the average aggregate incumbency 
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advantage in MMD-OPN/Low DM countries equals about two-fifths (2.04/5.0 = 40.80% 
for Japan and 1.93/5.0 = 38.60% for Ireland) of the economic vote.  The advantage in 
Finland is slightly greater than one-tenth (0.65/5.0 = 13.00%).  The incumbency advantages 
in Italy and SMD and MMD-CLD countries are much smaller.  These comparisons suggest 
that under electoral systems with intra-party competition, especially when electoral districts 
in these systems have, on average, low district magnitude, the electoral gains to political 
parties from fielding incumbent candidates have sizable impacts on election outcomes, and 
may undermine, to a substantial degree, the accountability and mandate-giving roles of 
democratic elections based on the collective responsibility of parties. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has conducted a comparative analysis of the electoral gains for political 
parties from fielding incumbent candidates — incumbency advantage for political parties.  
Based on the empirical analyses of district-level party votes in nine developed democracies, 
this chapter has demonstrated that there is a sizable amount of electoral benefits to parties 
from fielding incumbent candidates, and the magnitude of advantage varies across electoral 
systems in a way different from what we naturally expect from the existing theory of 
individual politicians’ incentives for a personal vote.  It is found that the incumbency 
advantage is larger under electoral systems with intra-party competition than those without it, 
and among systems with intra-party competition, the advantage declines as district 
magnitude grows.  While smaller than in systems with intra-party competition, there is also a 
statistically significant electoral advantage of running incumbents under SMD systems.  On 
the other hand, the estimated advantage under MMD systems with no intra-party 
competition is largely statistically insignificant.  However, the estimated advantages of SMD 
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and MMD-CLD systems are not statistically distinguishable.  These findings suggest that an 
important difference in the magnitude of the electoral advantage of running incumbents lies 
between electoral rules with intra-party competition and those without it, and the difference 




Table 2.1. List of Countries in the District-Level Election Dataset and Summary Statistics 
 















SMD          
New Zealand SMD-Plurality 1946-1990 7 1 1 1 1 596 1191 
United Kingdom SMD-Plurality 1950-2005 11 1 1 1 1 5685 11353 
MMD with NO Intra-Party Competition (MMD-CLD)       
Austria Closed-List PR 1995-2008 5 4.33 4 3 8 210 630 
Belgium Closed-List PR 1971-1987 6 7.07 5 2 34 180 600 
Norway  Closed-List PR 1953-2005 13 7.94 7 3 16 250 889 
MMD with Intra-Party Competition & Low District Magnitude (MMD-OPN/Low DM)  
Ireland STV 1954-2007 15 3.87 4 3 5 540 1338 
Japan SNTV 1958-1993 12 3.97 4 2 6 1480 3182 
MMD with Intra-Party Competition & High District Magnitude (MMD-OPN/High DM)  
Finland Open-List PR 1958-2007 13 14.18 13 6 34 181 681 
Italy Open-List PR 1948-1992 10 20.17 18 3 54 308 709 
Total  1946-2008 92     9430 20573 
 
NOTE: The dataset is constructed from the following sources.  Austria: Bundesminiterium für Inneres. Various years. Die 
Nationalratswahlen.  Belgium: i) Ministère de l’Intérieur. Various years. Elections Législatives.  ii) Résultats électoraux 
(http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/fr/main.html).  Finland: Tilastokeskus. Various years. Kansanedustajain Vaalit.  Ireland: i) Stationery 
Office. Various years. Election Results and Transfer of Votes.  ii) ElectionsIreland.org (http://electionsireland.org/index.cfm).  iii) Ted Nealon. 
1997. Nealon's guide to the 28th Dail & Seanad: Election ’97.  Italy: i) Ministero dell’ Interno. Various years. Elezioni Politiche.  ii) La Navicella. 
Various years. I Deputati e Senatori del nono Parlamento Repubblicano.  Japan: Steven R. Reed. Japan MMD Data Set (http://www.fps.chuo-
u.ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.html).  New Zealand: i) Electoral Office. Various years. The General Election.  ii) Clifford Norton. 1988. New 
Zealand Parliamentary Election Results 1946-1987.  Norway: Statistisk Sentralbyrå. Various years. Stortingsvalget.  UK: i) The UK Electoral 
Commission. Election Results (http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/election-data/index.cfm).  ii) Craig, F.W.S. Various years. British 
Parliamentary Election Results.  iii) UK General Elections since 1832 (http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/edates.htm) 
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Table 2.2. Incumbency and District-Level Party Vote Share Across Electoral 




Model 1:  
SMD 
Model 2:  
MMD-OPN 
Model 3:  
MMD-CLD 
1−t
cijV   0.9133 (0.0043) ***  0.8302 (0.0125) ***  0.9271 (0.0098) *** 
t
ciNumPty  -0.0082 (0.0004) *** -0.0050 (0.0005) *** -0.0002 (0.0004) 
t
cijInc   0.0101 (0.0014) ***   
1−t
cijSeat   0.0112 (0.0016) ***   
t
ciDM   -0.0001 (0.0002)  0.0000 (0.0003) 
t




cij DMNumInc /    0.0831 (0.0126) ***  0.0030 (0.0132) 
1−t





1−   -0.0531 (0.0139) ***  0.0023 (0.0126) 
Number of Observations         12544            5910        2119 
R squared         0.9941         0.9851      0.9943 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are district-level party vote shares.  Estimates of national swings 
to each party in each election ( tcjα ) are not shown.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  


































Notes: The figures for MMD-OPN and MMD-CLD draw the estimated marginal impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) based on Models 2 
and 3 in Table 2.2.  The figure for SMD draws the estimated marginal impact of Inc  divided by district magnitude ( DM/3β ) based on 





Figure 2.2. Difference in the Change in District-Level Party Vote Share (%) by Fielding One Additional Incumbent Candidate 






























Notes: The first figure draws the difference in the estimated marginal impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) between MMD-OPN and MMD-
CLD, based on Models 2 and 3 in Table 2.2.  The second figure is the difference between the marginal impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) 
of MMD-OPN and the marginal impact of Inc  of SMD divided by district magnitude ( DM/3β ), based on Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.2.  
The third figure is the difference between the marginal impact of Inc  of SMD divided by district magnitude ( DM/3β ) and the marginal 
impact of NumInc  ( DM/54 ββ + ) of MMD-CLD, based on Models 1 and 3 in Table 2.2.  Black lines indicate point estimates, and gray 
areas are 90 % confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.3. Aggregate Electoral Advantage for Parties from Fielding Incumbent 


























Notes: The figure draws the simulated “average aggregate incumbency advantage” for each 










Incumbency Disadvantage for Individual Candidates under Electoral Rules with 
Extreme Intra-Party Competition: Evidence from Japan 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 This chapter extends the analysis to the electoral advantage of holding an incumbent 
seat for individual candidates — incumbency advantage for individual candidates.  In particular, 
it develops the theory of the variation in incumbency advantage for individual candidates 
between single-member district (SMD) systems and multimember district (MMD) systems 
with intra-party competition.  Although the theory is applicable generally, this chapter 
focuses on the extreme case of the systems with intra-party competition — Japan under the 
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system during 1958-1993.  The theory developed 
here posits that incumbency advantage for candidates will be smaller in MMD with intra-
party competition than SMD, due to the particular competitive environments generated by 
intra-party competition in multimember districts.  Since Japan under SNTV entailed one of 
the most extreme cases of intra-party electoral competition, it should be in this country case 
that the difference from SMD can be seen most clearly.  In other words, Japan is an 
appropriate case for the first systematic attempt to study of a smaller advantage of 
incumbents over non-incumbents.  Indeed, the empirical analysis reported in this chapter 
reveals that marginal incumbents suffer disadvantage over marginal non-incumbent 
candidates in Japan under SNTV. 
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 An important point of this chapter is that the theoretical expectation and empirical 
findings contradict with the natural expectation derived from the existing literature of 
electoral systems and personal-vote incentives.  When electoral rules allow for intra-party 
competition, individual politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote will also become 
greater (Carey and Shughart 1995).  Given the strong incentives for the personal vote, we 
naturally expect that incumbents would have greater electoral advantage relative to non-
incumbents under MMD systems with intra-party competition than under SMD systems.  
However, this chapter (and the next chapter) suggests to the contrary that greater intra-party 
competition diminishes the electoral advantage of incumbents. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 provides a theoretical 
explanation for why there may be little incumbency advantage or even a disadvantage under 
MMD rules with intra-party competition.  Section 3.3 introduces the case of Japan.  Section 
3.4 presents a regression-discontinuity analysis of individual-candidate-level election-
outcomes.  Section 3.5 concludes with the summary of the findings of this chapter.  
 
3.2. Theory of Incumbency Disadvantage  
Under SMD systems, incumbents are expected to have an advantage over non-
incumbents because they can use their various office privileges as incumbent legislators to 
cultivate personal votes and deter the entrance of high-quality challengers (Cox and Katz 
1996, Levitt and Wolfram 1997).  Even under SMD systems, however, it is not unreasonable 
to point out some potential disadvantages that incumbents may have vis-à-vis non-
incumbent candidates although these disadvantages generally do not seem to outweigh the 
advantages empirically.  In the following paragraphs, I list three potential sources of 
disadvantages, which can equally apply to both SMD systems and MMD systems with intra-
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party competition.  Then I discuss how the particular features of competitive environments 
created by MMD systems with intra-party competition may strengthen these potential 
disadvantages of incumbents, perhaps leaving little net advantage, or even a disadvantage, of 
incumbents over non-incumbents. 
First, between elections, incumbents must spend significant amounts of time in their 
country’s capital to attend the parliamentary sessions and participate in the daily politics of 
policymaking at the national level.  On the other hand, non-incumbents can stay in their 
district throughout the entire parliamentary session during which incumbents must report to 
the capital.  This provides non-incumbents with a considerable time advantage over 
incumbents to rebuild and expand their local campaign organizations, attend local social 
events to sell their name among the electorate, and canvas the electoral district in de facto, if 
not official, campaigning for the next election (Curtis 1992, Inoguchi and Iwai 1987).1
Second, some incumbents may not be able to provide their supporters with 
promised policies and services due to an insufficiency of their bargaining power in the 
legislature or to unfavorable economic or political environments that hinder the fulfillment 
  Of 
course, non-incumbents also need to spend some time in earning their living and thus 
cannot spend the entire time between elections in campaigning efforts.  But, incumbents’ 
full-time jobs are worse in this regard, being out of district (as a national legislator at the 
capital).  The need to travel between a district and the capital is the primary disadvantage 
that incumbents have over non-incumbents.   
                                                 
1 In Japan, the empirical case for this paper, electoral campaigning is prohibited by law between elections 
except for a short official campaigning period before an election (McElwain 2008).  However, candidates 
can conduct a wide range of de facto campaigning activities throughout the entire period between elections, 
so long as they do not explicitly ask voters to vote for them, and most candidates, whether incumbents or 
not, actually spend significant amounts of time in those de facto campaign activities.  See Curtis (1971) for 
detailed examples of these de facto campaign activities. 
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of those promises.  Non-incumbents can criticize those incumbents who failed to fulfill their 
promises and persuade some voters who had cast a ballot for the incumbents to turn their 
support to non-incumbents.  This strategy may involve some credibility problems, because it 
is not necessarily clear if non-incumbents who criticize incumbents are competent enough to 
deliver on their own promises.  The credibility problems can be mitigated if non-incumbents 
have some prior experience in elected office or other important positions that influence the 
local economy and society.  Some non-incumbents may be former national representatives in 
the district prior to the previous election but failed to get reelected in that election.  Others 
may have prior experience in local executive or legislative offices in that district.  Prior 
experience in elective office is regarded as an important signal of candidate quality both in 
the U.S. (Jacobson 1980) and other developed democracies (Shugart et al. 2005).  Yet others 
may be business managers, non-elected government officers, and leaders of unions or other 
local organizations, whose accomplishments are well-known among the electorate.  These 
non-incumbents with no experience in elective office may still be able to convince a 
sufficient number of voters that they are as competent as, or more so than, incumbent 
legislators to fulfill their policy promises based on their past accomplishments outside of 
politics. 
Third, in service of partisan goals and reputation, incumbents are sometimes placed 
in a position to vote for the policies that deviate from the preferences of their supporters in 
their district.  Non-incumbents can blame those incumbents and may attract some of the 
incumbents’ previous voters who are now disgruntled with the incumbents’ support for bills 
that are against their interests.  There is some evidence that this type of strategy should work 
for non-incumbent candidates to defeat incumbents of the opponent party in the U.S. 
Congress.  For example, Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) showed that, controlling for district 
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partisanship, members of Congress who had voted more consistently along their party line in 
the Capitol chambers lost votes in their electoral district in the subsequent election.  This 
evidence indicates that non-incumbents were successful to a certain degree in attracting 
some voters by criticizing these incumbents for making a legislative choice away from the 
median voter’s preference in their district.  This type of disadvantage to incumbents, 
however, does not seem to outweigh the overall advantage that incumbents enjoy in the U.S. 
Congressional elections, as evidenced in the considerable net advantage estimated for 
incumbent candidates.  This may be because, in the U.S. Congress, a party’s legislative voting 
unity is usually low in the first place and incumbents often vote against their party’s 
proposals to appeal to voters in their districts.  This potential disadvantage for incumbents 
should be more problematic for members of parliament (MPs) in parliamentary democracies, 
in which legislative voting cohesion is necessary for the survival of the cabinet, and most 
MPs in fact vote along the party line (Carey 2007).  
Whether these disadvantages outweigh the advantages incumbents enjoy is an 
empirical question.  The positive findings of incumbency advantage in the existing studies on 
SMD systems in developed democracies imply that these disadvantages do not outweigh the 
advantages of incumbents under these systems.  Under MMD systems with intra-party 
competition, however, the particular nature of intra-party competition is likely to make these 
disadvantages more pronounced.  Incumbents’ advantages may not necessarily outweigh 
these enhanced disadvantages and consequently, there may be little incumbency advantage, 
or even a disadvantage, under these systems.  I discuss below four such natures of intra-party 
competition. 
First, to attract voters who had previously voted for incumbents is a relatively easier 
task for non-incumbents in MMD systems with intra-party competition than non-
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incumbents in SMD systems.  To win under SMD systems, a non-incumbent candidate must 
attract some fraction of voters who had voted for an incumbent of an opponent party.  This 
implies that non-incumbents will typically need to appeal to voters who are ideologically 
distant from themselves.  However, when there are multiple candidates from one party in 
the same district, non-incumbents can attract voters who had voted previously for other 
candidates of their own party.  In this case, non-incumbents can appeal mainly to voters who 
are closer to their own ideological position.  For non-incumbents, the latter task — 
attracting voters who are ideologically closer to non-incumbents but had voted for other 
candidates of the same party — is easier than the former — attracting voters who are 
ideologically distant from non-incumbents and therefore had voted for an opponent party’s 
candidates. 
Second, under SMD systems, non-incumbents have a real chance of ousting 
incumbents only in a relatively small number of marginal districts where a good number of 
independent and less-partisan voters, to whom non-incumbents can realistically appeal, 
reside.  Under MMD systems with intra-party competition, however, non-incumbents can in 
general find marginal incumbents in a much greater number of districts.  This is because 
there are multiple incumbents in every district, making some incumbents more marginal than 
others within each district, and these relatively more marginal incumbents tend to have 
smaller vote margins.  For example, in the U.K. under SMD during 1945-2005, 
representatives won within a 5% vote-share margin in 13.55% of all districts, but in Japan 
under SNTV during 1958-1993, there were legislators who won within an equivalent 5/M % 
vote-share margin in 84.38% of all districts (M refers to district magnitude, the number of 
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seats in a district).2
Third, the existence of multiple incumbents in the same district also makes credit 
claiming of individual incumbents less plausible or less effective in MMD systems with intra-
party competition than in SMD systems because any and all incumbents in the same district 
can claim credit for their party’s achievement.  To avoid this credibility or effectiveness 
problem of credit claiming, incumbents of the same party usually specialize in different 
policy areas or divide their electoral district into narrow bailiwicks and claim credit in these 
policy or geographical areas (Hirano 2006, Marsh 2000, McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995).  
This policy- or geographical-demarcation strategy should be an excellent insurance for 
incumbents, if it works well, but they are by no means perfect.  To the extent that a certain 
policy area is appealing to a given district (e.g., agricultural policy in a rural district, small 
business policy in an urban district), multiple incumbents are tempted to claim credit for the 
achievements in that policy area, which makes these incumbents’ credit claiming less 
convincing.  Geographical bailiwicks are also always subject to encroachment by other 
candidates, either incumbents or non-incumbents.  These problems do not exist under SMD 
systems since there is only one incumbent in each district.  This incumbent can claim sole 
credit for policy achievements of her party. 
  With a greater fraction of districts with marginal incumbents, MMD with 
intra-party competition provides non-incumbent candidates with a greater chance of winning 
than SMD. 
Fourth, given the relative ease of defeating incumbents for the reasons discussed 
above, high-quality challengers are more likely to enter the race or remain in the race — if 
they had also run in the previous election — in MMD systems with intra-party competition 
                                                 
2 In general, a vote share, V, in a single-member district is comparable to V/M in a multimember district.  
Therefore, I treat a 5% vote-share margin under SMD as equivalent to a 5/M% vote-share margin under 
SNTV.  
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than in SMD systems.  One important factor for incumbency advantage, identified for SMD 
systems in the literature, is that the quality of non-incumbent challengers is low in districts in 
which incumbent candidates return to the race (Cox and Katz 1996, Levitt and Wolfram 
1997).  This is because high-quality challengers are deterred from entering or remaining in 
the race due to the strength of personal reputation developed by incumbents.  Compared to 
SMD systems, however, high-quality non-incumbent challengers should have fewer reasons 
to be deterred from running because of the relative ease of defeating incumbents as 
discussed above. 
These considerations of the particular natures of competitive environments created 
by MMD systems with intra-party competition suggest that the disadvantages incumbents 
face are stronger and more likely to be evident under these rules than SMD systems.  The 
advantages of incumbency, on the other hand, gain no commensurate enhancement in 
MMD as opposed to SMD systems.  It is, therefore, more likely under MMD systems with 
intra-party competition than SMD systems that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages 
that incumbents enjoy.  In other words, incumbents under MMD systems with intra-party 
competition are more likely to have little advantage or even a disadvantage over non-
incumbents of the same party.   
In addition, there should also be important variation in the disadvantage of 
incumbents over non-incumbents depending on their electoral marginality.  As we have seen in 
the examples from the U.K. and Japan, while marginal incumbents and non-incumbents are 
concentrated in a small number of districts under SMD systems, they are more commonly 
observed in many districts under MMD systems with intra-party competition.  This makes 
the electoral marginality of candidates a particularly important variation under MMD systems 
with intra-party competition.  On average, incumbents who had marginally won in the 
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previous election should be most vulnerable to the challenge of non-incumbent candidates 
since these incumbents have the least votes to spare before facing defeat by non-incumbents.  
Similarly, non-incumbents who had marginally lost in the previous election should be, on 
average, the greatest beneficiary from the disadvantages of incumbents since they need the 
least additional number of votes to get elected.  For these reasons, it is further expected that 
incumbency disadvantage is likely to be materialized for incumbents who had won a seat 
marginally in the previous election over non-incumbents who had lost a seat marginally.  It is 
this hypothesis that I examine empirically based on the electoral data from Japan. 
 
3.3. The Case of Japan 
To examine the hypothesis posed above, this paper uses the electoral data from 
Japan during 1958-1993 when the country used the SNTV system for the House of 
Representatives (Shugiin), the lower house of the national parliament (the Diet or Kokkai), 
which had consisted of 467 to 512 representatives in the period covered.  SNTV uses 
multimember districts and allows voters to cast a single vote for a single candidate.  Each 
district has multiple seats except for a sole single-member district that existed until the 1990 
election.  There were 118 to 130 districts in each election and most districts (92 to 99% of all 
districts) had 3 to 5 seats.   For districts with M seats, the top M candidates are elected, and 
there is no vote-pooling for candidates of the same party.  It is this last feature that 
distinguishes SNTV from other popular systems with intra-party competition such as open-
list PR and STV, under which votes are pooled across candidates of the same party to 
determine the seat allocation.  Due to this feature, SNTV is ranked among the top of the 
various theoretically possible electoral formulas and the highest of the electoral rules used 
for national parliaments in developed democracies in terms of its propensity to encourage 
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intra-party competition and a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995).  It is also well 
documented in the Japanese-politics literature that SNTV led to highly intensive intra-party 
competition among candidates of the same party in the same electoral district (e.g., Curtis 
1970, Richardson 1998).  Moreover, intra-party electoral competition in a district took the 
form of institutionalized factional competition for the ruling LDP.  That is, each candidate of the 
LDP in a district was usually backed up by a different faction of the LDP.  This 
institutionalized nature of intra-party competition may be understood as the extreme form of 
intra-party competition — the very end of the continuum between the non-existence and the 
greatest degree of intra-party competition.  Given this high intensity and the extreme form 
of intra-party competition, if an incumbent would have a disadvantage under MMD rules 
with intra-party competition, then the disadvantage should be most pronounced under 
systems like SNTV in Japan. 
The particular nature of the institutionalization of LDP factions — which was 
heavily influenced by intra-party competition under SNTV (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 
Fukui 1978, Thayer 1969) — should have also made incumbency non-advantage or 
disadvantage more likely.  To compete with their copartisans, LDP candidates needed 
electoral resources beyond the party label and party funding.  Internal factions of the LDP, 
led by aspirants of party presidency (and premiership), provided those resources, such as 
cabinet or committee posts and campaign moneys, which helped individual candidates to 
cultivate their personal support bases.3
                                                 
3 Individual LDP candidates also raised their campaign funds but the money raised and distributed by 
factional bosses played a significant role in financing their campaigns (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993). 
  In return, LDP candidates voted for their faction 
leaders (or voted as directed by faction leaders) in the party’s leadership elections and also 
acted upon faction leaders’ directions in other various important occasions.  These 
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exchanges between faction leaders and followers developed into stable, institutionalized 
factions of the LDP (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, Thayer 1969).  Factions’ support to non-
incumbents’ election campaigns should have made non-incumbents’ challenge to 
incumbents more effective by giving non-incumbent candidates otherwise unavailable 
campaign funds and also providing additional credibility to these candidates’ pre-electoral 
promises of policies and favors to their supporters. 
For these reasons, the possibility of the disadvantages of incumbents outweighing 
their advantages, as discussed in the previous section, should have been greatest in Japan 
among developed democracies during its SNTV era.  Therefore, Japan is an appropriate case 
for the first systematic attempt to investigate incumbency non-advantage or disadvantage 
under MMD systems with intra-party competition. 
 An illustrative example would provide a clear idea about the possibility of 
incumbency non-advantage or disadvantage under the SNTV system in Japan.  The example 
is Iwate 1st district in the 1960 and 1963 elections.  In both elections, the LDP won three of 
the four seats in this district.  The party nominated the same four candidates, but the 
winning candidates were different between these two elections.  Yamamoto Takeo, an 
incumbent who had won a seat marginally in the 1960 election with a 1.27 percentage-point 
vote share margin, lost in the subsequent election after serving four terms in the Japanese 
Diet.  Isurugi Michiyuki, who had lost marginally in his first attempt to be elected into the 
Japanese parliament in the 1960 election, won the seat held by Yamamoto in the 1963 
election.  Yamamoto recorded a decline in his vote share from 14.78% to 11.64% between 
these two elections, the largest loss among the three LDP incumbents (the loss of a 3.14 
percentage-point vote share).  The other two incumbents, Suzuki Zenkou, who later became 
the prime minister in 1980, and Nohara Masakatsu also decreased their vote shares from 
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19.25% to 17.56% (the loss of a 1.69 percentage-point vote share) and from 17.98% to 
16.33% (the loss of a 1.65 percentage-point vote share), respectively.  On the other hand, 
Isurugi increased his vote share from 13.51% to 19.25%.  His gain of a 6.12 percentage-
point vote share was almost equivalent to the total loss of vote shares by other three LDP 
incumbents (6.48 percentage points).  In this example, while all LDP incumbents suffered 
some vote loss — especially Yamamoto, who had won a seat marginally in the previous 
election, suffered the greatest vote loss and thus lost his seat — the non-incumbent who had 
lost marginally in the previous election increased his votes and won.4
 The above example of Iwate 1st district illustrates incumbency disadvantage, 
especially for those who won the previous election marginally.  The question is whether this 
phenomenon can be found systematically in Japanese elections under SNTV.  Simple 
descriptive statistics provide a favorable answer.  Of the total 1632 district observations 
during 1958-1993 (13 elections, 118-130 district observations per election), the number of 
electoral districts in which at least one LDP incumbent lost a seat but, at the same time, at 
least one LDP non-incumbent won is 305.
 
5
That is, LDP incumbents lost to non-incumbents of the same party in about one-fifth 
(18.69%) of all districts.  If we restrict observations to districts in which there was intra-party 
competition between incumbents and non-incumbents of the LDP (1052 district 
observations in which at least one incumbent and one non-incumbent ran from the LDP), 
the proportion increases from one-fifth (18.69%) to approximately one-third (28.99%) — 
305 of 1052 district observations.  In these appreciable portions of electoral races found in 
Japan during the period covered, LDP incumbents were replaced by LDP non-incumbents, 
 
                                                 
4 A phenomenon like this is known as jiten-bane (“a re-bounce of a runner-up”) in Japan. 
5 LDP candidates here include conservative independents.  See the next section for justification. 
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suggesting that many incumbents might be little advantaged or even be disadvantaged.  To 
examine incumbency non-advantage or disadvantage more systematically, the next section 
turns to a regression-discontinuity analysis of the LDP candidates’ election outcomes.  
 
3.4. Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
3.4.1. Data and Estimation Sample 
Due to the LDP being the only party that regularly fielded multiple candidates per 
district in the majority of electoral districts under the SNTV system, the estimation focuses 
solely on the candidates of the LDP.  The dataset covers elections that occurred between 
1958, when the first election was held after the LDP was established through the merger of 
smaller conservative parties, and 1993, when the last election was held under SNTV.  I use 
the Japan MMD Data Set collected by Steven R. Reed (Reed 2007).  I include the 
conservative independents that are coded as “LDP-related independents” by Reed (2007) in 
this analysis of LDP candidates.  In Japan under SNTV, conservative candidates who had 
failed to win an official nomination from the LDP usually stood for election as conservative 
independents, often backed by one of the main factions of the LDP, and joined the LDP 
after they were elected to the national parliament (Browne and Kim 2003, Reed 1994).  
These conservative independents should be regarded as de facto LDP candidates, and “LDP 
candidates” hereafter refers to both official LDP candidates and LDP-related independents.  
In total, there are 4638 LDP candidate observations in 1514 districts in the dataset.6
The analysis is restricted to districts where intra-party competition between 
incumbent and non-incumbent candidates took place.  Specifically, only districts in which at 
  
                                                 
6 There are 1632 district observations during 1958-1993.  However, 118 district observations in the 1958 
election are excluded from this count because these observations are used only as lagged variables for the 
observations of the following election.  
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least one incumbent and one non-incumbent candidate ran from the LDP are included in 
the analysis.  As a result, 578 district observations (38.2% of the entire district observations) 
were excluded from the estimation sample.  This restriction of observations is necessary as 
these districts do not provide any information about intra-party competition between 
incumbents and non-incumbents.  In addition, a small number of redrawn or reapportioned 
districts were excluded.  In Japan under SNTV, redistricting and reapportionment were 
extremely rare.  There are only 36 district observations (2.4% of the entire district 
observations) that are excluded solely for this reason.  This exclusion should accordingly 
have little effect on the estimation results.  After these restrictions, the number of district 
observations included in the analysis becomes 900 districts, which cover close to two-thirds 
of the entire district observations in the dataset. 
Since the model, more fully explained below, requires lagged observations of 
candidates, only candidates who also ran in election t-1 are included in the analysis.  After 
this restriction, the estimation sample consists of 2418 LDP candidates.  This number is 
more than three-quarters of all LDP candidates (3179) in the 900 districts included in the 
analysis.  These restrictions of the observations could potentially cause a bias in estimation.  
I will discuss why this sample-selection issue is not a problem for the current purpose after I 
introduce the research design adopted for estimation. 
 
3.4.2. Regression Discontinuity Design 
I apply a regression-discontinuity (RD) design to the present analysis.  The RD is one 
approach to a causal inference of observational data, which is increasingly gaining popularity 
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960, Imbens and Lemieux 2008).  It has also been applied 
recently to incumbency advantage in the SMD literature (Lee 2008, Hainmueller and Kern 
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2008).  The RD design’s primary advantage over usual regression models is that, if its key 
assumptions are met, it is free from a potential bias due to unobserved omitted variables.  In 
usual regression models, our estimate is always subject to a potential bias due to omitted 
variables, especially unobserved ones.  The estimate from the RD analysis is insensitive to 
this possibility if its key assumptions hold.   
There are three main variables in the RD analysis.  In the jargon of causal inference, 
they are called outcome, treatment, and assignment variables.  An outcome is a dependent variable in 
the usual regression terminology, which is, in the present application, the election outcome 
of LDP candidates.  A treatment is a key independent variable which causes the difference in 
the outcome.  The treatment here is incumbency — whether a candidate won a seat in the 
previous election.  The estimand of interest is the average treatment effect (ATE) of incumbency, 
the average causal impact of incumbency on the election outcomes of individual candidates.  
The assignment variable plays an important role in the RD analysis.  This is an underlying 
variable that determines whether an observation receives a treatment.  The treatment is 
assigned to an individual only if an assignment variable is greater than a certain threshold.  
The assignment variable for the analysis here is the vote-share margin of victory of the 
candidate in election t-1 (VM).  For an incumbent, VM is calculated as her vote share minus 
the runner-up’s vote share (the vote share of the candidate who finished in the M+1-th place, 
where M refers to the number of seats in a district).  For a non-incumbent, it is his vote 
share minus the last winner’s vote share (the vote share of the candidate who finished in the 
M-th place).  VM is negative for non-incumbents, zero at the threshold, and positive for 
incumbents.  Incumbency, or a victory in election t-1, is assigned only if VM crosses the 
threshold value of zero. 
 72 
The key idea of the RD design is that at the threshold, assignment to a treatment is 
random.  In the present application, in very close elections in t-1, winning a parliamentary 
seat — an assignment of incumbency — is as good as random.  So long as the assignment is 
random, there is, on average, no other difference between incumbents and non-incumbents, 
except for whether they hold a seat (whether individuals receive a treatment).  Consequently, 
we can identify the average causal effect of incumbency as the difference in election 
outcomes in t between incumbents and non-incumbents at the threshold of the vote-share 
margin of victory in t-1, which is insensitive to either observed or unobserved omitted 
variables.  If we find a discontinuous positive jump in election outcomes at the threshold, it 
suggests an electoral advantage of holding an incumbent seat.  If we find a discontinuous 
negative jump, it suggests an incumbency disadvantage.  If there is no clear difference at the 
threshold, it suggests non-advantage. 
A limitation of the RD design is that the estimate of a treatment effect is valid only at 
the threshold of an assignment variable.  The RD design does not identify the treatment 
effect for the entire population (all LDP candidates) because the assignment of incumbency 
is not considered as random except for the near neighborhood of the threshold of the 
previous vote-share margin.  Therefore, it identifies the causal impact of incumbency only 
for the local population around the threshold (for marginal incumbents and non-incumbents 
only).  However, this is not really a limitation for the present analysis.  Since my hypothesis is 
concerned specifically with marginal incumbents and non-incumbents, the treatment effect 
estimated from the RD design is an appropriate quantity to test the hypothesis.  In other 
words, the RD design is especially suitable for the current analysis of incumbency non-
advantage or disadvantage of marginal candidates. 
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I analyze two election outcomes of LDP candidates at election t: one is a candidate’s 
vote share (a candidate’s votes divided by total number of valid votes cast in her district) and 
the other is a candidate’s winning probability (a binary indicator of the victory of a 
candidate).  Following one of the standard approaches of the RD analysis (Hainmueller and 
Kern 2008, Lee et al. 2004, Lee 2008), an outcome variable is regressed on a fourth-order 
polynomial of the margin of victory variable and its interaction with an incumbency indicator 
(I).  Specifically, the outcome variable is regressed on VM, VM2, VM3, VM4, I, (I × VM), (I 
× VM2), (I × VM3), and (I × VM4).7
 
  The idea is that the only thing that a flexible-enough 
polynomial could not reflect is a discontinuous break, which should be all what is left for the 
dummy variable, I, to pick up.  The estimated coefficient of I should reflect the magnitude of 
this discontinuous break in an election outcome at the threshold where VM is zero.  It 
identifies the average causal effect of incumbency on individual LDP candidates at the 
margin.  Standard errors are clustered in districts and elections to reflect stochastic 
dependence among candidates in the same district. 
3.4.3. Sample-Selection Issues 
The research design adopted here, which focuses on the candidates who ran in both 
the previous and current elections, has two sample-selection issues which might introduce 
potential sources of bias on the estimate of the treatment effect of incumbency.  First, if only 
non-incumbent candidates who expect better election results in their next run return to the race, 
the estimate of the incumbency effect may be biased downward.  Second, if only incumbents 
                                                 
7 In a standard regression framework, a binary dependent variable is usually modeled by a probit or logit 
model since a linear probability model fails to reflect non-linearity of the relationship between a binary 
variable and covariates and often produces logically impossible values of the predicted probability.  Here, 
the use of a high-order polynomial prevents these problems.  
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who expect good electoral prospects return to the race, the estimated treatment effect may 
be biased upward.  As explained below, however, these two issues do not cause a serious 
problem for the research question and estimation purpose of this paper. 
The first issue of the strategic exit of non-incumbents does not pose a significant 
problem given our interest in the electoral disadvantage that incumbents suffer over non-
incumbents.  If our theoretical interest lay in the electoral gain of average non-incumbents, the 
strategic retirement of non-incumbents would certainly bias our estimate of such a gain.  
However, the concern here is incumbents’ disadvantage — how negative the incumbents’ electoral fates 
could be — under intra-party competition.  An appropriate comparison here should be made 
between incumbents and electorally viable non-incumbents who can potentially defeat incumbents.  
The current research design is suitable for this purpose as the treatment effect, I, compares 
the performance of marginal incumbents with the performance of marginal, returning non-
incumbents who have self-selected into the costly race and spent a significant amount of 
time and energy in outpacing incumbent candidates.  In other words, for our purpose, the 
self selection of non-incumbents into the race is an important feature that we want our 
estimate of the treatment effect, I, to reflect, rather than a bias we want to eliminate. 
The second issue of the strategic exit of incumbents, if it exists, would bias the 
estimate of the desired treatment effect, but it would do so against my hypothesis.  That is, I 
expect a negative or a small and statistically insignificant positive estimate of the effect of I, 
and the potential upward bias, if present, would make it more difficult to find supportive 
evidence for my hypothesis.  If the incumbency non-advantage or disadvantage is 
nonetheless found as hypothesized, this will provide stronger evidence for the hypothesis 
since it is found despite a potential upward bias from incumbents’ strategic exit.   
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3.4.4. Estimation Results 
Panel (a) of Table 3.1 reports the estimated treatment effects of incumbency on an 
LDP candidate’s vote share and winning probability, and panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.1 
present these results graphically.  In panel (a) of Figure 3.1, LDP candidates’ vote shares at 
election t are plotted against their vote-share margin of victory at election t-1.  Panel (b) of 
Figure 3.1 similarly plots LDP candidates’ winning probability at election t against their vote-
share margin at t-1.  For graphical purpose, each point shown in both panels represents a 
local average of LDP candidates’ vote shares or winning probability (y-axes) at an interval of 
0.005 along the vote-share margin of victory (x-axes).8
 
  The thick curve draws a fitted value 
from the fourth-order polynomial fit and dashed curves show the 90% confidence intervals 
at each side of the threshold.  The dashed vertical line is the treatment threshold.   
[Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 about here.] 
 
Both panels of Figure 3.1 demonstrate the disadvantage of marginal incumbents 
relative to marginal non-incumbents by clearly depicting a downward discontinuous jump at 
the treatment threshold.  In terms of vote share, it is estimated that, at the threshold, 
marginal incumbents won 15.87% of district votes while marginal non-incumbents won 
19.30%.  As summarized in Table 3.1-(a), this gives an estimated 3.43 percentage point 
disadvantage for marginal incumbents, which is statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level.  The winning probability of marginal incumbents is estimated to be 69.24% while that 
of marginal non-incumbents is estimated at 85.91%.  As in Table 3.1-(a), marginal 
                                                 
8 Specifically, I took the average of the vote shares of all LDP candidates or that of the 0-1 indicators of 
the victory of individual LDP candidates for each 0.005 interval of the previous vote-share margin.  It is 
this average that is plotted in Figures 3.1-(a) and 3.1-(b).    
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incumbents have a 16.67 percentage-point lower winning-probability than marginal non-
incumbents at the threshold, which is also statistically significant at the 1% level.  These 
results indicate a both statistically and substantively significant incumbency disadvantage of 
marginal LDP candidates and provide supportive evidence to the hypothesis. 
 
3.4.5. Validity Tests 
The validity of the RD estimates of the treatment effects of incumbency rest on the 
assumption that the victory at election t-1 is randomly assigned at the vote-share margin 
threshold.  If this assumption holds true, pre-determined characteristics of LDP candidates 
(their characteristics before election t) should be balanced, i.e., distributed equally, in the 
neighborhood of the discontinuity threshold.  Following Lee (2008), I estimated the 
treatment effects of incumbency on pre-determined characteristics of LDP candidates to see 
whether there is evidence for the violation of the assumption.  If the pre-determined 
variables are well balanced at both sides of the threshold, there should not be a clear 
discontinuity in these variables at the threshold.  The pre-determined variables examined 
here are the number of past victories of each candidate as of election t-1 and the number of 
past times running for this office in this district as of election t-1.  Table 3.1-(b) reports the 
statistically insignificant treatment effects of incumbency on both variables, suggesting that 
these pre-determined variables are well balanced at both sides of the threshold.  These 






3.4.6. Alternative Explanations 
The above estimation results have demonstrated that there was a negative effect of 
incumbency on marginal LDP incumbents’ vote share and winning probability under SNTV.  
I argued that this is a manifestation of marginal incumbents’ electoral disadvantage over 
marginal non-incumbents under intra-party competition.  However, the estimated negative 
effect of incumbency can be consistent with some other alternative explanations.  To see 
whether these alternative explanations, rather than incumbents’ disadvantage due to intra-
party competition, drive the results, I reestimated the models, restricting to district 
observations to which these alternative explanations do not apply.  If the estimated negative 
effect of incumbency is considerably smaller in this subset of district observations, it 
suggests that these alternative explanations primarily account for the electoral loss of 
incumbents.  If the negative incumbency effect in this subset is still estimated at the similar 
level to the estimates in the full estimation sample, it suggests that the estimated negative 
incumbency effect are explained primarily by incumbents’ disadvantage over non-
incumbents rather than the alternative explanations. 
The first alternative explanation is that the negative incumbency effect may be the 
result of a reallocation of votes from retiring incumbents to non-incumbent candidates.  
When some LDP incumbents retired before election t, voters for these incumbents in 
election t-1 may choose other LDP non-incumbents in election t, so long as they still want to 
vote for someone of their favorite party.  These vote gains of non-incumbents do not 
represent a disadvantage of incumbents relative to non-incumbents.  The analysis focusing 
on districts in which all incumbents returned to the race is robust to this concern. 9
                                                 
9 When long served LDP politicians retire, they oftentimes designate their electoral heir (frequently their 
child(-in-law), relative, or secretary), who succeed the individual electoral support base (Jiban) from the 
retiring politicians.  These inheriting candidates are new candidates in election t and there are no 
  Excluding 
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the districts where at least one LDP incumbent retired, the number of district observations is 
reduced to 641 and the number of candidates becomes 1845, which are 71.2% and 76.3% of 
these observations, respectively, in the full estimation sample. 
Table 3.1-(c) reports the results of this subsample estimation.  For the districts in 
which all incumbents returned, the negative incumbency effect is estimated at 3.26 
percentage points in vote share and 15.57 percentage points in winning probability.  Both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level and almost equal in their magnitudes to 
the estimates for the full estimation sample.  The results indicate that the reallocation of 
votes from retiring incumbents to non-incumbents is not the primary cause of the estimated 
negative incumbency effect. 
The second alternative explanation is that the estimated negative incumbency effect 
may be the consequence of the strategic response by the party (LDP), candidates, and voters 
to suboptimal vote-division among LDP candidates in the previous election.  The absence of 
pooling of votes across the same party’s candidates, an inherent characteristic of SNTV, 
creates what is known in the literature as a “vote-division problem” — a coordination 
problem for parties, candidates, and voters in optimally distributing electoral support to a 
party among the candidates of this party (Browne and Patterson 1999, Cox and Niou 1994, 
McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995).  When a party fails in the vote-division problem, the 
party loses a seat which it could have won if the party’s votes had been distributed optimally 
among its candidates.  After experiencing such a loss, the party, candidates, and voters are 
                                                                                                                                                 
observations of lagged variables for them.  Therefore, these candidates are not included in the analysis and 
cannot be the main cause of the estimated negative incumbency effect.  One possible explanation for the 
estimated negative effect in this line is that retiring incumbents’ votes were not completely inherited by 
their heir, and some of these votes were spilled over to other non-incumbents who also ran in t-1 more 
than to other returning incumbents.  This possibility is also ruled out in the subsample estimation of the 
districts in which all incumbents returned. 
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likely to adjust their strategies to avoid the same problem in the subsequent election.  The 
vote distributions resulting from their response may produce an ostensibly negative impact 
of incumbency on candidates’ electoral performance.  
There are three well-known types of the failure in the vote-division problem in 
SNTV (Cox and Niou 1994).  The first one is overnomination of candidates — a party 
nominates candidates more than the number of seats it could have won.  For example, the 
LDP fielded three candidates but won only one of the three seats in Tokyo 8th district in 
1979.  The vote share total of the two losing LDP candidates in this race (29.94%) was 
greater than the vote share of either of the two winning candidates of the opposition parties 
(19.70% and 19.69%), suggesting that if the LDP had run two candidates instead of three, it 
could have won two seats instead of only one.  In the next election in 1980, the LDP 
reduced its candidates to two.  Most votes freed up by the exiting non-incumbent were 
absorbed by the remaining non-incumbent, whose vote share was almost doubled from 
14.05% in 1979 to 27.81% in 1980.  On the other hand, the returning LDP incumbent 
increased his vote share by much smaller margin from 24.32% to 29.92%.  If we simply 
compare the change in vote shares of the remaining LDP non-incumbent and the returning 
LDP incumbent, it looks as if the incumbent was disadvantaged relative to the non-
incumbent although the primary cause of the change was the reduction of the number of 
candidates. 
The second type of the failure in the vote-division problem is undernomination of 
candidates — a party nominates candidates smaller than the number of seats it could have 
won.  An example is Yamanashi district in the 1972 election.  In this five-seat district, the 
LDP fielded three candidates and won three seats.  However, if we divide the party’s total 
vote share, 61.35%, by four, we have 15.34%, which is greater than the vote share of either 
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of the two winners of an opponent party (14.00% and 13.26%).  If the LDP had fielded one 
more candidate and distributed its votes evenly among the four candidates, it could have 
won one more seat in this district.  In the following election in 1976, the LDP indeed fielded 
four candidates in Yamanashi district and won four seats with its party votes distributed 
almost evenly among the candidates (14.29%, 14.19%, 13.91% and 12.91%).  In this case, 
vote shares of all three LDP incumbents declined from those in the 1972 election, since 
some of these votes were distributed to the newly-entering LDP candidate.  If we simply 
look at the vote change in this district between the two elections, it also looks as if there was 
a disadvantage in holding an incumbent seat, although the main reason of the change was 
the increase in the number of candidates. 
To rule out the possibility that the estimated negative incumbency effect is a by-
product of the adjustment of the number of candidates, responding to overnomination or 
undernomination, I restricted the sample to the districts in which the number of LDP 
candidates did not change from the previous election.  In this subsample, the number of 
district observations is 413 and the number of candidate observations is 1115 (45.89% and 
46.11%, respectively, of the full estimation sample).  The results are presented in Table 3.1-
(d).  It shows the statistically significant estimates of the negative incumbency effect — 3.36 
percentage points in vote share and 16.54 percentage points in winning probability 
(statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively).  The magnitude of 
disadvantage is again almost equal to the full estimation sample.  These results suggest that 
the strategic response to overnomination or undernomination is not primarily driving the 
estimated negative impact of incumbency.  
The seat loss due to suboptimal vote-division may occur, even when neither 
overnomination nor undernomination is present — i.e., even when a party runs the optimal 
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number of candidates (the third type of the failure in the vote-division problem).  This is 
possible if votes are too unevenly distributed among candidates of the same party.  For 
example, the LDP ran three candidates and won 77.72% of district votes in Kagoshima 3rd 
district in 1963.  The LDP won only two of the three seats in this district, although it could 
have won all three if its votes had been evenly distributed among the three candidates.  The 
two winning LDP candidates gained more than necessary (29.44% and 27.84% vote shares), 
and the losing LDP candidate won the slightly lower vote share (20.44%) than the other 
winning candidate from an opponent party (21.37%).  In the subsequent election in 1967, 
the LDP votes were more evenly distributed among the same three candidates (28.12%, 
25.61%, and 24.89%), and all of them won a seat.  Compared to the previous election, the 
two incumbent LDP candidates decreased their votes by 1.32 and 2.94 percentage points, 
respectively, while the other LDP non-incumbent increased his votes by 5.17 percentage 
points.  In this case, it is ambiguous whether the negative impact of incumbency is driven 
primarily by incumbents’ disadvantage over non-incumbents or it is chiefly a by-product of 
the strategic response by the party, candidates, and voters to maximize the LDP seats. 
A conservative test of the case of incumbency disadvantage is to exclude all districts 
that potentially provide the LDP, candidates, and voters with incentives to adjust their 
actions to redress uneven vote distribution.  I identified such districts by determining 
whether LDP could have won an additional seat in the previous election if it had run the 
optimal number of candidates and distributed their votes evenly among these candidates in 
each district.  For this purpose, I summed up all LDP candidate votes in each district in 
election t-1 and divide the vote total by S+1, where S is the number of seats LDP won in t-1 
— I call the resulting number of votes “optimal average votes.”  If the optimal average votes 
exceed the votes of the last-winning non-LDP candidate in t-1 (the one finished last of all 
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the winning non-LDP candidates), it indicates that the LDP could have won one more seat 
in this district, if it had fielded S+1 candidates and distributed its votes among these 
candidates evenly.  These are the districts which potentially induce the party, candidates, and 
voters to adjust their strategies to maximize the LDP seats.   
Excluding these districts, the remaining observations are 420 districts and 1036 
candidates, which are 46.67% and 42.85% of the full estimation sample, respectively.  Table 
3.1-(e) reports the estimation results.  The negative incumbency effect in vote share is 
estimated at 3.35 percentage points and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This 
estimation result is once again almost equivalent to the estimate for the full sample.  On the 
other hand, the incumbency effect in winning probability is statistically insignificant.  
However, its sign is still negative and its magnitude (11.61 percentage points) is only slightly 
lower than the estimate for the full sample.  Taken together, the estimation results in vote 
share and winning probability still point to a sizable negative impact of holding an 
incumbent seat.  It suggests that the strategic reaction of parties, candidates, and voters to 
the vote-division problem does not primarily explain the estimated negative incumbency 
effect.  
Finally, I also estimated the model, imposing all the three restrictions discussed 
above simultaneously.  That is, the analysis includes only districts i) with all LDP incumbents 
returned, ii) with the same number of LDP candidates as in the previous election, and iii) 
with no suboptimal vote-division in the previous election.  The number of observations in 
this subsample is 128 districts and 369 candidates, 14.22% and 15.26% of the full estimation 
sample, respectively.  Although this dataset consists of a relatively small part of the full 
estimation sample, if the negative incumbency effect is still found, it will provide all the 
stronger evidence of the electoral disadvantage of incumbents over non-incumbents, because 
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neither alternative explanation considered above is applicable to this subsample.  The results 
presented in Table 3.1-(f) indeed provide such strong evidence.  The estimated negative 
incumbency effect is 5.20 percentage points in vote share and 26.36 percentage points in 
winning probability, which are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Not only do the results indicate the negative incumbency effect, but also the magnitude of 
the negative effect is greater than in the full estimation sample.  Since the alternative 
explanations cannot account for the negative incumbency effect found here, this is strong 
supportive evidence to the argument that marginal incumbent candidates are disadvantaged 
over marginal non-incumbents of the LDP in Japan under SNTV. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on MMD rules with intra-party competition, under which the 
personal vote, argued to be one of the primary sources of incumbency advantage, is more 
important than under SMD rules.  While greater incumbency advantage may be naturally 
expected from the primacy of the personal vote in these MMD systems with intra-party 
competition, I argued to the contrary that incumbents may rather have little advantage, or 
even a disadvantage, relative to non-incumbents of the same party due to the particular 
nature of competitive environments generated by intra-party competition.  I examined this 
argument empirically using the election data of Japan during 1958-1993 when SNTV was 
used to elect national representatives.  Applying a regression discontinuity analysis to the 
election outcomes of LDP candidates, I found that incumbents who had marginally won 
their seats in the previous election lose a 3.4 percentage-point vote-share and have an 
approximately 16.7 percentage-point lower winning-probability than non-incumbents who 
had closely lost in the last election.  I also conducted a series of subsample estimations to 
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rule out alternative explanations to the estimated negative incumbency effect.  The negative 
impact of incumbency has been consistently found in each subsample to which each or all of 
alternative explanations do not apply.  These results constitute strong evidence of 
incumbency disadvantage under SNTV in Japan. 
While this chapter focused on Japan, the theory developed here applicable more 
generally.  In particular, the degree to which electoral disadvantages outweighing advantages 
of incumbents, and the magnitude of the resulting net advantage of incumbents, may also 
vary depending on the extent of intra-party competition generated by these institutional 
differences.  Extending the analysis of this chapter, the next chapter explores such a 




Table 3.1. Regression Discontinuity Estimation Results: Incumbency Effect on the 
Marginal LDP Candidates’ Election Outcomes 
 
 
(a) Full Estimation Sample 
Outcome Variable ATE N 
Vote Share -0.0343 (0.0067) *** 2418 
Winning Probability -0.1667 (0.0474) *** 2418 
 
 
(b) Balance Tests for Pre-determined Variables 
Outcome Variable ATE N 
No. of Past Victories (t-1) -0.3848 (0.3490) 2418 
No. of Electoral Attempts (t-1) -0.2339 (0.4031) 2418 
 
 
(c) Districts with All Incumbents Returned  
Outcome Variable ATE N 
Vote Share -0.0326 (0.0084) *** 1845 
Winning Probability -0.1557 (0.0568) *** 1845 
 
 
(d) Districts with Same Number of Candidates in Elections t and t-1  
Outcome Variable ATE N 
Vote Share -0.0336 (0.0097) *** 1115 
Winning Probability -0.1654 (0.0655) ** 1115 
 
 
(e) Districts with No Suboptimal Vote Division in Election t-1 
Outcome Variable ATE N 
Vote Share -0.0335 (0.0114) *** 1036 
Winning Probability -0.1161 (0.0872) 1036 
 
 
(f) Districts with All Incumbents Returned, Same Number of Candidates in 
Elections t and t-1, and No Suboptimal Vote Division in Election t-1  
Outcome Variable ATE N 
Vote Share -0.0520 (0.0146) *** 369 
Winning Probability -0.2636 (0.1256) ** 369 
 
NOTE: All estimates are based on the regression of an outcome variable on an incumbency 
indicator (I), a fourth-order polynomial of the previous vote-share margin of victory (VM), 
and its interaction with an incumbency indicator (I).  Specifically, an outcome variable is 
regressed on VM, VM2, VM3, VM4, I, (I × VM), (I × VM2), (I × VM3), and (I × VM4).  
Only the treatment estimates (the coefficient estimates of I) are shown in “ATE” (Average 
Treatment Effect) column.  Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.  *p <0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  “N” column lists the number of observations. 
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Figure 3.1. Incumbency Effect at the Threshold on the LDP Candidates’ Election 
Outcomes 
 




(b) Winning Probability 
 
NOTE: Each point represents a local average of an outcome variable in election t (y-axis) at 
an interval of 0.005 along the vote share margin of victory in election t-1 (y-axis).  A thick 
curve draws a fitted value from the fourth-order polynomial fit.  Dashed curves are the 90% 
confidence intervals of the fitted value.  A dashed vertical line is the treatment threshold.  
The numbers in the figure show the estimated values of an outcome variable at each side of 
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Electoral Rules, Intra-Party Competition, and Incumbency Advantage for Individual 




This chapter extends the analysis of incumbency advantage for individual candidates in 
Chapter 3, by broadening the scope of analysis to five developed democracies — Canada, 
Finland, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. — which use or had used various kinds of candidate-
centered electoral systems, such as SMD plurality, open-list PR, and SNTV systems.  The 
chapter extends the theoretical argument of Chapter 3 and provides the multiple-country 
empirical evidence of the relationship between electoral systems and incumbency advantage 
for individual candidates. 
Section 4.2 lays out the theoretical argument, built on the theory developed in 
Chapter 3.  Section 4.3 introduces the empirical cases of the five developed democracies and 
derives specific hypotheses for these countries.  Section 4.4 describes data and methods.  
Section 4.5 presents the results.  Section 4.6 explores the validity of the estimation 
methodology.  Section 4.7 considers an important alternative explanation.  Section 4.8 





4.2. Intra-Party Competition and Varying Incumbency Advantage 
4.2.1. Overview 
Since this paper concerns the electoral advantage of holding an incumbent seat for 
individual candidates, it focuses on candidate-centered electoral rules — the rules under which 
voters cast a ballot for individual candidates and these votes for candidates are a decisive 
factor of whether candidates win a seat.  These rules include the SMD system, whether 
voters actually cast a ballot for an individual candidate or a party.  With a single candidate 
from each party, votes for a party are equivalent to votes for the party’s candidate in this 
system, and therefore, all SMD systems can be effectively considered as candidate-centered 
rules.  Other candidate-centered electoral rules are multimember district (MMD) systems 
with intra-party competition, such as open-list PR, SNTV and the single-transferable vote 
(STV) system.1  SMD is an example in which intra-party competition is not allowed, but the 
other MMD systems allow intra-party competition in varying degrees.2
When we compare the electoral environments of incumbents and non-incumbent 
candidates in these electoral rules, we can think of both potential advantages and disadvantages 
of incumbents over non-incumbents.  If those advantages outweigh the disadvantages, 
incumbents will enjoy a net advantage in election outcomes.  If the advantages and 
disadvantages cancel each other, there will be no net electoral advantage for incumbents.  If 
the disadvantages overwhelm the advantages, incumbents will have a net electoral 
disadvantage over non-incumbents.  As detailed below, when electoral rules allow for more 
  
                                                 
1 Some closed-list PR countries allow preferential votes for candidates (e.g., Austria, Belgium), but these 
systems are not included here, because those votes are not a decisive factor of candidates’ electoral fate 
(hence, these countries’ system is still effectively classified as closed-list PR). 
2 Throughout this paper, I focus on intra-party competition in general elections only.  Intra-party competition 
can also take place in the candidate nomination stage of each party (e.g., primaries), but the impact of 
candidate nomination rules on incumbents’ electoral advantage is left out for future research. 
 89 
intense intra-party competition, incumbents’ advantages are more likely to diminish and their 
disadvantages are more likely to mount.  Consequently, the net electoral advantage of 
incumbents is more likely to shrink as intra-party competition becomes more intense. 
 
4.2.2. Advantages of Incumbents 
 The literature has identified various advantages of incumbents.  First, incumbents 
enjoy greater visibility and wider name recognition among electorate than non-incumbent 
candidates.  In candidate-centered electoral systems, name recognition and name recall are 
one of the important factors determining the electoral fate of candidates (Mann 1978, Mann 
and Wolfinger 1980).  A particular advantage of incumbents is that they tend to gain some 
visibility for free, which is not possible for non-incumbent candidates.  As a legislator 
representing the locality, an incumbent usually enjoys plentiful, free opportunities of being 
covered by local media.  To the extent that free information about incumbents is available 
through popular media, incumbents can gain name recognition with less direct and less 
costly contact with electorate than non-incumbent candidates (Parker 1981).  
 Second, incumbents can use their privileged access to government and legislative 
resources to improve their electoral fortunes.  Incumbents use those resources for various 
constituency services to develop their personal reputation and to insulate their personal 
electoral fate from their party’s collective electoral fate (Cain et al. 1987, Heitshusen et al. 
2005, King 1991).  Incumbents can also allocate pork-barrel projects and other targeted 
benefits to their supporters to enhance their reelection chance (Bickers and Stein 1996, 
Levitt and Snyder 1997, Stein and Bickers 1994).  Incumbents’ ability to influence legislation 
also makes easier, compared to non-incumbents, their campaign fund raising from private 
companies, business associations, and other sectoral or professional organizations, which 
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may also contribute to incumbents’ advantage (Benoit and Marsh 2008, Box-Steffensmeier 
1996, Gerber 1998, Moon 2006).  
 Third, these advantages and whatever other advantages may accrue to incumbents 
discourage high quality challengers from entering or remaining in the race.  If incumbents 
take advantage of their visibility and office-holding benefits to develop a personal support 
base, it is increasingly costly for high quality challengers to enter the electoral race and 
compete with those entrenched incumbents.  This deterrence of the entry of high quality 
challengers further boosts the advantage of incumbents (Cox and Katz 1996, Levitt and 
Wolfram 1997).  
 
4.2.3. Potential Disadvantages of Incumbents 
While the literature is replete with the description of the advantages of incumbents, it 
is also possible to note several potential disadvantages of incumbents (Ariga 2010a).  First, 
incumbents must stay away from their electoral districts and spend significant amounts of 
time in the country’s capital while the legislature is in session.  On the other hand, non-
incumbents can stay in their district throughout the entire legislative session.  This provides 
non-incumbents with a considerable time advantage in canvassing their district in 
campaigning for the next election (Curtis 1992). 
Second, not all incumbents can fulfill their pre-electoral promises because of the 
insufficiency of their legislative capability, lack of bargaining power, or unfavorable political 
and economic circumstances.  If incumbents can successfully deliver on their promised 
goods, such as pork-barrel spending, they can increase their votes in the following election, 
but those who failed cannot receive such an electoral gain (Bickers and Stein 1996, Levitt 
and Snyder 1997, Stein and Bickers 1994).  Moreover, non-incumbents can blame those 
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incumbents who failed to fulfill their promises and attract some previous voters for the 
incumbents. 
Third, to advance their party’s collective goal, individual incumbents must sometimes 
support legislation that deviates from the preferences of voters in their district.  Non-
incumbent candidates can also blame those incumbents for that and might thereby attract 
some previous voters for the incumbents.  Those incumbents who support their party’s 
policy by deviating from voters’ preference in their district are likely to lose votes in the 
subsequent election (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002).     
 
4.2.4. The Net Electoral Advantage of Incumbents 
The potential disadvantages suggested above are, in effect, mirror images of the 
advantages of incumbents.  While incumbents enjoy an advantage of greater visibility 
through free media coverage, they are disadvantaged compared to non-incumbents in the 
time available for direct contact with electorate in their district.  Incumbents can take 
advantage of their access to parliamentary resources in credit claiming, but they could be 
disadvantaged if they fail to deliver on their promises or they have to vote for their party’s 
policy, which deviates from the median voter preference of their district.  The question is 
what the net electoral (dis)advantage of these considerations would be.  In general, 
incumbents are expected to behave so as to enhance their advantages and mitigate their 
disadvantages, so that they can enjoy the net electoral advantage of incumbency.  For 
example, U.S. congressmen use franking privileges to reach out to voters via mass mail using 
public money, and thereby reduce the time disadvantage compared to non-incumbents who 
can stay in their districts (Cover 1980, Cover and Brumberg 1982).  A net electoral advantage 
of incumbency is likely in SMD systems that do not allow direct competition of candidates 
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of the same party in general elections.  I argue that this is not necessarily so, however, if we 
move our attention to MMD rules that allow for intra-party competition because 
incumbents’ efforts to increase the advantages but mitigate the disadvantages are constrained 
by particular natures of intra-party competition. 
 
4.2.5. Weakened Advantages and Strengthened Disadvantages under Intra-Party 
Competition 
 
There are several reasons why we may expect that intra-party competition in 
multimember districts diminishes incumbents’ advantages but increase their disadvantages 
(Ariga 2010a).  First, non-incumbents need to attract some previous voters of incumbents to 
win a seat, but this task is easier when intra-party competition takes place in multimember 
districts.  If direct competition of candidates of the same party occurs in the same district, 
non-incumbent candidates can attract previous voters for incumbents of the same party.  But, 
when there is no intra-party competition, as in SMD rules, non-incumbents must attract 
previous voters for incumbents of an opposing party.  Since voters who voted for incumbents 
of the same party presumably tend to be ideologically closer to non-incumbents than those 
who voted for incumbents of an opposing party, it should be easier for non-incumbents to 
attract previous voters of incumbents in MMD rules with intra-party competition than in 
SMD rules.  
Second, a greater percentage of districts will have marginal incumbents in MMD rules 
than in SMD systems.  Non-incumbents may be able to defeat incumbents only if these 
incumbents are electorally marginal.  Under SMD rules, marginal incumbents concentrate in 
a relatively small share of districts.  Under MMD rules, however, marginal incumbents can 
be found in a greater share of districts simply because there are multiple incumbents in each 
district and some incumbents are always more marginal than others within each district.   
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Third, there are multiple incumbents in the same district under MMD rules, which 
hinders effective credit claiming of each incumbent candidate because any incumbents in the 
same district can claim credit for benefits delivered to that district.  Incumbents in SMD do 
not face this problem, because there is only one incumbent in each district and that 
incumbent can claim sole credit for the benefits received by her district. 
Fourth, given the relatively greater ease of defeating incumbents as discussed so far, 
high-quality non-incumbents are more likely to remain in or enter the race in MMD with 
intra-party competition than in SMD. 
These considerations suggest that when electoral rules allow for intra-party 
competition, the advantages of incumbents tend to be weakened and the disadvantages of 
incumbents tend to be strengthened, resulting in the decline of the net electoral advantage.  
Furthermore, as electoral rules facilitate greater intra-party competition, incumbents’ efforts 
to increase the advantages but mitigate the disadvantages will be increasingly constrained.  
Therefore, we should expect that the net incumbency advantage for individual candidates 
diminishes as electoral rules encourage more intense intra-party competition.   
 
4.3. Empirical Cases and Hypotheses 
 Empirical cases covered in the current analysis are Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom, which use or had used various candidate-centered electoral systems.  
These countries are chosen because they share important non-electoral system features — in 
particular, they are all advanced industrial democracies with parliamentary systems — but 
exhibit important difference in electoral rules used for their national parliament.  Both 
Canada and the U.K. use the SMD plurality system to elect the representatives to the House 
of Commons.  Finland uses open-list PR for its unicameral national parliament, Eduskunta.  
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Italy had also used open-list PR (a different version from that of Finland) for elections to the 
lower chamber, Camera dei Deputati, until 1992.  Japan had used the SNTV rule for the lower 
house of its national parliament, Shugiin, until 1993.  The first two SMD countries represent a 
candidate-centered rule that do not allow for direct competition of candidates of the same 
party.  The latter three countries all use or had used MMD rules that allow for intra-party 
competition, and they exhibit important variation in the expected degree of intra-party 
competition. 
 A critical difference in the three MMD countries, which affects the extent of intra-
party competition, is the way votes are cast for individual candidates.  In Finland, all voters 
cast one vote for one candidate from the candidate list of their district, which consists of the 
candidate lists of all parties running in that district.  The votes for the same party’s 
candidates are pooled to determine the seat allocation to that party, but specific winning 
candidates of the party are determined by the number of votes obtained by individual 
candidates.  In Italy, voters cast a ballot for a party but could optionally indicate their 
preferred candidate of that party, up to three until the 1987 election or only one in the last 
election under open-list PR in 1992.  The seat allocation is determined by party votes, but 
winning candidates of each party are determined solely by the number of preferential votes 
won by individual candidates.  In Japan under SNTV, voters cast one vote for one candidate 
and there was no vote pooling among candidates of the same party.  The top M candidates 
(from any party), in terms of individual votes gained, won a seat in a district with M seats. 
 While Finland and Italy both use (or had used) open-list PR, they differ in the extent 
to which preferential votes for individual candidates are utilized.  In Finland, all voters need 
to choose an individual candidate, but in Italy, voters merely had an option to indicate their 
preference for an individual candidate.  In fact, the majority of Italian voters did not use 
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preferential votes.  It is reported that “only about 30 percent of Italian voters used any of 
their available preference votes.” (Golden n.d.)  This difference should lead to varying 
intensity of intra-party competition between the two countries.  To get reelected, incumbent 
legislators in Italy need to appeal to a much smaller segment of their district than their 
counterparts in Finland.  Italian legislators could carve out a small segment of their district, 
ether geographical or sectoral, and develop it into their personal support base by providing 
targeted benefits to this group.  As long as they can satisfy this small group in the district, 
Italian legislators can secure their seat, since the majority of voters, who are outside the small 
groups of personal followers of individual candidates, would cast party votes only.  On the 
other hand, as every voter is required to choose an individual candidate in Finland, Finish 
legislators must appeal to a larger segment of their electoral district compared to Italian 
legislators.  Since it is more difficult to maintain larger groups of personal followers, Finish 
legislators should face greater competitive pressure from their peers in the same party than 
Italian legislators.  Therefore, intra-party competition is expected to be greater in Finish 
open-list PR than in Italian open-list PR. 
 In Japan under SNTV, every voter was also required to cast a ballot for individual 
candidates, but the main difference from Finland is that there was no vote-pooling among 
candidates of the same party.  Absence of vote-pooling is expected to intensify intra-party 
competition in Japan under SNTV compared to Finland under open-list PR.  This is because, 
without vote pooling, candidates cannot rely on votes of copartisans to win a seat, and 
therefore, they must expand their personal support base until the personal votes for 
themselves alone are enough to secure a victory.   
A simple example may help understand this point more clearly.  Table 4.1 shows two 
hypothetical distributions of individual candidates’ votes of the otherwise same electoral 
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district.  There are four parties, A to D, running in this hypothetical district with four seats.  
Party A fields two candidates but all other parties nominate one candidate.  In two 
hypothetical vote distributions, only party A’s candidates’ individual vote shares are different, 
while all parties’ vote shares remain the same.  In the first hypothetical scenario, party A’s 
votes are divided equally between its candidates at 0.20, respectively, indicating two 
candidates are equally competitive.  In the second scenario, party A’s votes are divided 
unevenly between the two, with candidate a1 winning 0.30 and a2 gaining 0.10, indicating the 
latter candidate a2 is uncompetitive.  If the d’Hondt PR formula (used in Finland) is applied, 
both candidates of party A win a seat in either scenario.  If SNTV is used, however, 
although both candidates of party A win in the first scenario, only candidate a1 wins a seat in 
the second scenario.  This is because uncompetitive candidate a2 in the second scenario can 
rely on the votes won by candidate a1, if the PR formula is used to allocate seats to the 
parties.  If SNTV is used, candidate a2 can no longer rely on candidate a1, and candidate a2 
must attract voters for a1 until he can win a seat with his votes only.  In principle, candidate 
a2 can also attract voters for other parties, but realistically, new votes for candidate a2 are 
likely to come mostly from voters for his copartisan, candidate a1.  This implies that intra-
party competition should be more intense in Japan under SNTV than in Finland under 
open-list PR. 
 
[Table 4.1 about here] 
 
These arguments suggest that, among the three MMD countries, intra-party 
competition is most intense in Japan (SNTV), followed by Finland and Italy (both open-list 
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PR) in this order.  All these considerations lead to the following specific hypotheses 
examined in subsequent sections. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The electoral advantage of incumbents over non-incumbents is greater in SMD 
countries (Canada, the U.K.) than in MMD countries with intra-party competition 
(Finland, Italy, Japan). 
Hypothesis 2: Among MMD countries with intra-party competition, the electoral advantage of 
incumbents over non-incumbents is greatest in Italy, followed by Finland and Japan in 
this order. 
 
4.4. Data and Methods 
4.4.1. Dataset 
The empirical analysis uses a dataset of candidate-level election results of major 
parties in the five developed democracies, the majority of whose data were compiled by the 
author.3
                                                 
3 I also rely on the datasets compiled by other scholars whenever I can.  For example, I use the datasets 
compiled by Miriam Golden (2007) on the Christian Democrats (DC) and Socialists (PSI) in Italy and 
Steven Reed (2007) on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Socialists (JSP) in Japan.  See the note to 
Table 4.2 for a full description of the sources of the data. 
  Table 4.1 lists those parties included in the analysis.  There are two parties each 
from Canada, Japan, and the U.K., and four parties each from Finland and Italy.  The 
analysis focuses on the district elections which did not experience a redrawing of district 
boundaries prior to the election, since the districts after redistricting should have different 
competitive environments from the previous ones.  The analysis of the parties in the MMD 
countries also focuses on districts in which intra-party competition between incumbents and 
non-incumbents actually took place — i.e., the districts in which at least one incumbent and 
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one non-incumbent of the same party competed — since the theoretical argument of a 
smaller incumbency advantage under intra-party competition rests on the competition 
between incumbents and non-incumbents of the same party.  In total, the analysis covers 
43,009 candidate observations of 14 political parties (see Table 4.2 for breakdown). 
 
[Table 4.2 about here] 
 
4.4.2. Definition of Incumbency Advantage 
For each party, I estimate the electoral advantage of incumbents over non-
incumbent candidates, defined here as “the difference in the electoral outcomes of 
incumbents and non-incumbents under (hypothetically) the same situation” (Ariga 2010a).  
That is, I estimate the impact of holding an incumbent seat on individual candidates’ election 
outcomes controlling for other factors, such as candidates’ party affiliation, their party’s 
electoral strength in an electoral district, and various individual characteristics (except for 
incumbency).  An election outcome which is frequently the subject of analysis of 
incumbency advantage is a vote share, but it is not used here because the same proportion of 
vote share has a quite different substantive meaning between single-member and 
multimember districts, and across multimember districts with different district magnitudes.  I 
focus instead on the three probabilities concerning individual candidates’ election outcomes 
listed and explained below.  These probabilities for individual candidates are comparable 
across districts with different district magnitudes, and therefore, appropriate for the current 
comparative analysis. 
The estimates of incumbency advantage here are based on the observations of all 
candidates who ran in election t-1.  Of these candidates, those who won in election t-1 are 
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incumbents in election t, and those who lost in t-1 are non-incumbent candidates in t.  Three 
election outcome probabilities, by which incumbency advantage is measured, all concern 
whether these candidates in election t-1 returned to the race in election t and winning a seat.  
The first estimate of incumbency advantage is the difference between incumbents and non-
incumbent candidates in the joint probability of returning to the race in election t and winning a seat, 
denoted by Pr(R∩W), where R refers to the returning to the race and W refers to the 
winning of a seat.  I also decompose this probability into two probabilities (a marginal 
probability and a conditional probability), and estimate incumbency advantage as expressed 
in each of these two probabilities, individually.  That is, the second estimate of incumbency 
advantage is the difference between incumbents and non-incumbents in the probability of 
returning to the race in election t, Pr(R), and the third estimate of incumbency advantage is in the 
probability of winning a seat in election t conditional on returning to the race, Pr(W|R).  To restate, the 
relationship between these three measures is that the first probability of returning and 
winning is a product of the latter two probabilities; i.e., Pr(R∩W) = Pr(R) × Pr(W|R). 
Most existing studies on incumbency advantage that concern candidates’ winning 
probability have focused on the third probability of winning a seat conditional on returning, 
Pr(W|R) (Carey et al. 2000, Gallagher 2000, Hayama 1992).  That is, the electoral advantage 
has been conceptualized in terms of winning a seat in election t only.  However, if 
incumbency confers candidates an advantage in winning a seat in election t, those who won a 
seat in t-1 (incumbents in t) should also be more likely to return to the race than those who 
lost in t-1 (non-incumbents in t) because they presumably base their decisions to return on 
their expectation of whether they could win a seat in election t.  In other words, the electoral 
advantage of incumbents is also manifested in candidates’ decisions to return to the race.  
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Therefore, it is appropriate to extend the definition of incumbency advantage to include the 
advantage in the two other probabilities, Pr(R∩W) and Pr(R). 
 
4.4.3. Methods of Estimation 
For estimation, I apply a potential outcome framework for causal inference from 
observational data.  This framework concerns the causal effect of a treatment variable assigned 
to observations on a certain outcome variable.4
Specifically, a regression discontinuity (RD) design is applied to the present 
estimation (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960, Imbens and Lemieux 2008).  The RD design 
can be used if there is an assignment variable, which determines an assignment of a treatment, 
or increases the probability of the assignment, discontinuously, when the value of the 
assignment variable passes a particular threshold.  In the current case of incumbency 
advantage, the assignment variable is the winning or losing vote margin of each candidate in 
the previous election (Hainmueller and Kern 2008, Lee et al. 2004, Lee 2008).  The previous 
  In the present application, a treatment is 
incumbency, or winning a seat in the previous election, and an outcome is one of the three 
probabilities related to candidates’ election outcomes.  Of a particular interest here is the 
average causal impact, or average treatment effect (ATE) in causal inference terminology, of 
holding an incumbent seat on candidates’ election outcome.  If victory in the previous 
election is randomly assigned to candidates, we can compute the ATE of incumbency by 
simply taking the average difference in election outcomes of incumbents and non-
incumbents.  Unlike a controlled experiment, however, incumbency is not randomly 
assigned.  Hence, a quasi-experimental approach is needed to implement a causal inference. 
                                                 
4 Treatment and outcome variables are the jargon of causal inference.  They should be understood as a key 
independent variable and a dependent variable, respectively, in usual regression terminology.  
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winning vote margin for incumbents (the previous winners) is calculated by subtracting the 
votes of the marginal loser (a candidate who lost in a district with the greatest number of 
votes) in the previous election from the votes of the incumbents in the same election.  
Similarly, the previous vote margin for non-incumbents is computed by subtracting the votes 
of the marginal winner (a candidate who won in a district with the smallest number of votes) 
in the previous election from the votes of non-incumbents in the same election.  The 
previous vote margin of incumbents is always positive while that of non-incumbents is 
negative.  From this formulation, we can regard that incumbency, or a victory of a seat, is 
assigned to a candidate, when the value of the previous vote margin exceeds zero. 
The underlying rationale of the RD design, as a quasi-experimental approach to 
causal inference, is that, at the neighborhood around the threshold of the assignment 
variable, the assignment of a treatment is random, due to whatever random component there 
may be in the assignment process.  In the current application, the previous victory near the 
vote margin can be considered as good as random.  Therefore, incumbents (previous 
winners) and non-incumbents (previous losers) near the threshold should have, on average, 
the same characteristics except for incumbency because only or mostly random chance 
determined on which side of the threshold they fell.  Hence, we can estimate the causal 
impact of incumbency by taking the difference in election outcomes between incumbents 
and non-incumbents very near the threshold of the previous vote margin.  A primary 
advantage of the RD design compared to a usual regression analysis is that the RD estimate 
is insensitive to bias due to omitted variables, including in particular unobserved ones.   
On the other hand, the limitation of the RD design is that it provides a valid estimate 
of the ATE around the neighborhood of the threshold only.  That is, the RD estimate of 
incumbency advantage is valid only for marginal incumbents and non-incumbents.  This may 
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not be a serious limitation to the current analysis, however, because the electoral advantage 
of incumbents are most important for marginal, electorally vulnerable incumbents 
(Hainmueller and Kern 2008, Lee 2008).  The RD analysis of incumbency advantage, 
presented here, provides causal inference for this important subset of candidates.  In 
addition, when we conceptualize incumbency advantage for individual candidates, reasonable 
counterfactuals can be defined only for marginal candidates.  That is, it is unreasonable to 
consider the counterfactual of non-incumbency (a defeat in t-1) for an incumbent who won a 
large margin in t-1 because the large margin implies that this incumbent was too strong to be 
defeated in t-1.5
The present RD analysis of incumbency advantage is conducted in two steps.  In the 
first step, incumbency advantage in Pr(R∩W) and Pr(R) is estimated directly from the data of 
all candidates who ran in t-1.  Then, in the second step, incumbency advantage in Pr(W|R) is 
derived from the estimates of Pr(R∩W) and Pr(R) produced in the first step.  This indirect 
estimation of incumbency advantage in Pr(W|R) is used to avoid potential endogeneity bias 
due to strategic exit of candidates, which might arise if the advantage is directly estimated 
from the data (more on this later). 
  This counterfactual is entirely reasonable for an incumbent who won 
marginally in t-1 because she could have lost in t-1 with a reasonable chance (that is why she 
is marginal).  Thus, the RD analysis provides the estimate of incumbency advantage for 
individual candidates for an appropriate group of candidates for this concept. 
For incumbency advantage in the first two outcomes, Pr(R∩W) and Pr(R), I estimate 
a regression of each election outcome in t on a polynomial of the vote margin in t-1 with a 
break at the incumbency (treatment) threshold, which is one of the standard approaches to 
RD analysis (Lee et al. 2004, Lee 2008, Hainmueller and Kern 2008).  More specifically, an 
                                                 
5 A similar reasoning can be applied to a non-incumbent who lost with a large margin in t-1. 
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outcome variable is regressed on the third-order polynomial of the previous-vote-margin 
variable (VM) and its interaction with an incumbency indicator (I) — i.e., VM, VM2, VM3, I, 
(I × VM), (I × VM2), and (I × VM3).6
For the assignment variable, the winning or losing vote margin in election t-1, 
measured in vote counts (the raw number of votes), is used.  I measure the vote margin in 
terms of vote counts, because a more commonly used measure of vote share in the SMD 
context is not comparable across multimember districts with different district magnitudes.  
This is because the same proportion of vote share represents the different degree of electoral 
closeness for individual candidates across these districts.  For example, suppose there is a 
candidate whose (either winning or losing) margin was a Y% vote share in a single-member 
district, which corresponds to 10,000 votes.  The same Y% vote margin in a district with, say, 
15 seats corresponds to 150,000 votes, if a strict one-person-one-vote rule applies in drawing 
district boundaries.
  For the first outcome variable, Pr(R∩W), I use an 
indicator of whether a candidate returned to the race and won a seat in election t (the 
variable equals to one if a candidate returned and won, and zero otherwise).  For the second 
outcome, Pr(R), I use an indicator of whether a candidate returned to the race in election t 
(the variable is one if a candidate returned, and zero otherwise).   
7
                                                 
6 As a robustness check, I also estimated the same model with higher order polynomials, namely, the forth, 
fifth, and sixth orders.  Results did not change appreciably from the ones reported here. 
  It is a lot harder for an individual incumbent to win extra 150,000 votes 
than extra 10,000 votes.  Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that winning the same extra 
number of votes would be equally difficult (or easy).  Therefore, the same amount of vote 
counts better represents the same degree of closeness for individual candidates across these 
districts.   
7 More realistically, the rule applies only approximately, but the logic of the argument here still holds. 
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To accommodate stochastic dependence among candidates in the same district under 
MMD systems, standard errors are clustered in districts and elections. 
Figure 4.1 presents graphically how the estimation procedure works.  Panel (a) shows 
the estimation result of incumbency advantage in the joint probability of returning to the 
race and winning a seat, Pr(R∩W), for the Conservatives of the U.K.  A thick line represents 
a polynomial fit from the regression model and the dashed lines surrounding it show its 90% 
confidence interval.  For graphical-presentation purposes, each dot represents a local average 
of an outcome variable in the 400-vote interval of the previous vote margin.  That is, an 
average of an indicator of returning and winning of the candidates in each of the 400-vote 
interval of the vote margin is computed and plotted in the figure (the polynomial regression 
is estimated using non-averaged raw values of the indicator).  A polynomial flexibly fits a 
nonlinear relationship between the probability of returning and winning and the previous 
vote share margin on either side of the threshold.  A discontinuous break in these flexible 
polynomials at the threshold represents the causal impact of incumbency.  The positive gap 
presented here indicates an advantage of marginal incumbents over marginal non-
incumbents in the probability of candidates’ returning and winning.  Just to the left of the 
discontinuous break, marginal non-incumbents’ probability of returning and winning is 
estimated at 11.12%.  Just to the right of the break, marginal incumbents’ probability of 
returning and winning is estimated at 58.74%.  The estimated incumbency advantage is the 
difference between these two probabilities: 58.74% − 11.12% = 47.62%.  Marginal 
incumbents of the Conservatives enjoy, on average, a 47.62 percentage-point advantage in 
the probability of returning and winning compared to marginal non-incumbents.  Panel (b) 
similarly depicts the estimation result of incumbency advantage in the probability of 
returning to the race, Pr(R), for the Conservatives of the U.K.  As shown in the panel, the 
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probability of returning to the race is estimated at 89.77% for marginal incumbents and 
30.57% for marginal non-incumbents.  Incumbency advantage in this probability is 
computed as: 89.77% − 30.57% = 59.20%. 
 
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
The last measure of incumbency advantage in terms of the probability of winning a 
seat conditional on returning to the race, Pr(W|R), is computed based on the two previous 
RD estimates of the advantage.  It is not impossible to estimate this third advantage in the 
same way as the two previous ones, dropping the observations of candidates who did not 
return to the race and using an indicator of whether they won a seat as an outcome variable.  
However, deleting all observations of non-returning candidates may introduce a potential 
bias and inconsistency into the estimation, due to potential strategic exit from the race by 
candidates.  If incumbents who expect a poor electoral performance tend to exit from the 
race, this may bias the estimate of the advantage upward.  Similarly, if non-incumbents who 
expect a poor electoral performance tend not to reenter the race, this may bias the estimate 
of the advantage downward. 
To avoid this potential endogeneity problem due to strategic exit, I compute the 
incumbency advantage in the conditional probability of winning from the estimates of the 
joint probability of winning and returning and the marginal probability of returning to the 
race, based on the following relationship among these probabilities: Pr(W|R) = Pr(R∩W) / 
Pr(R).  Specifically, incumbency advantage in Pr(W|R) at the threshold is computed by 
Pr(R∩W)I / Pr(R) I − Pr(R∩W) NI / Pr(R) NI, where superscripts I and NI denote marginal 
incumbents and non-incumbents, respectively.  That is, Pr(R∩W)I is the estimate of the joint 
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probability of returning and winning for incumbents at the threshold, which is 58.74% in the 
example of the U.K. Conservatives.  Pr(R∩W)NI is the estimate of the same probability for 
non-incumbents at the threshold, which is 11.12%.  Similarly, Pr(R)I is the estimate of the 
marginal probability of returning to the race for incumbents at the threshold, and Pr(R)NI is 
the estimate of the same probability for non-incumbents at the threshold (89.77% and 
30.57%, respectively, for the Conservatives).  Accordingly, incumbency advantage in the 
conditional probability of winning can be computed for the Conservatives as: 58.74% / 
89.77% − 11.12% / 30.57% = 29.05%.  Its standard error and confidence interval are 
computed via simulation, similar to the method proposed by King et al. (2000).8
 
  
Incumbency advantage in the conditional probability of winning, Pr(W|R), estimated in this 
way is immune to potential endogenuity bias due to strategic exit.  
4.5. Results 
Incumbency advantage in the three probabilities is estimated for 14 political parties 
in the five developed democracies.  Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 present the results.  For each of 
the three probabilities, Pr(R∩W), Pr(R), and Pr(W|R), Table 4.3 shows the estimated 
probability for marginal incumbents at the threshold (“Inc.” column), that for non-
incumbents at the threshold (“Non-Inc.” column), and their difference, i.e., the incumbency 
advantage in that probability at the threshold (“Inc. Adv.” column).  The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors clustered by districts and elections.  The two SMD countries 
appear at the top of the table, followed by the three MMD countries in the hypothesized 
                                                 
8 Specifically, 1000 simulations of a set of coefficients were drawn from the estimated asymptotic 
distribution of the parameters of the polynomial regression model.  For each draw of coefficients, 
incumbency advantage in Pr(W|R) was computed.  Standard error and confidence interval were computed 
from the distribution of these simulated advantages. 
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order of the magnitude of incumbency advantage (Italy, Finland, and Japan).  Within each 
country, parties are listed in the order of the magnitude of the estimated incumbency 
advantage in the joint probability of returning and winning, Pr(R∩W). 
 
[Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 about here] 
 
Of the above three quantities for each probability, Figure 4.2 graphically shows 
incumbency advantage.  Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 draws incumbency advantage in the 
probability of returning to the race and winning a seat, Pr(R∩W).  Panel (b) is incumbency 
advantage in the probability of returning to the race, Pr(R).  Panel (c) shows incumbency 
advantage in the probability of winning a seat conditional on returning to the race, Pr(W|R).  
Black dots for each party represent the point estimates of the advantage — the difference in 
a particular probability of incumbents and non-incumbents at the threshold.  Gray bars are 
the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates.  As in Table 4.3, the two SMD countries 
appear at the top of each panel, followed by the three MMD countries in the hypothesized 
order of the magnitude of incumbency advantage.  Within each country, parties are listed in 
the order of the magnitude of this estimated advantage in each panel (as a result, the order of 
the parties within each country varies slightly between panels). 
In terms of the probability of returning to the race and winning a seat, Pr(R∩W), the 
estimation results of incumbency advantage are consistent with the hypotheses.  This can be 
seen easily in panel (a) of Figure 4.2, in which the estimated probability declines smoothly 
when we move down from the U.K. at the top of the panel to Japan at the bottom of the 
panel.  In the two SMD countries, the estimated advantages range from 29.83% (the 
Progressive Conservatives in Canada) to 47.62% (the Conservatives in the U.K.).  The 
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average of the estimated advantages in SMD countries is 40.11%.  On the other hand, in the 
three MMD countries, the estimated advantages are in the range of −16.24% (the Japan 
Socialist Party) to 45.31% (the Italian Social Movement in Italy), and the average over all 
MMD parties is 18.19%.  This indicates that, on average, the candidates in the SMD 
countries enjoy greater incumbency advantage in this probability than those in the MMD 
countries with intra-party competition.  Within the three MMD countries, the advantage 
declines as we move down in Figure 4.2-(a) from Italy to Finland, and then, from Finland to 
Japan.  The average of the estimated advantage of Italian parties in Pr(R∩W) is 35.27%.  The 
same average of Finnish parties is 15.46%, and that of Japanese parties is −9.04%.  These 
results indicate that the estimated advantage declines as electoral rules spur more intense 
intra-party competition, as hypothesized. 
A similar comparative pattern is found, when we move to incumbency advantage in 
the probability of returning to the race, Pr(R).  Panel (b) of Figure 4.2 shows a smooth 
declining pattern of the advantage in this probability, similar to panel (a), from the U.K. 
parties at the top of the panel to the Japanese parties at the bottom, although the difference 
between the SMD and MMD countries has widened and the difference between Finland and 
Japan has shrunk, compared to panel (a).  The average of the estimated advantage in Pr(R) is 
52.87% for the SMD countries and 22.84% for the MMD countries with intra-party 
competition.  Within the latter MMD countries, the average for each country is 37.29% for 
Italy, 13.52% for Finland, and 12.61% for Japan.  This comparative pattern is again 
consistent with the hypotheses. 
The estimated incumbency advantages in the probability of winning a seat 
conditional on returning to the race, Pr(W|R), are also by and large consistent with the 
hypotheses.  The pattern shown in panel (c) of Figure 4.2 is largely similar to those in panels 
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(a) and (b), although the difference between the SMD countries and the MMD countries has 
further diminished.  The average estimated advantage in Pr(W|R) is 23.06% for the SMD 
countries and 10.42% for the MMD countries with intra-party competition.  Of the latter 
MMD countries, the average for each country is 27.59% for Italy, 10.35% for Finland, and 
−23.80% for Japan. 
All in all, the estimation results of incumbency advantage in the three probabilities 
provide empirical support to the hypotheses.  The results demonstrate that, in the five 
developed democracies covered here, marginal incumbent candidates enjoy greater electoral 
advantage over marginal non-incumbents in SMD rules than in MMD rules with intra-party 
competition, and within MMD countries, marginal incumbents’ advantage declines as 
electoral rules facilitate more intense intra-party competition.   
 
4.6. Validity Tests 
 The validity of a RD analysis rests on the assumption that treatment assignment is 
random around the neighborhood of the threshold of an assignment variable.  Given the 
importance of this assumption, it is customary to check if there is evidence to suggest a 
violation of this assumption in the data used for the RD analysis.  This is usually done by 
investigating whether there is any significant difference in the pre-determined variables, 
variables whose values were determined prior to the treatment assignment, on either side of 
the threshold.  If there is a significant difference in these variables across the threshold, it 
indicates a violation of the random-assignment assumption around the threshold and 
suggests that the estimated ATE does not solely represent a causal impact of a treatment but 
reflect, at least partially, the difference in the pre-determined variables. 
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Two pre-determined variables of candidates are examined here.  The first one is the 
number of past victories of each candidate prior to election t-1, and the second is the 
number of past attempts to run for election prior to election t-1.  I regressed these two pre-
determined variables on the third-order polynomial and its interaction with an incumbency 
indicator, as is done for the three probabilities related to individual candidates’ election 
outcomes (Hainmueller and Kern 2008, Lee et al. 2004, Lee 2008).  Table 4.4 reports the 
results.  For each of the two pre-determined variables, the first column (“Inc.” column) 
reports the estimates of the average number of past victories or past attempts of marginal 
incumbents, while the second column (“Non-Inc.”) shows the estimates of the same average 
number of marginal non-incumbents.  The third column (“Diff.”) gives the estimates of 
their difference.  For the ease of interpretation, Figure 4.3 graphically presents the last 
information, the difference in these pre-determined variables between marginal incumbents 
and non-incumbents. 
 
[Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 about here] 
 
For the number of past victories, most parties’ results indicate both statistically and 
substantively insignificant difference between incumbents and non-incumbents at the 
threshold.  There are only three parties, for which the difference is statistically significant.  
Of these three, the difference in two parties, the Labour in the U.K. and the Communists 
(PCI) in Italy, are substantively small, 0.31 and 0.23, respectively.  On the other hand, the 
difference for the remaining party, the MSI in Italy, is substantively significant as well — on 
average, marginal incumbents of the MSI had an experience of winning a seat prior to the 
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previous election approximately one more time (estimated at 1.05 times) than marginal non-
incumbents. 
A similar pattern is found for the number of past attempts to run for election.  There 
are again only three parties — two of them are the same as in the number of past victories 
— for which the difference is statistically significant.  For two of these three parties, the 
Socialists (PSI) and the Communists (PCI) in Italy, the difference is substantively small, 0.41 
and 0.31, respectively.  For the remaining party, the MSI in Italy, however, the difference is 
again substantively significant — on average, marginal incumbents of the MSI had an 
experience of running for election prior to the previous one about 1.63 times more than 
marginal non-incumbents. 
These results suggest that the estimation results of incumbency advantage for the 
MSI may not be appropriate to be considered as a causal impact of incumbency on this 
party’s candidates.  Part of the estimates for this party may reflect a pre-election difference in 
the quality of marginal incumbents and non-incumbents.  For other parties, however, the 
results show that there is no significant difference in these pre-determined variables, 
suggesting that the RD estimates of incumbency advantage for these parties are valid. 
 
4.7. Alternative Explanation 
 The above empirical results for five developed democracies have shown variation in 
incumbency advantage of individual candidates across electoral institutions, consistent with 
the hypotheses.  A remaining question is whether an alternative explanation may be offered 
for the pattern found here.  In particular, I consider the argument presented by Morgenstern 
et al. (n.d.) in their discussion of the factors that might shape the variation across 
democracies in incumbents’ reelection rate.  Although the incumbents’ reelection rate is not 
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equivalent to incumbents’ electoral advantage, the factors affecting the former might also 
shape the latter.  Morgenstern et al. identified four such factors: the value of office, the 
resources available for incumbents, electoral volatility, and the ease of ballot access.  Of 
these, I consider the first three because the last factor, the ease of ballot access, is similar to 
the key institutional variable in this paper — the electoral-system features that affect intra-
party competition. 
Of the remaining three factors, the value of office and electoral volatility are unlikely 
to be the primary determinants of variation in incumbents’ advantage over non-incumbents 
because they are expected to affect both incumbents and non-incumbents in a similar way.  
First, when the office of the national parliament provides legislators with high prestige, salary, 
benefits and a great potential of affecting public policy and the society, incumbents should 
have greater incentives for reelection, but non-incumbents should also have greater 
incentives to work hard for getting elected.  As a result, the reelection rates of incumbents 
and non-incumbents should vary in a similar way across countries with different value of 
office, leaving little difference in the net electoral advantage of incumbents over non-
incumbents.  Second, Morgenstern et al. argue that highly volatile electoral competition 
would decrease incumbents’ reelection since it increases the electoral vulnerability of any 
incumbents and also discourages incumbents from returning to the race.  However, the 
volatility in party votes should affect the electoral fate of both incumbents and non-
incumbents of the same party in the same way, thereby leaving no difference in the 
advantage of incumbents over non-incumbents, holding their partisan affiliation constant. 
The remaining factor, the resources available for incumbents, is likely to affect 
variation in incumbency advantage.  If the legislature provides their members with a better 
access to the resources deployable for their reelectioneering efforts, such as strong 
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committees, budgetary pork, franking privileges, and the roll-call voting records, incumbents 
should also be more likely to succeed these efforts.  While the greater legislative resources 
increase incumbents’ reelection probability, they should either decrease non-incumbents’ 
winning probability or not affect it.  As a result, the greater resources will increase the net 
electoral advantage of incumbents.  The existing empirical studies of U.S. state legislatures 
bolster this expectation.  Multiple studies confirmed that the greater operating budget of U.S. 
state legislatures lead to the increase of both incumbents’ reelection rate (Berry et al. 2000, 
Carey et al. 2000) and incumbency advantage (Cox and Morgenstern 1993, 1995, Hirano and 
Snyder 2009, King 1991).  These prior studies suggest that the variation in legislative 
resources is a viable alternative explanation for varying incumbency advantage. 
 To assess the relative plausibility of this alternative explanation and the electoral-rule 
based theory of this paper, I focus on the estimated returning and winning probability of 
marginal incumbents and that of non-marginal incumbents (the estimated incumbency 
advantage is the difference between them), and explore how the variation in each 
component relates to the variation in the net advantage.  The variation in legislative 
resources primarily affects the reelection rate of incumbents and may or may not affect the 
winning rate of non-incumbents.  On the other hand, the greater degrees of intra-party 
competition, induced by electoral rules, necessarily influence non-incumbents’ returning and 
winning probability because more intense intra-party competition reduces competitive 
advantage of incumbents and therefore invites a greater challenge by high-quality non-
incumbent candidates.  If we find the variation in the estimated incumbency advantage is 
equally influenced by both incumbents’ and non-incumbents’ returning and winning 
probability, we cannot conclude either explanation is more plausible.  However, if the 
variation in the estimated incumbency advantage is produced mainly by the variation in the 
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estimated returning and winning probability of non-incumbents and little affected by that of 
incumbents, it provides evidence favoring the theoretical argument of this paper rather than 
the alternative explanation based on legislative resources.  On the other hand, if the variation 
in the estimated advantage is produced chiefly by the variation in the estimated returning and 
winning probability of incumbents and little influenced by that of non-incumbents, 
legislative resources rather than electoral rules may be the primary determinant of the 
variation in the estimated advantage.   
 Figure 4.4 depicts the estimated three probabilities for both marginal incumbents 
and non-incumbents, reported in Table 4.3.  Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 4.4 correspond to 
panels (a) to (c) in Figure 4.2, respectively.  The order of countries and the order of parties 
within each country are also the same as in Figure 4.2.  Black dots and gray bars represent 
the point estimates and the 90% confidence intervals of the three probabilities for 
incumbents at the threshold of the previous vote margin.   Gray dots and black bars show 
the point estimates and the 90% confidence intervals of the three probabilities for non-
incumbents at the threshold.  The differences between these two quantities in Figure 4.4 are 
the estimated incumbency advantages shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
[Figure 4.4 about here] 
 
All three panels in Figure 4.4 reveal a strikingly similar pattern.  First, there is not 
much variation in the estimated probabilities of marginal incumbents.  From the U.K. at the 
top of the panels to Japan at the end, there is neither increasing nor decreasing trend.  Rather, 
the estimated probabilities hover around a similar range, 40-60% in Pr(R∩W), 70-90% in 
Pr(R), 60-80% in Pr(W|R), with a few occasional outliers.  This pattern of the estimated 
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probabilities for incumbents in Figure 4.4 indicates that the resources available for 
incumbents are not large factors of the variation found in the estimated advantages of 
incumbents in Figure 4.2.  Second, the estimated probabilities for marginal non-incumbents 
increase as electoral rules allow for greater intra-party competition.  In the joint probability 
of returning and winning, Pr(R∩W), the estimated probabilities for non-incumbents are 
about 10-15% in SMD countries, but they grow to approximately 10-25% in Italy, 30-40% in 
Finland, and 60% in Japan.  Similarly, the estimates of other two probabilities, Pr(R) and 
Pr(W|R), increase as we move down the countries listed in panels (b) and (c).   
These findings suggest an important elaboration and clarification of the results from 
the main analysis: namely, the critical source of the pattern found for incumbency advantage 
in Figure 4.2 is the variation in each of the three probabilities of marginal non-incumbents.  
While there is little cross-country variation in the marginal incumbents’ propensity to run for 
reelection and win a seat, marginal non-incumbents are more likely to return to the race and 
win a seat as electoral rules allow for more intense intra-party competition.  These patterns 
are consistent with the theoretical argument of this paper that more intense intra-party 
competition reduces the competitive advantage of incumbents and therefore invites a greater 
challenge by high-quality non-incumbent candidates, which results in a reduced net electoral 
advantage for incumbents. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
 This chapter estimated incumbency advantage for individual candidates in three 
probabilities related to candidates’ election outcomes — the joint probability of returning to 
the race and winning a seat, the marginal probability of returning to the race, and the 
probability of winning a seat conditional on returning to the race — in the five developed 
 116 
democracies which use or had used various kinds of candidate-centered electoral rules 
(Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom).  The results showed that 
incumbency advantage for individual candidates is greater in SMD systems, in which intra-
party competition is not allowed in general elections, than in MMD systems that do allow for 
intra-party competition in general elections.  The results also demonstrated that as MMD 
rules facilitate more intense intra-party competition, incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates will become smaller. 
The results of this chapter extend those of Chapter 3, which focused on the 
empirical case of Japan under SNTV.  The existing literature on the intra-party aspect of 
electoral rules has shown that when electoral rules facilitate greater intra-party competition, 
they also provide individual politicians with greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote.  A 
natural expectation from this literature is that incumbency advantage would be greater as 
electoral rules allow for more intra-party competition.  Following Chapter 3, however, this 
chapter has provided empirical evidence for an argument contrary to this expectation.  
According to the findings, although intra-party competition induces personal-vote-building 
efforts of legislators, these efforts do not necessarily translate into actual electoral gains for 
incumbents, especially for those who marginally won in the previous election and therefore 




Table 4.1. Comparison of Hypothetical Election Results in SNTV and Open-List PR  











A a1  0.20 Win Win  0.30 Win Win 
 a2  0.20 Win Win  0.10 Lose Win 
B b  0.15 Lose Lose  0.15 Win Lose 
C c  0.20 Win Win  0.20 Win Win 





Table 4.2. Candidate-Level Electoral Dataset of the Five Developed Democracies 







SMD plurality     
   Canada Liberal Party 1953-2008 13 3593 
 Progressive Conservatives 1953-2000 11 2965 
     
   United Kingdom Conservative Party 1945-2005 11 6878 
 Labour Party 1945-2005 11 6851 
Open-list PR     
   Finland Social Democratic Party (SDP) 1958-2007 13 1712 
 National Coalition Party (KOK) 1958-2007 13 1559 
 Agrarian League (ML), Center Party (KESK) 1958-2007 13 1480 
 Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL), Left Alliance (VAS) 1958-2007 13 1351 
     
   Italy Christian Democrats (DC) 1948-1992 10 4407 
 Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 1953-1992 7 2763 
 Italian Communist Party (PCI) 1953-1987 8 3550 
 Italian Social Movement (MSI) 1948-1992 8 2220 
SNTV     
   Japan Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 1958-1993 12 3107 
 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 1958-1993 12   573 
     
Total   155 43009 
NOTE: The dataset is constructed from the following sources.  Canada: Parliament of Canada. History of Federal Ridings since 1867 
(http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/HFER/HFER.asp).  Finland: Tilastokeskus. Various years. Kansanedustajain Vaalit. Italy:  i) Miriam A. Golden. 
“Dataset on DC and PSI candidates and preference votes, Chamber of Deputies, Republic of Italy, Legislatures I-XI (1948-94)” 
(http://www.golden.polisci.ucla.edu/italy). Version posted 03/21/2007. ii) Ministero dell’ Interno. Various years. Elezioni Politiche.  iii) La Navicella. 
Various years. I Deputati e Senatori del nono Parlamento Repubblicano.  Japan: Steven R. Reed. Japan MMD Data Set (http://www.fps.chuo-
u.ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.html).  UK: i) The UK Electoral Commission. Election Results (http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/election-




Table 4.3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Incumbency Advantage 
 



























































































































































































































































































NOTE: All estimates are based on the regression of an outcome variable on an incumbency indicator (I), a 
third-order polynomial of the previous vote margin of victory (VM), and its interaction with an incumbency 
indicator (I).  Specifically, an outcome variable is regressed on VM, VM2, VM3, I, (I × VM), (I × VM2), and (I 
× VM3).  “Inc.” column presents the estimated values of an outcome variable for incumbent candidates at the 
threshold.  “Non-Inc.” column shows the estimated values of an outcome variable for non-incumbent 
candidates at the threshold.  “Inc. Adv.” presents the estimated incumbency advantage at the threshold.  




Table 4.4. Balance Tests of the Pre-Determined Variables 
 
  No. of Past Victories, 
Before Election t-1  
 
 
 No. of Past Attempts, 
Before Election t-1 
    
 Inc. Non-Inc. Diff. Inc. Non-Inc. Diff.    
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NOTE: All estimates are based on the regression of a pre-determined variable on an incumbency indicator (I), 
a third-order polynomial of the previous vote margin of victory (VM), and its interaction with an incumbency 
indicator (I).  Specifically, a pre-determined variable is regressed on VM, VM2, VM3, I, (I × VM), (I × VM2), 
and (I × VM3).  “Inc.” column presents the estimated values of a pre-determined variable for incumbent 
candidates at the threshold.  “Non-Inc.” column shows the estimated values of a pre-determined variable for 
non-incumbent candidates at the threshold.  “Diff.” presents the estimated difference of a pre-determined 




Figure 4.1. Examples of the Regression Discontinuity Estimation of Incumbency 
Advantage for Individual Candidates 
 
 
(a) Incumbency Advantage in the Joint Probability of  




(b) Incumbency Advantage in the Probability of  




NOTE: Each point represents a local average of an outcome variable in election t (y-axis) at 
an interval of 400 votes along the vote margin of victory in election t-1 (y-axis).  A thick 
curve draws a fitted value from the third-order polynomial fit.  Dashed curves are the 90% 
confidence intervals of the fitted value.  A dashed vertical line is the treatment threshold.  
The numbers in the figure show the estimated values of an outcome variable at each side of 
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Figure 4.2.  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Incumbency Advantage 
 
(a) Incumbency Advantage in  
     the Probability of Returning to  
     the Race and Winning,  
    Pr(R∩W), in Election t                  
(b) Incumbency Advantage in  
     the Probability of Returning to  
     the Race, Pr(R), in Election t                       
(c) Incumbency Advantage in  
     the Probability of Winning      
     Conditional on Returning to  
     the Race, Pr(W|R), in Election t 
 
 
NOTE: Each point represents a point estimate of incumbency advantage for each party, at the threshold of the previous vote margin, in 
terms of each probability related to candidates’ election outcomes.  A gray bar represents the 90% confidence interval for the estimate of 
incumbency advantage for each party.  A dashed horizontal line separates the parties for each country.  A vertical line represents no 





























































Figure 4.3.  Balance Tests of the Pre-Determined Variables 
 
(a) Number of Past Victories, 
      Before Election t-1                  
(b) Number of Past Attempts, 




NOTE: Each point represents a point estimate of the difference in each pre-determined variable for each party between incumbents and 
non-incumbents, at the threshold of the previous vote margin.  A gray bar represents the 90% confidence interval for the estimate of the 
difference for each party.  A dashed horizontal line separates the parties for each country.  A vertical line represents no difference in the 
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Figure 4.4.  Estimated Probabilities for Incumbents and Non-Incumbents at the Threshold of the Previous Vote Margin 
 
(a) Probability of Returning to  
     the Race and Winning,  
    Pr(R∩W), in Election t                  
(b) Probability of Returning to  
     the Race, Pr(R), in Election t                       
(c) Probability of Winning      
     Conditional on Returning to  
     the Race, Pr(W|R), in Election t 
 
                       Incumbents 
                       Non-Incumbents 
NOTE: Each black point represents a point estimate of one of the three probabilities related to candidates’ election outcomes for 
incumbents, at the threshold of the previous vote margin, for each party.  A gray bar represents the 90% confidence interval for the 
estimate for incumbents.  Each gray point represents a point estimate for non-incumbents and a black bar is its 90% confidence interval.  A 
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This dissertation has explored how the electoral advantage of incumbents varies 
across different electoral systems.  In particular, it has examined two types of incumbency 
advantage.  The first one is the electoral benefits that political parties gain from fielding 
incumbent candidates — which I call incumbency advantage for political parties.  The second 
one is the electoral advantage that incumbent candidates enjoy over non-incumbent 
candidates — incumbency advantage for individual candidates.  The main explanatory variable 
for both sorts of incumbency advantage is electoral systems, since they represent one of the 
fundamental differences in institutional frameworks of democratic polity, and they are 
known to influence the incentives for a personal vote, one of the primary sources of 
incumbency advantage.  For both types of incumbency advantage, the dissertation provides 
the first appropriate and comparable estimates across different electoral systems.  Moreover, 
it offers a theory of the impact of electoral systems on the variation in the magnitude of each 
type of incumbency advantage, which is built on the existing theory of the personal-vote 
incentive yet distinctive from it.  As more elaborated below, the predictions of the theory for 
each type of incumbency advantage show a stark contrast to the variation in the personal-
vote incentives across electoral systems.  The hypotheses derived from the theory are 
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examined and supported based on the most extensive and systematic cross-country 
comparative analysis, based on the district-level and candidate-level aggregate electoral data 
in ten developed democracies. 
In this chapter, I summarize the findings of the previous chapters and provide 
concluding discussions by highlighting various contributions of this dissertation.  The first 
two sections briefly review the findings of the dissertation. Section 5.2 covers the findings of 
Chapter 2 on incumbency advantage for political parties.  Section 5.3 summarizes the findings 
of Chapters 3 and 4 on incumbency advantage for individual candidates.  The rest of the chapter 
devotes itself to the discussion of various contributions that this dissertation makes.  In 
particular, I discuss the contributions related to the three distinctive literatures: incumbency 
advantage (Section 5.4), comparative electoral systems (5.5), and institutions and democratic 
accountability (5.6).  Then, I conclude with a brief discussion of the direction of future 
research in Section 5.7. 
 
5.2. Incumbency Advantage for Political Parties 
Chapter 2 examined incumbency advantage for political parties.  Based on the 
empirical analysis of district-level party votes in nine developed democracies — Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom — 
this chapter demonstrated that there is a sizable amount of electoral benefits to parties from 
fielding incumbent candidates, and the magnitude of advantage varies across electoral 
systems in a way previously unnoticed.  It was found that the incumbency advantage is larger 
under electoral systems with intra-party competition than those without it, and among 
systems with intra-party competition, the advantage declines as district magnitude grows.  
While smaller than in systems with intra-party competition, there is also a statistically 
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significant electoral advantage of running incumbents under single-member district (SMD) 
systems.  On the other hand, the estimated advantage under multimember district (MMD) 
systems with no intra-party competition is largely statistically insignificant.  However, the 
estimated advantages of SMD and MMD systems with no intra-party competition are not 
statistically distinguishable.  These findings suggest that an important difference in the 
magnitude of the electoral advantage of running incumbents lies between electoral rules with 
intra-party competition and those without it, and the difference dissipates as district 
magnitude grows. 
 
5.3. Incumbency Advantage for Individual Candidates 
Chapters 3 and 4 both analyzed incumbency advantage for individual candidates.  In 
particular, Chapter 3 focused on MMD systems with intra-party competition, under which 
the personal vote, one of the primary sources of incumbency advantage, is more important 
than under SMD systems.  While greater incumbency advantage may be naturally expected 
from the primacy of the personal vote in these MMD systems with intra-party competition, I 
presented a contrary argument that incumbents may have little advantage, or even a 
disadvantage, relative to non-incumbents of the same party, due to the particular nature of 
the competitive environments generated by intra-party competition.  I examined this 
argument empirically using electoral data from Japan during the 1958-1993 period when the 
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system was used to elect national representatives.  
Applying a regression-discontinuity analysis to the election outcomes of the candidates of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it was found that incumbents who had marginally won 
their seats in the previous election have an electoral disadvantage, measured both in vote 
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share and winning probability, compared to non-incumbents who had closely lost in the last 
election. 
Chapter 4 extended the theoretical argument of incumbency advantage for 
candidates and the empirical analysis of the Japanese case in Chapter 3 to comparative 
analysis of five developed democracies — Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom — which use or had used various candidate-centered electoral sytems, such as 
SMD plurality, SNTV, and open-list proportional representation (PR).  Specifically, I 
estimated incumbency advantage for individual candidates in the three probabilities related 
to candidates’ election outcomes — the joint probability of returning to the race and 
winning a seat, the marginal probability of returning to the race, and the probability of 
winning a seat conditional on returning to the race — in the five developed democracies.  
The results have shown that incumbency advantage for individual candidates is greater in 
SMD systems (SMD plurality in Canada and the U.K.), in which intra-party competition is 
not allowed in general elections, than in MMD systems that allow for intra-party competition 
(SNTV and open-list PR in Finland, Italy, and Japan).  The results have also demonstrated 
that as MMD rules facilitate more intense intra-party competition, incumbency advantage for 
individual candidates will become smaller.  In particular, in the three MMD countries 
covered by the analysis, incumbents’ advantage is the greatest in Italy, followed by Finland 
and Japan in this order. 
 
5.4. Comparative Incumbency Advantage 
Given the potential significance of its normative implications, incumbency advantage 
is regarded as an important subject to study.  Indeed, it is one of the most studied subjects in 
American politics.  While the normative concerns related to incumbency advantage are 
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applicable to any democracy, there have not been many studies on this subject for other 
democracies.  The existing literature on incumbency advantage has predominantly focused 
on U.S. elections, and if incumbency advantage is analyzed in other countries, it is conducted 
mostly for the countries using SMD electoral systems.  The analysis on incumbency 
advantage for other electoral systems is rare, and moreover, there is little systematic 
comparative study of this subject across multiple countries.  The first contribution of this 
dissertation to the literature on incumbency advantage is that it brings in a fully comparative 
perspective, by offering the most systematic and extensive comparative study of incumbency 
advantage to date. 
When we shift our attention to comparative analysis of incumbency advantage, the 
distinction of the two types of incumbency advantage — incumbency advantage for political 
parties and for individual candidates — becomes crucial.  This is because a sizable share of 
democracies uses electoral systems that allow for intra-party electoral competition of 
candidates, in which the electoral fates of political parties and their candidates potentially 
diverge.  In the existing SMD-focused or U.S.-centered literature, the distinction between 
these two types of incumbency advantage is little emphasized, perhaps because the electoral 
fates of parties and candidates largely coincide.  The distinction is important in its own right 
as each type of incumbency advantage represents a different substantive concept.  It is 
important also because each type of incumbency advantage has implications for different 
sort of electoral accountability.  Incumbency advantage for parties represents the extra 
advantage of parties from running incumbent candidates beyond their normal partisan 
electoral strength.  As long as the extra advantage insulates the parties from voters’ negative 
evaluation and the consequent electoral punishment on their collective performance, the 
advantage may diminish the collective electoral accountability of the parties.  Incumbency 
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advantage for candidates is the extra advantage of candidates from holding an incumbent 
seat beyond their normal electoral strength.  Insofar as the advantage makes difficult for 
voters to remove incumbents, the advantage may erode the individual electoral accountability 
of legislators.  The distinction of the two types of incumbency advantage also highlights the 
potential conflict of electoral interests between party leaders and individual incumbents.  
Bringing this distinction to the center place is the second important contribution of this 
dissertation to the literature of incumbency advantage. 
The third contribution of this dissertation is that it developed appropriate and 
comparable estimates of both types of incumbency advantage.  While the estimation of 
incumbency advantage in the SMD systems is well studied and developed, the estimation in 
the MMD systems is less sophisticated and less systematically conducted.  As a consequence, 
there have been no appropriate and comparable estimates of incumbency advantage across 
SMD and MMD systems in the literature.  This dissertation proposed novel estimates of 
both types of incumbency advantage, which are appropriate to their concepts and 
comparable across electoral systems.  This makes it possible to conduct, for the first time, 
fully comparative, cross-system analysis of incumbency advantage.   
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is that it provided a theoretical account 
for the variation in the magnitude of both types of incumbency advantage across electoral 
systems.  The literature has so far lacked a coherent theory for the cross-system variation in 
incumbency advantage.  There are a few studies on incumbency advantage which cover 
multiple countries (Somit et al. 1994, Morgenstern et al. n.d.); however, none of them have 
ever developed a fully systematic theoretical account for the variation in incumbency 
advantage across electoral systems.  This dissertation is indeed the first to develop an 
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extensive, comparative theory of the impact of electoral systems on the magnitude of both 
types of incumbency advantage. 
The fifth contribution of this dissertation is that it provided the most extensive and 
detailed cross-national empirical analysis of incumbency advantage for both types of 
incumbency advantage to date.  The empirical analysis of incumbency advantage for political 
parties was conducted based on the district-level party vote data in nine developed 
democracies — Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and 
the United Kingdom.  The empirical analysis of incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates was carried out based on the candidate-level vote data in five developed 
democracies — Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  In the past 
literature, there has been no single study which examined incumbency advantage in multiple 
countries across different electoral systems based on the district-level or candidate-level vote 
data.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing by far the most extensive 
and detailed cross-national empirical analysis. 
 
5.5. Comparative Electoral Systems 
This dissertation has focused on electoral systems as a key explanatory variable for 
the variation in incumbency advantage, and therefore it is also relevant for the broader 
literature on comparative electoral systems.  Electoral systems are primary suspects of the 
factors influencing the variation in incumbency advantage because the literature on 
comparative electoral systems suggests that the difference in electoral rules affects the 
variation in politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote, which is one of the main 
sources of incumbency advantage (Carey and Shugart 1995).  This dissertation’s link to the 
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comparative literature on electoral systems is through its relationship to the literature on 
electoral systems and personal-vote incentives. 
The majority of the past studies in the literature on comparative electoral systems 
have focused on party competition or the inter-party aspect of electoral competition (Shugart 
2005).  These studies have examined, for example, and especially, the impact of electoral 
rules on party systems and vote-seat proportionality (e.g., Cox 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 
1989).  More recently, a newer generation of studies has emerged to extend the scope of 
analysis to the intra-party aspect of electoral competition (Shugart 2005).  The workhorse 
theory in this new generation of research is the theory of the impact of electoral rules on the 
incentives for cultivating a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995).  A number of empirical 
studies have appeared and examined the relationship between electoral systems and 
personal-vote incentives.  However, there is little systematic cross-country evidence of the 
impact of electoral systems on election outcomes that reflect personal votes cultivated by 
candidates (Shugart 2005).  Most empirical analyses in this literature have not assessed 
election outcomes directly but instead used various proxies of personal-vote incentives as 
dependent variables, such as the type of bills initiated by legislators (Cirsp et al. 2004), 
incidence of corruption (Chang and Golden 2006), and legislators’ local attributes (Shugart et 
al. 2005).  These dependent variables used in the past studies have been “at least once 
removed from the proximal effect of the electoral system” that should be found in actual 
election outcomes (Shugart 2005).  The first contribution of this dissertation to the literature on 
comparative electoral systems is that it provides the cross-country, direct evidence of the 
impact of electoral systems on election outcomes that reflect personal votes cultivated by 
candidates. 
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The literature on comparative electoral systems suggests that electoral systems 
influence politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote, and the past literature on 
incumbency advantage indicates that the personal vote constitutes one of the main 
components of incumbency advantage.  One natural expectation from this line of reasoning 
is that incumbency advantage for either parties or candidates may vary across electoral 
systems in the same way as the personal-vote incentives.  However, there are reasons to 
believe that this may not be necessarily so.  First, greater incentives for the personal vote of 
individual candidates do not necessarily translate into greater vote gains even for these 
candidates themselves.  Insofar as some features of electoral systems prevent the effective 
translation of personal-vote incentives into actual electoral gains to incumbents, the variation 
in incumbency advantage for individual candidates across electoral systems diverge from the 
variation in personal-vote incentives.  Second, even when the personal-vote-building efforts 
of individual incumbents lead to actual electoral gains for them (incumbency advantage for 
candidates), these gains do not necessarily lead to extra gains to their parties beyond the parties’ 
baseline electoral strength (incumbency advantage for parties).   
Careful theoretical considerations in Chapters 2 to 4 suggest that the relationship 
between incumbency advantage and individual politicians’ incentives for the personal vote is 
not simple.  Indeed, the theoretically expected variation in both types of incumbency 
advantage is different from the variation in the personal-vote incentives in an important way.   
While the theory of incumbency advantage for parties predicts that the variation across three 
major categories of electoral systems — SMD, MMD with intra-party competition, and 
MMD with no intra-party competition — coincides with the variation in the personal-vote 
incentives, it also suggests that the variation across districts with different district magnitudes 
in MMD systems with intra-party competition diverges from the theory of personal-vote 
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incentives.  Under systems with intra-party competition, incumbency advantage for parties 
declines as district magnitude grows, opposed to the personal-vote incentives, which increase 
as district magnitude grows.  Similarly, the theory of incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates predicts that the advantage declines as electoral rules permit greater degree of 
intra-party competition.  This also contradicts with the personal-vote incentives, which 
increase as electoral systems facilitate more intense intra-party competition.   
These theoretical expectations are supported by empirical evidence based on the 
cross-national analysis.  The development and empirical verification of these new theories on 
the relationship between electoral systems and the two types of incumbency advantage is the 
second important contribution of this dissertation to the literature on comparative electoral 
systems.  It also demonstrated that personal-vote incentives do not always translate into 
actual personal votes, which should be an important distinction when we consider the 
relationship among electoral institutions, politicians’ electoral incentives, and actual election 
outcomes. 
 
5.6. Institutions and Democratic Accountability 
Although the main contribution of this dissertation is the theoretical and empirical 
demonstration of the variation in the two sorts of incumbency advantage across electoral 
systems, the results also have profound implications for broader themes of democratic 
institutions and electoral accountability.  The analysis of incumbency advantage for political 
parties in Chapter 2 offers implications for the erosion of the collective accountability of 
political parties.  The collective accountability of parties can be maintained as long as the 
poorly performing parties — for example, those which failed to deliver their promises or 
were engaged in corruptions — lose their votes in the subsequent elections.  However, the 
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extra votes that parties earn from fielding incumbent candidates, beyond what they could 
earn from their collective reputation, could offset such vote loss of the poorly performing 
parties.  For this reason, if the electoral advantage for parties of running incumbent 
candidates is large, the collective accountability of political parties may be eroded.  The 
analysis in Chapter 2 reveals that electoral systems affect the variation in the magnitude of 
incumbency advantage for parties.  From this result, we can draw implications for the 
relationship between electoral systems and the erosion of the collective accountability of 
political parties. 
  Similarly, the analysis of incumbency advantage for individual candidates in 
Chapters 3 and 4 offers implications for the individual accountability of legislators.  Insofar 
as individual candidates can earn a large extra electoral advantage from holding an 
incumbent seat, they are less likely to lose in elections, other things being equal.  This means 
that the electoral advantage of incumbents reduces the effectiveness of voters’ punishment 
on incumbent legislators, suggesting that the individual accountability of legislators may be 
eroded if the advantage is large.  The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 shows an important 
variation in the magnitude of incumbency advantage for candidates across electoral systems.  
These results offer implications for the relationship between the electoral systems and the 
individual accountability of legislators. 
Furthermore, if we consider the analysis of both types of incumbency advantage 
together, we can also draw implications for the relationship between electoral systems and 
the balance between the collective and individual accountability. 
In the rest of this section, I first discuss the implications from the analysis of 
incumbency advantage for political parties for the collective electoral accountability of parties 
(5.6.1).  Then, I discuss the implications from the analysis of incumbency advantage for 
 136 
individual candidates for the individual electoral accountability of legislators (5.6.2).  Finally, I 
also deal with the implications for the balance between these two types of electoral 
accountability (5.6.3). 
 
5.6.1. Incumbency Advantage for Political Parties and the Collective Electoral 
Accountability 
 
The findings of Chapter 2 on incumbency advantage for political parties have 
important implications for our understanding of democratic elections and the collective 
responsibility of parties.  Through casting a ballot in elections, voters delegate collective 
mandates to incoming government parties such as remedying an economic malaise and 
enacting important policies that solve pressing issues in the society.  Voters also try to hold 
their government accountable by voting against governing parties that managed economies 
poorly, were involved in corruption scandals or deviated heavily from their policy promises.  
However, to the extent that parties earn extra electoral gains from fielding incumbent 
candidates, these functions of democratic elections based on the collective responsibility of 
political parties may be compromised.  The findings of Chapter 2 have shown that this 
concern is indeed real.  For electoral systems with intra-party competition and low district 
magnitude, such as STV and SNTV, under which the greatest incumbency advantage is 
found, the aggregate advantage for parties of running incumbents is simulated, based on the 
estimated models, to be as large as two-fifths to four-fifths of the average vote loss of 
government parties due to the economic vote.  The sheer magnitude of the gains of parties 
implies that the collective accountability and mandate-giving mechanisms of democratic 
elections may be substantially undermined by incumbency advantage under these electoral 
systems. 
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This research also indicates an important variation across electoral systems in the 
erosion of the collective accountability and mandate-giving roles of elections.  The problem 
becomes small if we move our attention to electoral systems without intra-party competition.  
Even within electoral systems with intra-party competition, the problem is less acute if 
district magnitude in a country is, on average, large.  An important point here is that the 
cross-system variation found in Chapter 2 is different from the previously established 
relationship between electoral systems and individual politicians’ incentives for a personal 
vote.  If we drew institutional implications for the collective mandate and accountability of 
parties from the theory of the personal-vote incentives, we would wrongly conclude that the 
collective mandate and accountability are less eroded under low-district-magnitude systems 
than high-district-magnitude systems when electoral systems allow intra-party competition, 
since individual politicians’ incentives for the personal vote increase as district magnitude 
grows.  As this study has shown, however, individual incumbents’ incentives for the personal 
vote are not directly translated into the electoral benefits for their parties.  It is under low-
district-magnitude systems, rather than high-magnitude systems, that political parties most 
benefit from incumbents’ personal vote, and therefore, the collective mandate and 
accountability of the parties are most negatively affected.  This previously unnoticed 
variation across electoral systems improves our knowledge about the electoral rules’ impacts 
on the effectiveness of democratic elections. 
The findings of Chapter 2 also inform real-world practitioners, such as reformers 
who try to change the existing electoral rules in established democracies and policy experts 
who advise the crafting of electoral institutions in newly democratizing countries, of 
important implications for a choice of electoral systems.  To the extent that citizens and 
drafters of electoral rules value the collective mandate and accountability of governing 
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parties or the collective responsibility of political parties more generally, they should avoid 
electoral systems with intra-party competition.  Of course, those who draft or reform 
electoral rules may have other concerns and do not want to completely avoid intra-party 
competition, if it may well serve these concerns.  For example, in a country using a closed-
list PR system, citizens may demand more direct linkage between them and individual 
representatives.  In response, reformers may consider introducing preferential votes for 
individual candidates or increasing the usability of these votes, if these votes are already in 
place but ineffective, which lead to the introduction or intensification of intra-party 
competition.  A recommendation for these reformers derived from this study is that they 
should also consider increasing district magnitude, if it is small, to avoid the collective 
responsibility of political parties from eroding too much.   
Another example of implications of this study for electoral-system design concerns a 
recent proposal of an optimal electoral system by Carey and Hix (2009).  Much of the 
literature has focused on two central but conflicting objectives of electoral systems: a highly 
representative parliament and an accountable government (e.g., Lijphart 1994, Powell 2000).  
PR systems produce a parliament that closely reflects diverse interests in the society while 
generating a fragmented, unstable coalition government, which is difficult to be made 
accountable to voters.  On the other hand, majoritarian systems tend to create a unified, 
stable government, which can more easily be made accountable, while producing a 
parliament in which a winning part of the society may be disproportionately represented.  
The literature has so far depicted the design of electoral institutions as a choice between 
these two systems, each of which serves one objective while sacrificing the other.  On the 
contrary, Carey and Hix (2009) argue that the low-district-magnitude electoral systems are the 
best to balance these two conflicting objectives, by remedying high disproportionality of 
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majoritarian systems yet fostering relatively less-fragmented, less-complex coalition 
governments.  From the findings of this study, however, we can see that government 
accountability will still be substantially compromised if the low-district-magnitude systems 
allow intra-party competition.  Creating low-district-magnitude districts may be a necessary 
condition, but not sufficient to strike the best balance between representativeness and 
government accountability.  If designers of electoral systems follow the advice of Carey and 
Hix, the present study suggests that they should not introduce intra-party competition to 
prevent the benefit in government accountability from being eroded by the personal vote of 
incumbents. 
 
5.6.2. Incumbency Advantage for Individual Candidates and the Individual Electoral 
Accountability of Legislators 
 
This subsection offers a discussion of the implications of the findings of Chapters 3 
and 4 on “incumbency advantage for individual candidates” for the individual electoral 
accountability across different electoral systems.  In the traditional, SMD-centered literature, 
mostly based on U.S. elections, incumbency advantage is a subject of concern since it is 
taken to diminish electoral accountability.  When incumbents have a certain advantage, it 
insulates them from any negative national vote swing to their party, making it more difficult 
for voters to remove those incumbents.  On the other hand, in MMD countries, which allow 
for intra-party competition, marginal incumbents gain a smaller advantage than in SMD 
countries or some of them even suffer a disadvantage.  These marginal incumbents are less 
protected from negative swings to their parties than their counterparts in SMD countries.  
Furthermore, even when there is no negative swing to their parties, incumbents in MMD 
 140 
systems with intra-party competition are still vulnerable to the challenge of non-incumbents 
from the same party. 
This may be interpreted that electoral systems with intra-party competition exhibit 
greater individual electoral accountability, in the sense that holding an incumbent seat and 
taking advantage of the resources available for incumbents do not necessarily insulate these 
incumbents from the competitive electoral pressures.  Allowing for a larger degree of intra-
party competition means the increase of candidate-centeredness of electoral rules.  Therefore, we 
may infer from the greater individual electoral accountability, manifested in a smaller electoral 
advantage of marginal incumbents, that the primary purpose of the design of the rules with 
intra-party competition is fulfilled. 
Normative implications of this kind of greater individual electoral accountability are 
mixed, however.  Incumbents in MMD with intra-party competition have a smaller 
advantage, despite their greater efforts to take advantage of the resources available for them in 
cultivating a personal vote (these greater efforts are evidenced in many previous studies such 
as Chang and Golden 2006 and Crisp et al. 2004).  To win a reelection bid, these vulnerable 
incumbents may have no choice but further boost their efforts to cater to their personal 
supporters.  This could lead to “excessive accountability” of individual incumbents to their 
personal followers in the electorate, which might result in various negative consequences.  
For example, vulnerable incumbents in candidate-centered systems with intra-party 
competition may irresponsibly distribute pork-barrel projects to their constituents to greater 
extent, leaving inefficient resource allocation or enormous fiscal burden on the government 
(Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, Scheiner 2006).  They may also tend to commit to 
corruption more frequently in order to benefit their personal supporters (Chang and Golden 
2006) or to survive the severe electoral competition (Nyblade and Reed 2008).  In addition, 
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incumbents’ “excessive accountability” to their personal followers would also erode the 
coherence and discipline of their party, thereby degrading the collective accountability of 
political parties. 
These considerations suggest that when we expand our scope of analysis on 
incumbency advantage from a traditional SMD focus to comparative analysis across electoral 
systems, the normative implications of incumbency advantage become multifaceted.  In the 
SMD systems, the normative implications of incumbency advantage and accountability are 
relatively straightforward.  A greater incumbency advantage raises concerns about both 
collective and individual electoral accountability and smaller advantages would diminish 
symmetrically both concerns.  In the MMD systems that allow for intra-party competition, 
however, not only does a greater incumbency advantage raise the concerns about both types 
of electoral accountability, as in SMD systems, but also little advantage or a disadvantage 
may lead to the concerns about excessive individual accountability, which may result in various 
negative consequences also including the degradation of the collective party accountability.  
Among the three MMD countries covered in Chapter 4, Italy may have exemplified the 
former case, in which a relatively large, positive incumbency advantage raises the concerns of 
the erosion of both collective and individual accountability.  Japan may have exemplified the 
latter case, in which little advantage or a disadvantage might have resulted in excessive 
individual accountability.   
Although these considerations complicate normative justification for electoral 
systems with intra-party competition, it would be premature to abandon these systems 
altogether on the grounds that they could lead to both the erosion of electoral accountability 
and excessive individual accountability.  There may be a situation in which it is desirable to 
introduce intra-party competition and increase individual electoral accountability.  For 
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example, in many Latin American countries that use the closed-list PR system, the perceived 
problem is too strong party leaders, and many political reforms considered to date include 
measures to increase individual collective accountability, which necessarily include the 
introduction of some form of intra-party competition (Carey 2009).  A relevant question 
here is whether it is possible, by engineering either electoral or non-electoral institutional 
arrangements, to achieve some appealing middle ground, at which individual electoral 
accountability is effectively maintained while excessive accountability is relatively avoided.  In 
the three MMD countries covered in Chapter 4, Finland seems to have achieved a modest 
level of incumbency advantage, but whether this translates into an ideal middle ground in 
terms of electoral accountability is unknown.  To explore a way to achieve this goal would be 
one of the important future agenda in the comparative electoral-systems research. 
 
5.6.3. Balance between the Collective and Individual Accountability 
Taken together, the analyses on incumbency advantage for political parties and for 
individual candidates have implications for the balance between the collective and individual 
electoral accountability.  In the modern democratic polity, we can conceive of two types of 
electoral accountability — the collective accountability of political parties and the individual 
accountability of legislators.  Particular institutional arrangements of democracy may 
emphasize either one of collective or individual accountability or may strike an ideal balance 
between them.  How these two types of accountability are weighted or balanced under 
specific institutions is an important question for understanding how democracy works and 
for designing and assessing democratic institutions.  
If we consider the results of Chapters 2 to 4 together, the electoral systems in the 
countries covered in this dissertation seem to generally satisfy the purpose of their particular 
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designs.  The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that incumbency advantage for political parties 
will be greater and therefore, the collective accountability of parties may be more 
compromised when electoral rules allow for intra-party competition.  Similarly, incumbency 
advantage for parties will be smaller and thus, the collective accountability may be more 
effectively maintained when electoral rules do not allow for intra-party competition.  The 
purpose of introducing intra-party competition can be understood as shifting the emphasis 
of accountability from the collective accountability of parties to the individual accountability 
of legislators.  Therefore, the cross-system variation found in incumbency advantage for 
parties and its implications for the collective accountability of parties are consistent with the 
purpose of these electoral systems. 
 The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 revealed that incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates will be smaller as electoral systems allow more intense intra-party competition.  
As already discussed above, this can be interpreted that the individual accountability of 
legislators may be more effectively maintained, exactly when voters are more encouraged to 
evaluate individual candidates and individual candidates have greater incentives to compete 
on their personal appeal.  Again, this suggests that the cross-system variation found in 
incumbency advantage for candidates and its implication for the individual accountability of 
legislators are consistent with the purpose of these electoral systems.  As detailed in the 
previous subsection, however, a caveat here is that little or negative incumbency advantage 
in electoral systems with high intra-party competitiveness may indicate the excessive individual 
accountability of legislators to their personal supporters.  
With these implications, this dissertation also contributes to the emerging literature 
on the balance between collective and individual accountability (Carey 2009). 
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5.7. Direction of Future Research 
 As a final remark, I offer a brief discussion of the potential direction of future 
research on comparative incumbency advantage.  This dissertation provides the most 
comprehensive, systematic, comparative analysis of incumbency advantage to date and 
proves that the topic is worthy of study from a comparative perspective.  However, this 
dissertation may simply be the first step of systematic comparative analysis of incumbency 
advantage.  There are many other important questions related to this issue, which still await 
further scholarly attention.  I list the four possible directions of future research below. 
First, the comparison of incumbency advantage may be extended to other major 
categories of electoral systems — most importantly, to Mixed-Member systems that have 
both SMD- and PR-tiers and allow voters to cast a ballot for each of them.  This dissertation 
covered the three major categories of electoral systems — SMD systems, MMD systems 
with intra-party competition, and MMD systems with no intra-party competition.  While 
these three categories cover a large share of the electoral systems used in democratic 
countries, they by no means cover all the existing electoral systems.  The most important 
omission is the Mixed-Member systems, which are an increasingly popular electoral-system 
type these days.  One variant of the Mixed-Member systems has been used in Germany for 
the entire postwar period, and other types of the Mixed-Member systems have been adopted 
recently in many other countries.  For example, three developed democracies covered in this 
dissertation, Italy, Japan, and New Zealand, changed their electoral systems to a version of 
the Mixed-Member systems during the 1990s.  The extension of the analysis to this 
important electoral-system type further will enrich our knowledge on the electoral systems, 
incumbency advantage, and electoral accountability. 
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Second, the source of cross-country variation can be explored beyond the electoral 
systems.  There are many other factors, which may potentially influence either incumbency 
advantage for political parties or incumbency advantage for individual candidates, including 
the presidential-parliamentary difference in democratic regimes, the professionalization of 
legislatures, and the parliamentary resources available for incumbent legislators for 
reelectioneering.  The influence of some of these factors was examined and rejected as 
alternative explanations for the variation reported in this dissertation (e.g., the potential 
impact of the resources available for incumbents on incumbency advantage for individual 
candidates in Chapter 4).  However, more comprehensive inquiry into these potential 
determinants of the cross-country variation in incumbency advantage, perhaps with the 
expansion of country cases, should be one of the promising directions of future research.  
Third, contextual factors which may create the within-country (or within-system) variation 
in the magnitude of incumbency advantage can also be explored.  This dissertation focuses 
on the variation across electoral systems, and therefore, focused on the average incumbency 
advantage under each system.  However, there may be important within-country or within-
system variation in the magnitude of incumbency advantage for political parties or for 
individual candidates.  For example, the advantage may be greater when a party is part of the 
governing coalition prior to an election due to better access to government resources than 
among the opposition.  It may also be greater for senior incumbents than junior incumbents 
because senior incumbents’ greater bargaining power in the legislature may allow them to 
exploit a greater share of resources deployable for reelectioneering activities.  Institutional 
structures, such as candidate selection rules, or other characteristics of parties may also affect 
the variation in the advantage across political parties.   
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Fourth, the coverage of countries may be expanded to include more diverse cases.  
This dissertation has focused on developed democracies, but the same topic can also be 
pursued in democracies in the developing world.  A limited set of analyses on incumbency 
advantage in developing countries showed that incumbents do not necessarily enjoy an 
electoral advantage even in SMD systems, in which their counterparts can expect an 
advantage in developed democracies (Linden 2004, Titiunik 2008, Uppal 2010).  In these 
existing studies, the difference is attributed to the peculiarities of electoral environments in 
developing countries, such as the weak institutionalization of party systems, electoral 
volatility, and higher incentives for rent extraction.  Extending comparative analysis to a 
greater number of developing countries would introduce many interesting factors for the 
cross-system variation and also may alter the substantive meaning and the implications of 
incumbency advantage, due to the particular nature of political environments in developing 
world.   
The extension of the current study to these questions will further enrich our 
understanding of the relationship among political institutions and contexts, the electoral 
advantage of incumbency, and the effectiveness of democratic elections.  Of course, there 
may be many other ways to extend comparative analysis of incumbency advantage.  Given 
the importance of normative implications of incumbency advantage for democratic 
governance, a further investigation into this subject from comparative perspectives merits 
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